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Russia’s Syria strategy and consequences of the Su-24 incident
Russia’s Syria strategy and consequences of the Su-24 incident
The commencement of Russia’s military operation in Syria has caught not only ISIS off guard, but also most Western intelligence services and analysts. Russia’s ability to alter the strategic situation on the ground with minimum efforts and maximum «maskirovka» (disguising) deserves appreciation. However, Moscow fights ISIS not out of noble consideration, but rather from a practical issue of Russian national security.
Russian security connection with Syria
Russia has been weighing its involvement since at least 2013 when it first proposed to replace outgoing Austrian peacekeepers with Russians in the Golan Heights. Since 2013, Moscow took a major role in disarming Syria of chemical weapons; the first serious contacts with Damascus on battling Islamists also started then. Parallel to this, Russia engaged in a strategic military dialogue with Iraq, reaching a 4.2 billion USD weapon deal with Baghdad in 2012 and supplying much needed Su-25 fighters in 2014. In July 2015, Russia reached an agreement with Iran to join efforts in securing victory for Syria in the battle against ISIS. From that time, the question of assaulting ISIS was not an «if», but a «when» and «how.» The Ukraine crisis did not change the calculus, but postponed the move.
Security interests at stake motivated Russian agitation. Allowing ISIS to consolidate its control in Syria and Iraq would mean that, in 5 years, a new spurt of well-prepared terrorists would return to the North Caucasus and Central Asia. By Russian estimates, as many as 5000 of the 70,000 ISIS fighters are Russian and CIS natives. Thinking strategically, the effort of battling them in the Middle East will deliver bigger long-term gains at a relatively low-cost as opposed to facing them in combat at home.
Limited involvement strategy
The Russian strategy in Syria has two scenarios. The first one is limited in scope and posture. Its advantage is that by applying minimum resources and keeping the bar low, Moscow still gets a lot in return.
First, Russia can disrupt the terrorist infrastructure and prevent it from holding ground without the necessity of defeating it completely. North Caucasian terrorists are eliminated at home, but in Syria’s «no man’s land» they can rebuild training facilities and launch the export of terror to Russia as they did in Afghanistan under the Taliban.
Second, Moscow seeks to sustain a friendly regime in Syria. Russia can — but necessarily will — invest in its first major military naval facility in the Mediterranean and secure primacy in gas extraction projects on Syrian, Cypriot and Israeli shelves.
Third, Russia is asserting itself as a leading Middle East power capable of effective expeditionary military operations. Before that, no one else besides the U.S. could have projected power so far from its borders. In Syria, Russia has displayed its renewed ability to affect events in far-away regions and thus significantly changed calculus in the Middle Eastern capitals. By hitting ISIS in Syria with cruise missiles launched from the Caspian Sea, Russia also cemented its presence in that region.
Lastly, the Syrian operation is an exhibition of Russian armament, satellite communication and the geolocation system GLONASS — its lethally effectiveness, highly-preciousness and entirely reliability. This show is staged primarily for the customers of the biggest and fastest growing weapon market in the world — Middle Eastern countries. However, it also certifies that Russia maintains full sovereignty in matters of the 21st century war.
Shifting attention from Ukraine to Syria was not among Moscow’s top aims, but since it is happening as a consequence of recent events we can also consider this as one of Russia’s gains.
Extensive involvement possibility
The above-mentioned goals are the minimum achievements Russia can accomplish, provided its bombing campaign goes smoothly. The high bar of the second strategy is bigger — and riskier — than this. And it promises less.
With assistance from Syria, Iraq and Iran, Russia can aspire to defeat and eliminate ISIS in the region, including its CIS fighters. If attained, this monumental achievement would pave the way for the restoration of the traditional borders of Syria and Iraq and secure their allegiance to Russia for the future. Bringing stability to Syria and Iraq will mean fostering conditions to normalize life there. This will relieve the refugee Syrian crisis in the region and the European Union.
However, these challenges can be realistically tackled only by applying much more formidable resources and in coordination with a broader coalition, which should include Western powers, Turkey and Arab states of the Persian Gulf. In the absence of the latter, the second scenario benchmarks are bigger than Moscow’s current plan.
Resource management for the war with ISIS
Does Russia have sufficient resources to control the circumstances in Syria?
Moscow secured full support of Syria, Iraq and Iran, and can now act independently from the West — and Turkey. Russian allies are vitally interested in battling ISIS and were doing so prior to Moscow’s engagement. It seems that by numbers, Russia is the least involved partner in this coalition, yet its participation is decisive.
Russia’s military resources are sufficient to maintain an effective long-term commitment in Syria. Moscow’s operation is quite limited in scope and posture. During the annual news conference in December 2015, Vladimir Putin disclosed that the funding for the operation comes from the Ministry of Defense funds for training and exercises. He added that regarding operation in Syria, «It is difficult to think of a better training exercise. So, in principle, we can keep training for quite a long time there without unduly denting our budget.» Critics forget that Russia was deeply involved in conflict management in Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan in the 1990s when the Russian economy was particularly weak.
Most importantly, at home the Russian Sunni community’s (approx. 14 million people) leaders support the Kremlin’s move and defy ISIS ideology. In September 2015, Russia opened the biggest European Sunni Mosque in Moscow, strengthening support from Muslim clergy. Attending the opening ceremony Vladimir Putin expressed confidence that the mosque would help disseminate the «humanistic ideas and true values of Islam» in Russia and accused the «so-called Islamic State» of «compromising the great world religion of Islam.»
The risks of the involvement
The gains from the Syrian move seem to be solid for Russia. So are the risks. The path into Syria was marvelous, but the way out may be more difficult.
First, Russia risks deteriorating ties with an important regional partner, Turkey. Ankara is interested in having Assad go, and using the fight against ISIS to suppress the Kurdish militia on the Syrian part of the border. Despite claims that politics do not interfere with economic relations between the countries, the start of the ambitious «Turkish stream» gas pipeline was rescheduled for 2017. The incident with Russian Su-24 dramatically decreased relations between the two countries and will probably have a long lasting effect. This is not the first time Russia and Turkey have had differences on regional issues, and they have been able to manage to avoid confrontation in the past — but not now.
Second, Russia can get stuck in Syria, as did the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. That is why Moscow is acting only after careful considerations with viable local allies and a clear exit strategy. Having had both the Afghanistan and Chechnya experience, Russia is well prepared for a low-intensity war dynamic.
The most important risk, though, is that Russia could be dragged into a regional Sunni-Shia conflict on the Shia side. Having a Sunni majority in Russia, Moscow should be particularly careful. Critics say that in fighting ISIS, Russia is bound to confront all Sunnis in the region. This would essentially mean that all Sunnis support ISIS — and that is not true.
This issue is taking us to the point that is currently lacking in Russia’s Syrian strategy: viable Sunni opposition to ISIS. Well-aware of its Chechen conflict experience, Russia would search for a resolution to the Syrian civil war by allying with a potent local Sunni leader who would join the battle against terrorists. If such a Sunni potentate emerges triumphant, he would eventually fill the power vacuum left by ISIS, much like Ramzan Kadyrov did in Chechnya.
Applying the Chechen scenario in Syria is very tricky, but it is the only way to reach a deep and comprehensive settlement in the war-torn country. That is the reason why Russia thinks that the French proposal to unite Syrian government efforts with a «healthy opposition» in the Free Syrian Army is an «interesting idea that is worth a try.»
Consequences of the attack on Su-24
The military collision with Turkey was a blind side in Russia’s Syria strategy. In Moscow, nobody — literally, nobody — expected Ankara to use force against a Russian plane for any reason. Turkey was widely perceived as a strategic partner whose interests (including the most delicate ones) will be accommodated in the outcome of the events. Throughout the years, the two leaders — Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan — have developed an unprecedented level of trust. Sadly, this will now come to an end. In the skies above Syria, the Russian-Turkish strategic partnership has been hit.
I do not share the beliefs of my Turkish colleagues who state that the incident will eventually lead to more stable relations with Russia. On the contrary, the attack will have consequences far beyond the Syrian crisis. If Ankara’s motive in the incident was to send Moscow a signal to start considering its interests, it has achieved the opposite. The Kremlin sees Ankara’s move as an open challenge, not an incident.
A question mark now rises over strategic issues like energy transit, nuclear power cooperation, and, most importantly, regional security. Escalation of tensions can, in the worst-case scenario. lead to a limited military confrontation. Speaking at the open session of the Defense Ministry Board in early December, Putin ordered that the Russian military hit back against any targets that pose threats to Russian forces in Syria. Most importantly, he demanded that the recently adopted «Russian Defense Plan 2016-2020» be revised, stating that the «situation throughout the world is changing quickly.» Next year Russia will conduct its Kavkaz-2016 strategic exercises in the Caucasus, in which the main emphasis will be on preparing personnel to operate in mountainous areas.
Forced to pick the lesser evil, the best option now seems to be a «cold war» in the Black Sea with clandestine support for each other’s adversaries. In this situation, Russia will ignore any Turkish interest south of its borders.
The perspective for a settlement between Ankara and Moscow seems distant and elusive. For now, the interests of the two countries have collided in Syria. If Turkish leadership is indeed challenging Russia, we are on a very slippery slope. The real task now is to do damage control and prevent incidents from developing into a regional war.
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