The Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security was established in 2004. It is a part of the Scientific Council for Coordination of International Studies (NKSMI) of MGIMO. Its tasks include research and analysis in the field of the Euro-Atlantic security, preparing papers and analytical reports for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) structures, Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Centre organizes international conferences and seminars, publishes scientific books and articles.

The Center has established relations with many analytical structures of the CIS countries, as well as with different American, European and Asian scientific organizations.

Some of the Centre projects are conducted in cooperation with the Independent Centre for Peace and International Studies and the Russian Political Science Association.

The subjects of the Center’s studies include:
- international security architecture,
- relations of Russia and the CSTO with NATO and the EU,
- peace-keeping operations and conflict settling,
- nuclear policy, international Programs and Treaties on reduction and restriction of arms,
- new threats and challenges to international security.

Alexander I. Nikitin is the Director of the Center. Alexander Nikitin is the chairman of the UN expert Commission on mercenaries under the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, member of the International Pugwash Counsel, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Pugwash Committee of Scientists for Disarmament and International Security; Professor at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO); Honorary President of the Russian Political Science Association; the Chairman of the CSTO Expert Council; Member of the Presidium Bureau of the International Federation of Peace and Conciliation. He is the author of more than 100 scientific publications in 6 languages.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS IN EURASIA: RIVALRY AND CO-OPERATION

Edited by Alexander Nikitin, Andrey Kazantsev,
Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security

Москва
МГИМО – Университет
2009

Moscow
MGIMO – University
2009


This collection of articles is devoted to re-evaluing and re-considering the modes of interaction between different international security organizations and corresponding security cultures of Euro-Atlantic and Central Eurasian regions. The authors are trying to find optimal ways of establishing the dialogue between key international security organizations in Europe and Central Eurasia.

© МГИМО (У) МИД России, 2009
© Коллектив авторов, 2009

Contents

List of contributors.................................................................4
Editorial preface......................................................................5

I. Recent Changes in the Policies of European Security Structures.................................................................6

Rory Keane
The Changing Post-Cold War Landscape:
European Security Policy..........................................................6

Michael Emerson
Europeanization and Conflict Resolution:
Testing the Analytical Framework.............................................9

Barry Adams
The Security Culture of NATO-Russia Co-operation:
From Liability to Asset.............................................................18

II. New Challenges for Security Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space..........................................................36

Vladimir Petrovsky
Crisis Response/Rapid Reaction Capabilities in Eurasia:
Problems and Prospects...........................................................36

Andrey Kazantsev
Post-Soviet Security Organizations with Russia’s Participation:
Can the Culture of Free-Riding Be Overcome?.........................50

Yulia Grigorieva
Conflicting Views on the Conflict. The Nature of Ethnic Conflicts and Modern Political Dilemmas..........................80

III. The CSTO As a Growing Security Arrangement For the New Independent States...........................................92

Anatoly Lysiuk
Belarus’ Entrance to the Collective Security Treaty Organization:
Cultural Foundations.............................................................92

Assem Berniyazova
Kazakhstan’s Membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Influence upon Security Sector and Military Culture.........................................................101
List of contributors

ADAMS Barry (USA), Research Fellow, USA Education Council in Germany (Munich)
BERNYAZOVA Assem (Kazakhstan), Analyst, Centre for Research and Development, Kazakhstan Institute for Management, Economics and Forecasts.
EMERSON Michael (UK/Belgium), Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).
GRIGORIEVA Yulia (Russia), Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Caucasian Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).
KAZANTSEV Andrey (Russia), Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).
LYSIUK Anatoly (Belarus), Director, Centre for Transborder Studies, Brest State University named after A. Pushkin.
NIKITIN Alexander (Russia), Director, Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and of independent Centre for Political and International Studies, Professor of MGIMO.
PETROVSKY Vladimir (Russia), Member, Russian Academy of Military Science, Professor of Moscow State University (MGU).
Editorial preface

Since the moment of its establishment in 2004 the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security of MGIMO has organized lots of different international conferences and expert seminars on the problems of cooperation between the international security organizations of Euro-Atlantic region (NATO, EU, OSCE), on the one hand, and their counterparts on the territory of the former Soviet Union (CIS, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc.), on the other hand. During these conferences and expert seminars much attention was paid to re-evaluating and re-considering the modes of interaction between different security cultures of Euro-Atlantic and Central Eurasian regions. It was an attempt to find optimal ways of establishing the dialogue between the “culture of the community of the Kalashnikov submachine-gun” and the “culture of the community of the M-16 rifle”. This inter-cultural and inter-organizational dialogue on the expert level is especially important during the periods of international tensions, conflicts (such as the conflict around South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008) and general instability in the period of the global economic crisis.

All articles in this book are the result of different conferences and expert seminars organized by the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security in 2004 – 2009. This collective work is composed of texts of the authors representing different countries with different political systems and cultural background: Russia, the USA, the UK, Belgium, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Belarus. These experts and scholars do not agree on many different issues. The editors also do not agree with some arguments of the authors. However, all articles in this book have the same spirit of mutual respect, intercultural security dialogue and cooperation.

The editors of this book thank Dr. Gennady Gladkov (Professor of MGIMO), Dr. Yulia Grigorieva (Senior Research Fellow, the Center for Caucasian Studies of MGIMO), Diana Novikova (Junior Research Fellow, the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of MGIMO) and Dr. Yulia Kudryashova (Research Fellow, the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of MGIMO) for technical assistance in preparing the manuscript for publication.
I. Recent Changes in the Policies of European Security Structures

_Rory Keane_

**The Changing Post-Cold War Landscape: European Security Policy**

Huntington in his article “The Clash of Civilizations” (1993) wrote that the fault lines of civilizations create the basis for conflict today. Security policy must not only think and act in terms of territoriality and stability, but also consider issues related to identity, norms, values and culture. Cooper in “The Breaking of Nations” (2003) forwards mechanisms to deal with the threats in the post-Cold War globalised/unipolar world. Cooper argues that we must “understand foreigners better” and that foreign policy practitioners must “get under the domestic skin” in order to make a difference. Again this refers to the need to understand the nature of specific security threats through the eyes of the counterpart. Europe must also make “long term commitments” (which we can already see developing through SAP, Cotonou, Neighborhood policy).

In the post-Cold War world security from want has become as important as security from fear. State sovereignty does not in itself guarantee security from want, nor is it considered a legitimate provider of security from fear in all cases. In this sense, the security from want discourse is increasingly turning towards human security for answers. Additionally, it is now increasingly being accepted that security from fear cannot in all cases be safeguarded by the sovereign states, given that the notion of linguistic/territorial or ethnic sovereignty may in fact be the cause of insecurity (critical school).

The post-Cold War world has also witnessed a deeper securitization threat not only outside but also within the state. Networks of crime and internal enemies are now the perceived threat for both Homeland Security and Foreign Agencies. “Although the ‘street corner criminal’ and the ‘Soviet enemy’ used to belong to two separate worlds, the idea that police officers, customs officers, gendarmes, intelligence agencies and armies all can share the same enemies is gaining more and more support inside different agencies.
within Europe\textsuperscript{1}. Thus, the agenda of security policy today is based on synergizing and making coherent the relationship between foreign policy and homeland security. The reference to tackling terrorism and WMD in the European Security Strategy can be understood in this sense. Terrorism and WMD pose the biggest internal security threat for the EU and become top priority of the EU foreign policy.

**The EU Response – the ESS and ESDP**

Adopted by the heads of the EU states on 12 December 2003, the European Security Strategy sets out Europe’s place in the world of International Relations. While the strategy is to some degree realist in nature, for example in its references to “securing Europe” or “securing a zone of peace around Europe”; there is also a deeper “global responsibility dynamic” at play, which fits closer to a liberal internationalist approach. Additionally, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) cannot only be seen in realist terms. The Petersberg tasks, the Artemis mission in Bosnia (DCR, 2003) cannot be explained through realism alone. As a result, new theories are being applied to foreign policy by a new generation of academics (e.g. Helen Sjursen). These theorists outline that intergovernmentalism explains only some of the aspects of the EU foreign policy and neglects the others. For example, Hill speaks about the Europeanization of foreign policy in which shared norms and rules are being gradually accumulated. This process, according to Hill, might be closer to the accurate description of the CFSP than the image of rational bargaining leading to agreement on a policy of the lowest common denominator\textsuperscript{2}.

**Shared norms and values between ESDP and NATO – Berlin Plus**

Berlin Plus was used in the ESDP mission Concordia in Macedonia in 2003 and also in the ALTHeA mission in Bosnia (December 2004). Berlin Plus refers to a series of agreements concluded by NATO and the EU between December 2002 and March 2003, which allows the European Union to carry out operations using NATO assets and capabilities. Such arrangements were firstly tested when the EU’s operation Concordia took over from NATO in the

\textsuperscript{1} Dodier Bigo, in: International relations theory and the politics of European integration, 2000.
\textsuperscript{2} Christopher Hill, The Actors in European Foreign Policy, 1996.
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The overall assessment was that Berlin Plus worked well for Concordia, despite some problems in the chain of command such as the role performed by AFSOUTH (NATO’s regional command in Naples, Italy). Countries such as France were concerned that the EU command element in AFSOUTH was not fully under the EU control. Others such as the UK considered AFSOUTH’s role crucial.

For the ALTHEA operations, both the EU and NATO worked hard on division of labor. Nevertheless, given that NATO set an office in Bosnia, it leads to some confusion, especially regarding the question of ultimate responsibility to apprehend the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indictees Karadzic and Mladic. In December 2003 the European Council approved a document “European Defense: NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations”. According to this agreement the EU would have a permanent cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and NATO would have a representation in the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Additionally, the EU CIV-MIL planning cell would be established to create operation coherency and strategic assessments.

**Democratic Accountability**

The speedy development of the ESDP security apparatus (including the Battle-groups and the European Defense Agency) re-opened an old Brussels debate on the democratic accountability of the EU foreign policy. Key to this debate is the role of the European Parliament in overseeing the ESDP. The debate was accentuated by the ALTHEA mission in Bosnia given its size and mandate and also given the fact that Ashdown, the EU Special Representative for Bosnia at that time, in any case was accountable to the parliament, given his Commission’s credentials³.

In particular, the Parliament would like to see greater coherency between RELEX (the Commission) and the Council; improve public access to the Council documents; see greater role for the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee (EP FAC) and the ESDP

---

International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

subcommittee, in addition to the enhanced inter-parliamentary cooperation.

Michael Emerson⁴

Europeanisation and Conflict Resolution– Testing an Analytical Framework

The European Union citizens have come to believe that they stand for civilized conflict resolution. This belief seems at times to be something like the Holy Ghost, always present and pervasive in our souls, surely goodness itself, but difficult to put your hands on. The doctrine flows freely in official texts of the European Union, from the European Security Strategy documents, produced by High Representative Javier Solana, through to the European Neighborhood Policy documents coming from the European Commission. But the logic and mechanics of conflict resolution are rarely explicit when it comes to confronting the so-called ‘frozen’, ethno-secessionist conflicts of the South East European periphery.

Of course this belief is founded in the real historical experiences that have become part of the public awareness. The biggest case of all has been the reconciliation of Germany with its neighbors, structured into what has become the European Union. But several model cases of resolution of local ethno-political conflicts have also become part of the political culture of various communities, ranging from the Aland Islands solution agreed between Swedes and Finns in 1921, the devolution of Belgium into a bi-communal federal state over the last several decades, the solution found after the second world war to the South Tyrol problem on the Italian-Austrian frontier, and the semi-resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict in the last few years. All these cases settle down in the fuzzy ideology of contemporary Europe, which has something to do with post-modern, multi-tier and multi-national integration and governance based on common political values and the rule of law.

A cautious note has however also to be introduced immediately, given that the recent conflicts of Europe’s south eastern periphery

have not readily dissolved themselves with the mediating efforts of the norm-setting organizations — the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe, as well as the EU. The currency of the term ‘frozen conflict’ testifies to this. As a result, the diplomatic circuit has often been producing little more than repetitive streams of pious declarations on these frozen conflicts, year after year.

A group of us, therefore, decided recently to look systematically into four unresolved ethno-secessionist conflicts in Europe’s south-eastern periphery, to see whether the European Union was pursuing any identifiable logic in its search for solutions5. These cases were chosen so as to be at different distances politically and geographically from the core Europe. The four cases, to which I add here a fifth, were:

– Cyprus, where our recent study was shadowing the negotiation of the Annan Plan, and which resulted in the Yes-No referendum result in April 2004, and thence the accession of Greek Cyprus alone in May;
– Serbia and Montenegro, which in 2003 formed a thin but unsustainable union as a result of heavy mediating pressures from the EU, with the incentive of full membership in the long run (later, Montenegro seceded from the union);
– Moldova and Transnistria, which has become a chronic case of unproductive mediation sponsored by the OSCE, while Moldova’s interest in European integration has increased in recent years, and with Moldova becoming the first partner of the EU’s new European Neighborhood Policy;
– Georgia and Abkhazia, where the secession of Abkhazia is recognized and protected by Russia, while the new regime in Tbilisi now openly adopts a Europeanization discourse;
– Turkey and its Kurds, for whom the normalization of post-conflict relations now takes place in the context of the EU’s political conditions for the possible opening and conduct of negotiations for accession as a full member state.

The analytical tool kit

It would be good to have a robust body of theory to structure work under the heading of Europeanization and conflict resolution, but unfortunately that is asking too much for the time being. However, we can try to assemble more modestly an analytical tool kit, at least to provide some standard conceptual framework and language. We now set in their skeletal outlines four parts to the tool kit, which need to be integrated in practice.

Conflict models

Most of the ethno-secessionist conflicts of Europe’s south-eastern periphery can be placed within the framework of a stylized process. Initially there were a number of empires (Ottoman, British, Soviet, Yugoslav) keeping the order in ethnically complex states. Sometimes the empire actually created conditions for future conflict with divide and rule methods, or by transferring populations, or drawing political frontiers that were bound to cause trouble later. Upon the collapse of the empires the frustrated grievances of ethnic communities exploded in conflict, especially because of the non-existent democratic culture that the newly independent states inherited. The conflict parties prove unable to negotiate a political settlement. Initially this is because of the bitterness of the conflict, or because one party has achieved its objective through gains of territory or de facto secession, and the other party lacks the means to reverse this. The recent post-communist context has also meant privatization of property, providing ample opportunities for the new leaderships to build up new economic interests, consolidating the status quo. Given the impasse between the conflict parties, external parties enter the process, either as neutral mediators, or as powerful external actors. At some point the external actors may offer significant incentives and heavily mediate a settlement. Further, they may in some cases impose a solution, unless of course there is more than one of them who cannot agree between themselves, in which case the mediation remains ineffective. Assuming a political settlement has been heavily mediated or imposed, the process has then to turn to the task of transformation of the perceived interests of the former conflict parties, without which the settlement may prove unsustainable. At this point Europeanization may be the key, at least in the wider European neighborhood.
Europeanization process

The term Europeanization has gained currency in political science literature over the past decade or so, as scholars tried to understand the politico-economic-societal transformation involved in the European integration, and especially in the cases of states acceding to the European Union after exiting from fascist or communist regimes. Europeanization may be seen as working through three kinds of mechanism, which interact synergetically:

– legal obligations in political and economic domains flowing from Council of Europe membership and the requirements for accession to the EU;
– objective changes in the economic structures and interests of individuals as a result of integration with Europe;
– subjective changes in the beliefs, expectations and identity of the individual, feeding political will to adopt European norms of business, politics and civil society.

Here we define Europeanization for the particular context of conflict settlement and resolution as:

– “a mechanism and a process at the same time which is activated and encouraged by European institutions by linking the final outcome of the conflict with the degree of integration or association of conflict parties with European structures. This link is made operational by means of specific conditionality and socialization mechanisms, which are built into the process of Europeanization”6.

European multi-tier governance

The particularity of European multi-tier governance is that it has introduced the practice of three-tier federalism, with the EU tier as the third tier to add to the federal state and the federated entities. This three-tier federalism is most relevant for present purposes in the several cases of ethno-federations such as Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom, as opposed to the ethnically homogenous federations such as Austria and Germany. The range of interesting three-tier solutions extends also to such cases as the Aland Islands.

There are several features of these cases that warrant recognition as model mechanisms, all good for the tool kit. The Belgian case is notable for the very high degree of devolution of powers to the two

6 Quotation from G. Noutcheva, N. Tocci, T. Kovziridze et al., Europeanisation and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Paradigms, in Chapter 2 of B. Coppieters et al., op.cit.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

communities, and as a result the need to have developed a coordination mechanism between them and the federal government. This leads into the model type of the thin common state, which may serve as a single state in international law, but which in an extreme case becomes a coordination mechanism for the federal government to be mandated for negotiations in EU and international fora. The common state becomes a compromise between federation and confederation. The cases of Spain and the UK are examples of the asymmetric federation, in which entities such as Catalonia and Scotland retain much more autonomy than other regions, and view their direct relations with the EU as satisfying part of their demands for partial independence. The case of Northern Ireland sees the third EU tier of governance as transforming the traditional ideas of irredentist secession with a vision of both the UK and Ireland sharing sovereignty in the EU’s post-modern structures. The Aland Islands case is also a classic solution for autonomy of a minority community, which in an alternative political setting, such as in contemporary south-east Europe, might have seen a war of irredentist secession (such as in Nagorno-Karabakh). The overall conclusion is that the European Union has a rich experience of creative multi-tier governance solutions for actual or potential ethno-secessionist conflicts.

European mediation and conditionality models

Our study of the case examples has led us to identify three model types for how the EU uses its doctrine, incentives and conditionality in relation to unresolved conflicts in its periphery. For each of which there is both a logic of intended outcomes and a hazard of unintended effects. These are set out in Table 1. The standard doctrine is to try to discourage ethno-political secession in general, and especially where it cannot be agreed peacefully between the parties in accordance with the constitutional procedures. Model I therefore sees the EU mediating in favor of a common state solution, which may be successful, but with risks of forcing the birth of a dysfunctional state. Where, over a long period, the parties fail to agree the EU may come to regard one party as being unreasonable, and therefore switch from a position of neutrality to one of favoring the other party. Under this Model II the unreasonable party is isolated and weakened, and in due course becomes more realistic, returning to negotiate a fair common state solution. Here the possible unintended effects are several: relapse of the penalized party into a failed state condition, or its virtual
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

annexation by another external power, or even for the favored party to turn unreasonable when the excluded party itself becomes reasonable. Finally, in the case of Model III the EU reluctantly concludes that it must recognize secession and treat both parties equally, and here the risks of unintended effects lie with the possible destabilization of other regions or proliferation of micro states.

Table 1. EU conditionality and socialization models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I — common state solution</th>
<th>Model II — sequential route to the common state</th>
<th>Model III — two states solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU policy</td>
<td>EU favors one common state.</td>
<td>EU favors one of the conflict parties, viewing the other as the ‘unreasonable’ party.</td>
<td>EU reluctantly accepts secession, and treats both entities equally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended effects</td>
<td>Settlement reached, secession avoided, transformation to follow.</td>
<td>The ‘other’ party is isolated, weakened, returns to the negotiation table, settlement and transformation follows.</td>
<td>Conflict resolved with velvet divorce, transformation follows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintended effects</td>
<td>Creation of dysfunctional state. Empowerment of ‘wrong’ political parties.</td>
<td>Excluded party becomes more entrenched as failing state, and/or is annexed by another external power. Or, the favored party becomes ‘unreasonable’.</td>
<td>Domino effect, destabilizing other regions, favoring the proliferation of micro-states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Applications

When the EU candidacy of Cyprus was launched, the EU’s discourse set off down the track of Model I, arguing for conflict settlement and re-unification before accession. The incentive of accession was supposed to support of the UN’s role as mediator. When the last round of negotiations leading up to the Annan plan got seriously into the substance of a possible agreement, the UN mediator indeed took on board the future context of EU membership. It detailed a three-tier constitution, drawing explicit inspiration

---

7 This is a modified version of the matrix devised by Gergana Noutcheva, Research Fellow at CEPS, and presented in G. Noutcheva, N. Tocci and T. Kovziridze, et al., op. cit.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

from the Belgian model. But meanwhile, at their Helsinki summit in December 1999, the EU switched from Model I to Model II, given that Greece threatened to hold the whole enlargement hostage to the accession of Cyprus, re-unified or divided. Turkish Cyprus was indeed threatened with a disastrous outlook, also because President Denktas cast himself so readily in the role of the ‘unreasonable’ party. The story then initially took the expected course of the isolated party appreciating its weak position, and the elections in December 2003 shifted the political balance in northern Cyprus towards the Annan plan. This was then reinforced by Ankara’s decision, in the interests of its own EU accession strategy, to tip the balance decisively in favor of the Annan plan, proposing the formula of letting Kofi Annan ‘fill in the blanks’ where there might remain differences between the principal parties. However, the story then took its extra twist, when the new Greek Cypriot government, with its accession to the EU secured, hardened its own position on the Annan plan. The favored party had become the ‘unreasonable’ one. The EU was so disappointed at this, after the resulting No-Yes vote in the referendum in April, that it resolved immediately to end the isolation of Turkish Cyprus.

This comes close to informal recognition of a sub-state entity having direct relations with the EU, which opens aid programs, and an office in the north etc. Turkish Cyprus seems to be heading into a new institutional category, that of a sub-state entity that is virtually EU territory, most of whose population are EU citizens with Republic of Cyprus passports. The EU, in so doing, has also been managing its second shift in strategy, from Model II to something approaching Model III. The Greek Cypriot party has lost goodwill; the Turkish Cypriot party has ceded back neither land nor property, yet gained goodwill while retaining complete autonomy. Now the tables are turned, and it remains to be seen whether the Greek Cypriot side reconsider their position, to return to the Annan plan for a second referendum, in which case it would mark a reversion to Model II.

---

8 Referendum according to Annan plan took place on 24 April 2004. On the Northern Cyprus 65% of participants voted “yes”, while on the Southern Cyprus only 24% supported the plan.

9 Cyprus President Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat agreed 21 March 2008 to ask their respective advisers, George Iacovou and Ozdil Nami, to meet in order to set up a number of working groups and technical committees and establish their agendas. The two leaders also agreed to meet again in three months to review the work done on various aspects of the Cyprus problem, the results of which will be used to start negotiations under UN auspices for a solution. – The Famagusta Gazette Online http://www.famagusta-gazette. Agencies 28.MAR.2008
In the case of Serbia and Montenegro the EU again strongly favored a Model I common state solution, and Javier Solana was the forceful mediator the point that the new Union is known in the region as Solania. Settlement was achieved but the transformation is not happening, and a secession option after three years had to be included in the pact at the insistence of Montenegro. Finally, this led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Unfortunately the full set of unintended effects was on display: the dysfunctional state and empowerment of the ‘wrong’ political parties. The thin common state resembled the coordination model, which should be capable of functioning. The problem is that the EU tier of governance was not yet there to hold it together. The discord over the level of tariff protection illustrated why Montenegro favored lower external protection than Serbia. With EU accession the issue would be simply eliminated as the common external tariff prevails. But with accession not yet on the horizon the divergence of interests has been real. Regarding the party politics of the Union, its strongest supporters turned out to be the Serb nationalists (e.g. the former Milosevic party people), whose ideology is furthest away from European thinking. Finally, Serbia and Montenegro had also revealed a difference in the inclinations of the EU institutions between the Javier Solana and the foreign ministers’ Council versus the Commission. Foreign ministers strove to mediate a settlement. The Commission had to manage the transformation and sustainability of the settlement. The European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana and European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten (who was succeeded by Benita Ferrero-Waldner in November 2004) were respected for their sincere efforts to cooperate. But their institutions had naturally different perspectives, and the Union of Serbia and Montenegro seemed to be viewed more skeptically by the Commission.

Serbia and Montenegro separated after the initial three year period, following the referendum for independence held in Montenegro on 21 May 2006, but still the EU foreign ministers are very cautious, as the fears of destabilizing again Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo remain vivid. Both Serbia and Montenegro were, however, very attentive to avoiding being branded the unreasonable party (as in Model II)\textsuperscript{10}.

\textsuperscript{10} Later, on 17 February 2008 Kosovo unilaterally proclaimed independence from Serbia.
In the case of Moldova and Transniestria the EU has for years sustained the discourse favoring a common state solution (classic Model I), although offering very little incentives. But the game has moved somewhat. On the one hand, the EU has cautiously raised the level of its incentive for the Europeanization of Moldova, by including it as a first candidate for the new European Neighborhood Policy. On the other hand, it is now branding the Transniestria as the unreasonable party, backing this up with a visa ban on its leadership, all of whom happen to be Russian citizens.

So the EU is switching into Model II, but not strongly enough for the government of Moldova, which wants its ‘European option’ to be recognized with a ‘perspective of EU membership’. Whether Model II works as the EU hopes is open to doubt. Transniestria’s reliance on Russia is intensified, while Russia itself refused Moldova’s requests that the EU join the OSCE mediating group. The EU’s refusal to grant a membership perspective to Moldova may have further unintended but predictable consequences in a few years after Romanian accession to the EU, which took place in 2007. Most Moldavians can easily obtain Romanian citizenship and therefore future the EU citizenship, which means that without a membership perspective the already disastrous emigration trend will intensify. Then there could also be a return in due course to the idea of reunification with Romania as the only track into the EU, following the German DDR re-unification model. This is absolutely not desired by the EU. However, the agreement signed by President Snegur of Moldova and President Yeltsin of Russia in July 1992 recognized the right of the population of Transniestria to determine their future in case Moldova were to unit with Romania, thus possibly making legitimate the secession of Transniestria and maybe its absorption by Russia. The conclusion would seem to be if the EU pursues a half-hearted Model II strategy it could end up with perverse and negative results.

Also in the case of Georgia and Abkhazia the EU has been sustaining a Model I common state discourse, but bringing limited incentives into play, and having no role as such in the UN sponsored mediation efforts. France, Germany and the UK do have a role, while France has a role in the OSCE Minsk Group for the Nagorno-Karabakh case. But the EU has not yet seen fit to Europeanize these mediation efforts, which is weakness for the credibility of the EU as conflict resolution partner. If the EU comes to an end in accession negotiations with Turkey, renewed in 2004, then there would be
new possibilities to act together more effectively in the Caucasus, and possibly to bring Russia to see interest in a cooperative deal of this type, for example by opening up and developing the entire east Black Sea coastline.

Finally on Turkey and its Kurds. The conflict between Turkey and the PKK Marxist separatist Kurds raged for 15 years, but by 1999 Turkey had virtually won the war, employing harsh and much criticized military tactics. Since then the Kurdish leadership has abandoned the objective of secession, and pursued the objective of conventional minority rights. Political settlement was achieved by Turkey’s victory in war, and now the societal transformation has to take place to make the peace sustainable. This is what seemed to be happening, following the acceptance by the EU of Turkey’s candidacy in Helsinki in December 1999, just after the end of the war. Since then, and especially after the AK Party became the government in 2002 (repeating its success in summer 2007), the EU’s conditionality machine has been working on full power. The EU takes a major part in the transformation of Turkey’s political norms and institutions, all the way down to the issue of minority rights for the Kurds. Here the second phase of the EU’s Model I seems to be working, but after the war had been fought and won without the EU in the first phase.

The overall conclusion from this short survey of five cases is that the EU has a long way to go before becoming a master of the art of conflict resolution. Its heart may be in the right place. But its ‘actorness’ is still weak, except when there are foreseeable prospects of accession negotiations. The hazards of perverse and unintended consequences are frequently visible where the EU pushes for civilized solutions, but with only half-hearted deployment of incentives and instruments of action.

**Barry Adams**

**The Security Culture of NATO-Russia Co-operation: From Liability to Asset**

The following paper seeks to apply examination of modern security culture to a case study, which at first glance might seem rather contrived. The difficult history and current institutional complexity of NATO-Russia relations not only owes a lot to the security culture of both actors. This relationship — so I will argue — has now itself
become a major influence on the security cultures of NATO as an organization, its Nations and Russia. Indeed, one could even claim that the co-operation taking place in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council in particular could potentially lead to the creation of a common security culture of what Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin recently described as the common space of the Northern Hemisphere.

I. Culture: Mediator between Ideology and Interests

In this respect this comparative analysis bears some resemblance to the convergence theory of the 1970’s – especially popular in the West Germany of the SPD-FDP coalition, – which posited that the two socio-economic systems of East and West were gradually growing more alike and would some day be so similar as to throw off the artificial political division of the Cold War. Yet, whereas this earlier convergence theory placed the stress on material aspects, this analysis will address culture.

The course of Russia’s foreign and domestic policy under Putin have left many Western observers in a quandary. Repeated verbal commitments to civil rights co-existed with restrictions on the media and political competition. Moscow’s great power status – including interventions in the politics of former Soviet Republics – and co-operation with the West, especially in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, were pursued with equal vigor. Among the many explanations of these apparent inconsistencies was the argument that the institutional realignment embodied by the NATO-Russia Council simply reflected the (brief) constellation of Western and Russian foreign policy interests following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Later, it was openly recognized, “Russia shares our interests, but not our values”. After last disagreements between Russia and NATO (on anti-missile defense system, enlargement and war in Ossetia) the cooperation became even much more problematic.

The focus on culture entailed in this paper can be seen as an attempt to mediate between ideology (to use another name for values) and interests. In this context “culture” is defined as a repeated pattern of attitudes, beliefs and practices based on historical experience, tradition and/or “national character”. It contrasts with (and lies between) the explanatory models based on ideology, which deterministically assumes universally valid rules about the way the world functions, and rational choice, which assume decision-making
based on cost-benefit analysis with a view to furthering an actor’s objectively existent national interests, be they measured territorially, economically or in terms of prestige. Thus I will argue here that both the gap in values, which undoubtedly persists between NATO Nations and Russia, and the deviation of national interests, which already has returned over many issues, will not necessarily sound the death-knell of Western-Russian relations. If, namely, NATO and Russia are able to establish a shared set of attitudes and practices in the field of security, a common security culture, this co-operation can lead to an overall convergence of the two actors in the long run.

This analysis will then be guided by several questions. What were the main features of the security cultures of the Soviet Union and NATO prior to the re-emergence of Russia in 1991. Has NATO-Russia co-operation since then engendered a new security culture — or at least elements of one — among the elites and populations of the 27 nations involved? If so, what are the characteristics of this security culture, how did it come to be, and how resilient is it likely to be in the face of countervailing national and international forces?

II. The Traditional Soviet/Russian and NATO Security Cultures

An analysis of the convergence of Russian and NATO security cultures must necessarily be prefaced by a description of these cultures as they existed in the Cold War. Following the definition of culture given above, this analysis will not attempt to trace the influence of the myriad specific ideational or material factors on basic security attitudes and practices, choosing instead to provide a basic description of these attitudes and practices themselves. The following brief comparison of the elements mentioned below reveal fundamental differences, yet also striking similarities.

While one could attempt to define the impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology on Soviet foreign policy, the degree of such influence is impossible to prove empirically. Did the postulate of the world revolution make Soviet foreign policy inherently aggressive? Or did the deterministic belief in the eventual historical victory of Communism give USSR’s leadership patience? How, moreover, did these ideological influences interact with the country’s historical foreign policy patterns, consisting of a seemingly never-ending cycle of weakness and strength, foreign invasions and imperialist expansion.
**Definition of security**

In the early phase of the Cold War both the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact and NATO placed a premium on national security versus individual welfare. Yet, while in the post-war Soviet Union the dominant role of security priorities and the military in society was underlined by the trauma of recent invasion and linked to the long Muscovite tradition of the hypertrophic over-developed state, NATO Nations began to scale back their security commitments soon after the death of Stalin. Increasingly security priorities had to make room for the demands of the welfare state and the desire of citizens for normalcy. Whereas the Soviet doctrine of peaceful co-existence did not lead to a demilitarization of national priorities and society, large segments of NATO Nations’ societies began to doubt the existence of a Soviet threat and the need for maintaining a deterrent force. Both sides of the conflict became increasingly aware of the overarching threat of nuclear cataclysm in the case of war, though this fear gained popular political expression only in the West.

In this way, notwithstanding Cold War competition and the different priority of security in the East and the West, elites and society in both camps defined the nature of their security threats in the same way: conventional or nuclear war and the loss of national wealth resulting from the arms race. As a result, in both the East and West, resources allocated to border security, anti-terrorism, and police co-operation paled in comparison with huge defense outlay. But by the end of the Cold War, while a new era of peace seemed to be dawning for NATO Nations, many of the Alliance’s former Cold War adversaries were soon afflicted by the sundry new threats and challenges of the 21st century: ethnic violence, weak state structures, terrorism.

**Military doctrine and resources**

The different traditions of national security between the East and the West were clearly reflected in their respective military doctrines and defense planning. The end of the Second World War saw the Soviet Union’s expansionist tradition (based on universal Communist idea) unbroken; moreover, the tremendous losses of the war made it mandatory that the next war be fought on the enemy’s territory. These factors, more so perhaps than the Communist doctrine of the world revolution, translated into an offensive military strategy. The Soviet Union’s military doctrine, moreover, went far beyond similar
documents of NATO member states. It entailed a comprehensive strategy for mobilizing all sectors of Soviet society for war. Thus the bulk of the Soviet Union’s economic, scientific, human resources were geared towards military needs. For whatever historical reason, the Soviets therefore far exceeded the requirements of sufficient defense. The result was a proactive military stance, typified by the attempt to gain and then extend supremacy in all weapons categories.

In contrast, NATO Nations, in particular European members of the Alliance, were keen to achieve sufficient defense only, saving as much as possible of their scarce resources for programs aimed at increasing the welfare of their citizens. The effects of this tendency on Alliance policy were mixed. On the one hand, this desire to save money gave incentives to establish common defense structures and develop common armament programs, thus strengthening NATO’s role. On the other, the preference of some Allies for butter over guns tended to undermine public support for NATO, while leading to serious debates over burden-sharing between Allies’ governments. In any case, NATO doctrine, as defined by the Alliance’s periodically updated strategic concepts, coupled a defensive conventional posture with the threat to use nuclear weapons as needed to defend the North Atlantic area. Thus, NATO’s strategic culture could be called reactive and ad hoc. New weapons systems (or new areas of co-operation such as civil emergency planning or economic and scientific co-operation) were only grudgingly provided for as a last resort. If the all-encompassing Soviet security culture developed new weapons systems for the sake of doing so — since logic of system demanded it, —NATO tended not to act until unmistakable necessity forced it to do so12.

**Civil-military relations**

It is difficult to compare and contrast the Soviet and “NATO” system of civil-military relations, because there never was and still is no single “NATO” model in this sphere. Nonetheless, these different traditions can generally be contrasted with the Soviet system, which was characterized by a stark division of the roles of civilian and military decision-makers into autonomous spheres. Thus, while the civilian leadership held undisputed sway in matters pertaining to

12 Of course, this description reflects mostly Western vision of the situation in the former Soviet Union and many Russian experts would not agree with it.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

grand strategy, the military decision-makers — and this, significantly, meant the general staff — were given almost complete autonomy in all other matters of defense planning, from recruitment, to the allocation of national resources to strategic and operational planning. This disconnection explains many peculiar features of Soviet security culture: the coexistence of a defensive political stance in Europe and an offensive military strategy on the continent; the central role of the military-industrial complex in the Soviet economy; the lack of civilian control over defense, leading to misappropriation and corruption.

**Definition of international co-operation**

Although the Cold War witnessed the adversarial stance of two military blocks, these blocks were defined by two very different visions of partnership. Russian history was replete with clear lessons about international co-operation. European alliances — whether Napoleon’s, the Entente or the Axis — had more often than not been directed against Russia’s territorial integrity. Those which had not posed a threat to Russia had at least included Russia as a major player (such as the anti-Napoleon alliances) or been Moscow-led (such as the Holy Alliance of the early 19th century or the Warsaw Pact). Moreover, Russian history had witnessed the existence of numerous inveterate enemies (the Ottoman empire, Poland, Austria), but not a single traditional ally, as Britain possessed for centuries in Portugal or France had in Austria for much of the 18th century. Therefore, Moscow decision-making elites, while paying lip-service to Communist internationalism, had a low opinion of international co-operation, preferring instead to rely on its own state resources. Thus the Warsaw Pact, its doctrine and bodies, were never much more than extensions of the “Stavka” in Moscow. At the same time, Russian cultural preconditioning led Moscow to view NATO with great suspicion even after the end of the Cold War. Projecting its understanding of co-operation onto Brussels, the North Atlantic Alliance was seen as an American-dominated, anti-Russian force.

NATO, in contrast, in many respects broke with the long tradition of European coalitions. While not dominated by the United States, inasmuch as Allied decision-making was based on consensus, it is hard to deny the leading role of America in light of the spectacular weakness of Western Europe at the end of the WWII.

---

13 Or Britain and France had in each other from the turn of the 20th century onwards.
This very weakness, however, led the Europeans to cede de facto control over large parts of their militaries for the sake of increased efficiency. At the same time, joint commands gave NATO officers and soldiers, many of them until recently former adversaries, the opportunity to work together to solve common security problems. In the process, not only was an effective deterrent created, but, even more importantly, the spirit of competition for European hegemony which had repeatedly brought the continent to the brink of ruin was gradually replaced by a culture of co-operation. In parallel with the European Community/Union experience, NATO Nations were finding out that real integration and collective decision-making were possible. Though it required protracted negotiations, the repeated chewing over of proposals and delays, especially painful for the military, these practices created lasting consensus among generations of politicians. This pleasant discovery that the nation-state could be successfully transcended by international arrangements was accompanied by the tendency to guard covetously the integrity of these new international bodies, manifested by a desire to clearly delineate the rights of members from non-members. In the case of NATO, nations developed an obsession for the inviolability of Alliance chain of command which to outsiders (and civilians) seemed to border on pedantry.

III. Forging a Culture of Co-operation

The immediate end of the Cold War gave rise – especially in the West and among liberal circles in Russia – to a euphoria reflected in Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of the end of history. There existed a naive belief that the universal victory of democracy — at least in Europe — would automatically lead to common security interests, attitudes and practices. Most actors in the West saw no pressing need to engage the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states institutionally, provide military assistance, apart from the sphere of redeployment of Russian troops, or to address systematically the disparities in security culture described above. Nor did NATO’s specific strategy to engage Russia follow a conscious pattern of increased engagement suggested by a cursory look at major political developments: the founding of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council in 1991, the introduction of the Partnership for Peace Program in 1994, the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in May 1997 and establishment of
the current NATO-Russia Council in May 2002. Such a view belies the complexity of the issue and diversity of response.

**The early years of semi-formal dialogue: 1991-1994**

In fact, NATO was first prompted to assist Russia and other Central and Eastern European states by the latter’s own concrete requests for support. The Alliance’s response during this first phase of contacts was, however, hesitant. Too deep-seated was a reactive NATO culture which, when it acted, addressed primarily traditional security threats, and only did so after bilateral efforts had failed and the then 16 nations had agreed to a common policy after long and comprehensive consultations. Nor were NATO Nations immediately comfortable with opening up the exclusive expert functions of the Alliance, much less providing Article 5 guarantees. It was thus left for NATO’s International Staff, in particular then Secretary-General Manfred Woerner and his Special Advisor for Central and Eastern European Affairs, Chris Donnelly, to establish a network of contacts.

The resulting series of official and semi-official visits, workshops and seminars in the years 1991-1994 represented the first medium of cultural convergence. Visits to Moscow and Brussels brought together policy-makers, parliamentarians, military officers, representatives of think tanks and universities, and members of the press. More focused expert workshops and seminars then addressed security-related subjects ranging from the democratic control of armed forces to defense reform, force planning and procurement. The latter had the advantage of being discrete, while the lack of official sponsorship made the impact on high-level decision-making processes more diffuse. This early form of dialogue enabled not only the exchange of views, but the chance to sniff out the other side, to see the other as he really was. In this way, to name but one example, early Russian military visitors to NATO “Headquarters” learned, to their astonishment, that the large majority of Brussels staff were in fact civilian. It is significant about the conference that the advice NATO provided was given in full awareness of Russian (and other CEE countries’) sensibilities; great care was taken to avoid the impression that the West was preaching or patronizing the new partners. Moreover, this early outreach program aimed in particular at enabling Russian civilians make the most educated security decisions in accordance with the interests of their country. These outreach efforts influenced thousands
of Russian decision-makers and opinion-makers, increasing their knowledge of NATO and security issues in general. Such meetings, moreover, used to continue within the framework of established official programs.

The Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and Balkan peacekeeping

The logical conclusion of this program of broad contacts should have been its integration into the Partnership for Peace, which represented the Alliance’s belated response to the CEE countries’ requests for assistance. However, from its introduction in January of 1994, the PfP was put in an unfortunate nexus — not only in the Russian consciousness — with NATO enlargement. Thus, the enhanced dialogue and co-operation envisioned at the January 1994 Brussels Summit took a different form in the case of NATO-Russian relations. The political dialogue, which soon did increase at a high level, did not take place as much in the foreseen forum of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), but took rather “bilateral” form. Moreover, the main issue on the agenda was to become for the next several years NATO enlargement. Similarly, Russia shunned the newly created PfP mechanisms in favor of bilateral NATO-Russia ones, which were used to define Moscow’s participation in IFOR/ SFOR, for example. Despite the awkwardness of such institutional arrangements, they did have the effect of bringing together decision-makers and soldiers from Russia and NATO Nations to work out common solutions to shared challenges. Especially, the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans had a tremendous impact in proving that the two former adversaries could in fact co-operate on the ground and in creating a basic level of interoperability between NATO and Russian forces.

A special partnership: the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and NATO-Russia Council (NRC)

These joint NATO-Russia activities set a pattern for creating common cultural understandings, to which the Founding Act of May 1997 only granted formal character. Having overcome its traditionally closed culture to open NATO structures to partners within the PfP in 1994, NATO now went a step further, establishing a privileged partnership with a non-member, Russia. In accordance with the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and
Security, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was created, with the authority to carry out joint actions. Unfortunately, this body never fulfilled its full potential and after the Kosovo crisis limited its consultations to the situation on the Balkans and NATO and Russia’s joint peacekeeping efforts there.

It was to take the geopolitical realignment following the terrorist attacks of 11 September and the subsequent creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC, May 2002), with a chance to greatly expand the sphere of common activities. The partners started addressing an ambitious agenda, which included the struggle against terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD, mil-to-mil co-operation and defense reform, theatre missile defense, civil emergency planning and science co-operation. Moreover, since the NRC’s rules of procedure allowed for the creation of working groups to discuss those issues, the numbers of NATO and Russian personnel involved with and man-hours devoted to co-operation had increased dramatically. However, later this activity gradually diminished due to contradictions on NATO enlargement, anti-missile defense systems and other issues.

Towards a culture of co-operation

Admittedly, most of those common activities took place around a table and not in the field, — a fact, which had incurred the scathing epithet of “talk shop” from the NRC’s detractors. The following NRC’s developments showed that critics of the progress in NRC co-operation were not quite wrong to say that “feasibility studies”, “threat assessments”, “workshops on macroeconomic aspects of defense reform” could not be regarded as exact indications of a revolutionary transformation of partnership. Those critics said that real NATO-Russia co-operation would need to have involved joint actions, as envisioned in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, the solution of frozen crises or the creation of a standing joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping force. They stressed the need for co-operation on the ground and not in the conference room and pointed to the fact that such concrete co-operation was decreasing with the Russian withdrawal from SFOR and KFOR and lack of a Russian presence in ISAF.

In response, one must say that the kind and course of co-operation the NRC had launched since its creation falls better into the pattern of historical NATO co-operation and integration than one might think. As the larger part of NATO’s co-ordinating role
had involved activities carried out beneath the threshold of actual joint operations. Interoperability, the necessary pre-requisite for operations, goes deeper and involves a whole series of integration processes, including:

- Common assessments of possible threats;
- Agreed military doctrines and concepts of operations as a basis for responding to threats;
- Joint planning of forces needed to carry out possible operations;
- Common procurement, in some cases, and co-ordinated defense economics; and
- Training and exercises.

Only at the end of this chain, perhaps, do joint operations occur, though this happens rarely enough. One mustn’t forget that NATO throughout its more than fifty years’ history was always operational, though it seldom carried out operations. It was constantly assessing the Soviet threat, planning the structure of its forces to meet this threat, training them according to certain scenarios, and thus providing the deterrence that made the use of force unnecessary. At the same time, NATO was transforming the security culture of its Nations. As the long-time Special Advisor Chris Donnelly was fond of differentiating: NATO’s function was deterring Soviet aggression; but its more important, hidden purpose was that of teaching its Nations, former adversaries, to work together, to understand their cultural viewpoints, to trust each other, to achieve cultural as well as technical interoperability, to develop — in short - a “culture of co-operation”. And there is no reason to doubt that the NRC could be a vehicle for the same purpose between the NATO Nations and Russia — given enough time and resources.

Using the measuring stick of cultural convergence, rather than operations, one still can assess the prospects of NATO-Russia co-operation positively, despite the sharp disputes over enlargement for Ukraine and Georgia, American plans of placing anti-missile systems in Eastern Europe and Russian support for independence of Abkhazia and Northern Ossetia.

In the past years thousands of Russian and NATO decision-makers have been exposed to NRC activities, and, especially in the field of mil-to-mil co-operation, the focus was being placed on cadre-development. Not every contact meant a convert and room for skepticism all the time remained. But the analogy to the development
of NATO’s security culture would suggest that NATO at “26+1” format (actually, “28+1” after Croatia and Albania acceptance in April 2008) may keep on its way towards developing a critical mass of “believers”.

IV. Features of a Nascent NATO-Russia Security Culture

A high degree of interaction had undeniably taken place. Yet it is still put into doubt by many whether this interaction is capable to constitute a qualitatively new NATO-Russia security culture, worth more than the sum of its parts? And if such a development is viable, what distinguishes this security culture? The following features contrast in some cases starkly with those characteristics of individual NATO and Soviet/Russian security cultures described above, while not yet completely liberating themselves from them.

A. A culture of partnership

At the outset of the 1990’s both actors were leery of comprehensive external partnerships. This changed with the realization that the 21st century security cannot be ensured without co-operating with neighboring states, whose particular security challenges – ethnic tensions, permeable borders, weak state structures, failed economic reform – can and will eventually impact one’s own security14. This realization first struck NATO with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leaving four nuclear powers in place of the former familiar interlocutor. The need for collective security encompassing the security interests of the whole continent became increasingly clear with the wars of the former Yugoslavia. Also Russia’s early struggle with terrorism puts this issue on NATO’s radar screen in the course of its regular consultations with Moscow15. At another level NATO’s culture of sufficient defense made partnership a pure necessity: when the Alliance began its Balkan peacekeeping operations, it found

---

14 This approach is fundamentally different from the EU’s. Thus whereas the added value of Russia-EU communication in terms of industrial, social, environmental, or Common Agricultural Policy could be negligible to negative (and its fulfilment of the respective acquis communautaire would require the prior implementation of tens of thousands of legal and administrative acts), Moscow’s potential contributions to Euro-Atlantic security (through force contributions to NATO-led peacekeeping, the lending of its strategic airlift assets, effective border controls) would not.

15 Though it was to take the terrorist attacks of 11 September to put it squarely on the Alliance’s agenda.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

that its nations lacked the deployable light infantry forces needed to fulfill what was to become a ten-year mission. The contributions of partners, in particular Russian forces, were therefore invaluable. NATO’s partnerships, in particular its relationship with Russia, have dramatically changed the way the Alliance does business. Russian diplomats and officers were the very first to break into the “sacred realm” of NATO HQ, and in 2000s the sight of officials from partner countries at the tables and in the corridors of NATO has become commonplace. And just as the desire to establish ties to the new Moscow authorities was one of the driving interests to create partnership structures in 1991, the NRC format has been creating a new form of NATO “membership” – the “26+1”, which has blurred the formerly clear boundary between members and non-members.

Thus, Russia somehow moved from the grudging acceptance of NATO-led pan-European partnership structures to an increasing identification with them, especially the NRC format. While this change of policy was of course made in accordance with Moscow’s perceived security interests, it also invariably reflects the experiences of many years of partnership. Irrespective of different disagreements that are especially great after Ossetian war these experiences have helped to, at least, partially disabuse the Russians of their deep-seated fears of foreign alliances, in particular their illusions that NATO is a hyper-effective, American-dominated monolith. Years of military contacts and confidence-building measures have erased from the minds of military planners the possibility of offensive NATO operations against Russia, whether this is admitted publicly or not. On the contrary, even the often recalcitrant General Staff now recognizes the benefit of most, if not all, areas of co-operation. For its part, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), while at the end of the day implementing the will of the presidential administration, seems most of the time particularly comfortable with the NRC format. Despite early difficulties, the MFA representatives have become true masters of the NATO diplomatic game, as their NATO counterparts are quick to admit. One can hope that gone are the years of viewing NATO-Russia relations as damage control, in which each more audacious attempt at tying the hands of the Alliance led to a greater diplomatic failure. This diplomatic culture of spoiling has been

---

16 Some observers even detected Russian moves to supplant the OSCE as the continent’s most inclusive security-related organisation with the NRC, a tendency witnessed with no small degree of suspicion by NATO Nations.
gradually and not without retreats replaced by active engagement. Russia has introduced many of the initiatives within the NRC and contributed to its success as a reliable and effective instrument of foreign policy – a welcome experience to any diplomat.

Indeed, for all Nations of the NRC the success of this body since its inception in 2002 has been conspicuous in a time otherwise dominated by news of NATO’s transatlantic rift over Iraq, on the one hand, and Russia’s at best mixed record of extending its influence in its so-called near abroad. This objective success of the NRC begs the question as to whether the members of its bodies are even subject to the pressure of “going native”. At the personal level there have doubtless been cases of this. Members of NRC bodies under pressure to not jeopardize consensus will have at times bent their national instructions to the breaking point. At the military level, Russian officers and soldiers taking part in NATO-led exercises or training courses will have certainly internalized many NATO perspectives, just as their NATO counterparts acquired a better understanding of Russian positions. However, at the end of the day, national representatives must return home and all of them are interested in moving up the career ladder. While experience with Russian interlocutors is generally viewed positively by NATO Nations’ bureaucracies, Russia manifests disparate organizational traditions: within the MFA NATO experience would seem quite beneficial to career advancement; within the Russian Armed Forces this is not necessarily the case. As for the national level, it would be naive to claim that any member of the NRC subordinates its national interests to those of NATO at 27, or NATO at 26 for that matter. However, it would be equally stubborn to deny that NATO-Russia co-operation has no impact on the interests of its members. All 27 have invested considerable resources and clout into the success of this body and, if for no other reason than this, are unlikely to take actions that would seriously impede it progress. NATO-Russia co-operation does not override the interests of its NRC members, but has certainly become a factor of these interests.

**B. A panoptic security culture**

Many NATO experts – both within and without the organization - viewed the Alliance’s early partnerships in terms of defending NATO’s traditional security culture. For these more conservative contemporaries partnerships were initially about getting the most
from its partners. This implied having their contribution to NATO-led peacekeeping, their adaptation to NATO standards, their political moderation and stability — without having to grant them Article 5 guarantees, invest substantial NATO resources or sacrifice the smooth working of NATO decision-making and chain of command, in short, without changing the traditional culture of the Alliance. So, it could not be a focal point, how much partners were to help drive NATO’s development from a purely reactive organization for defense planning and interoperability towards a more panoptic actor. Just this, however, has become the case.

When NATO interacted with the Warsaw Pact/Soviet Union, the two partners – for all their differences — met as equals, discussing that limited range of issues of common interest, mainly force reductions and confidence-building measures. With the creation of partnerships with nation-states, NATO was confronted with the much broader spectrum of concerns common to nation-states, obliged not only to man armed forces, but also to secure national borders, deal with minority issues, respond to natural disasters, combat corruption, combat terrorism. These so-called “new security threats” were not so new to NATO’s partners as they were to the Alliance itself. In some cases these threats were more virulent in partner countries; in others they simply struck partner countries earlier than NATO nations (as with terrorism). In any case, in the course of the 1990’s the more panoptic security culture of NATO’s partners gradually left their mark on the Alliance, which has widened its definition of security accordingly. Among NATO partners Moscow has been perhaps the most consistent advocate for a more “political” NATO, not least because it hoped to make the Alliance less “military” in this way:

- It was Russia who was instrumental in the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC), the main operational capability in the field of civil emergency planning;
- Russia, Ukraine and the Balkan states forced issues of border security upon the Alliance;
- Russia — along with the other partners — put security sector reform and anti-corruption on the agenda;
- Russia launched the initiative within the NRC to involve this body, and thus NATO, in combating Afghan narcotics17.

17 In this context, Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) proposed to establish closer relations with NATO. However, the Alliance is still not ready for such cooperation.
C. A more civilian security culture

If Russia had somewhat contributed to making NATO a more “political” actor, then NATO has helped strengthen the civilian aspects of Russian foreign and security policy. As mentioned above, the earliest NATO efforts at assisting Russia entailed programs at increasing the expertise of civilian defense officials. This idea has been taken up in the agenda of the NRC in the form of a working group on defense reform, which has carried out dozens of expert activities aimed at helping the Russian MOD fulfill its control functions. And while the issue of defense reform in Russia has been a never-ending story, one must assume that the input of NATO experts has found its way into Russian reform proposals to date. In addition, the extensive mil-to-mil contacts over the years have provided NATO with countless opportunities to explain its Nations’ various models of democratic control of armed forces to Russian interlocutors.

Moreover, the NRC mechanisms and co-operation, while driven by such issues as peacekeeping, defense reform and mil-to-mil co-operation, have a highly civilian content as well. Several of the areas of co-operation mentioned in the Rome Declaration or broached since then are civilian in character, i.e. involve ministries other than or in addition to the MOD. These include: struggle against terrorism (inasmuch as it has involved non-military intelligence interaction); non-proliferation; civil emergency planning; NATO-Russia Science Committee and the NATO-Russia Committee on the Challenges to Modern Societies; co-operative airspace initiative. Furthermore, the institutional mechanism of the NRC has enabled Russia to experiment with a different mix of civilian–military decision-making. NATO has always had a convoluted, not to say confused, civilian and military committee structure. The NRC, inasmuch as it took over the NATO model, reflects this fact. Thus, depending on the subject matter, representatives of MFA, MOD, Emercom and/or other ministries take part in the deliberation of working groups. Since, at the end of the day, most issues impact both foreign and defense policy, Russia’s MFA and MOD (and other ministries) are forced to co-ordinate their efforts. And while this inevitably entails turf fights — as it does within NATO nations as well — and though it is difficult to disentangle chains of command, it would seem that the MFA has the lead in the overall co-ordination of most issues.18

18 Thus the initiative to establish a NATO-interoperable peacekeeping brigade seems to have been launched or at least passed on by the MFA.
Russia’s mission to NATO, moreover, is considered by some NATO counterparts a veritable model of interagency decision-making. *In contrast to all NATO missions, with the exception of Canada, it is fully joint. The mission’s MFA and MOD representatives are rumored to co-ordinate their activities well.* In addition, whereas NATO Nations’ representatives are often double-hatted or even triple-hatted, Russia’s mission is in fact focused solely on NRC co-operation. Thus, in this manner, Russian representatives in Brussels have somehow outdone upon the NATO HQ civil-military model, so that at least one representative of the NATO side had expressed his envy at their high level of co-ordination.

Finally, the activities of the NRC are supervised by an external NATO-Russia Joint Monitoring Group, based, from NATO side, on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly as an independent organization. Of course, a parliamentary control group can only be as good as the parliament, which sends it, and Russia’s Federal Assembly has not exactly made a name for itself in rocking occasionally the boat of state. On the other hand, some forces within the Russian parliament continue to perceive and paint the picture of NATO as an aggressive military alliance – sometimes in seeming ignorance of their president’s will.

**D. A more proportional, professional and interoperable security culture**

NATO-Russia co-operation has also contributed to closing the formerly conspicuous gap between Russia’s “hypertrophic” and NATO’s barely sufficient defense culture. Though Moscow’s traditional military-centric societal model collapsed from within after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the following decision to give priority to the country’s economic development was a domestic one, NATO-Russia co-operation has played not a small role in these developments. First and foremost, the realization — by all serious policy-makers — that NATO had no aggressive intentions had partially eliminated — for the first time in perhaps 500 years - the formerly “central” front as a planning priority. Irrespective of the 2007-2009 disagreements about NATO’s potential enlargement on Ukraine and Georgia, American anti-missile systems in Eastern

---

19 NATO cannot be blamed if some Russian politicians and members of the press play a different tune to the public and the General Staff persists in planning theatre operations on this front.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

Europe and Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008, this change of attitude freed up part of Russian forces and thus national resources needed elsewhere, without lessening security in this theatre. In addition, NATO-Russia interaction — both at the seminar table and in the field — have enhanced the partners’ interoperability and professionalism.

NRC activities in the area of defense reform concentrated on microeconomic, recruitment and retraining elements, while several working groups are striving to increase the interoperability of land, sea and air forces. In the field, Russian forces were exposed to NATO Command, Control, Communications (C3) standards and Nations’ different models of noncommissioned officers (NCO) training and financial accountability, to name but two key areas.

Although due to different political disagreements that culminated during Russian-Georgian conflict many of these directions of cooperation were stopped, one can still say that changes in security culture of both sides have deep character and can not be immediately reversed.

Summary

This essay has provided evidence for the emergence of a new security culture in Europe based on NATO-Russian co-operation. It would be foolhardy to suggest that this new culture eclipses those of Russia and NATO Nations; too diverse remain many fields of security policy: threat assessment, recruitment, training, procurement, financial accountability, force planning, parliamentary oversight. This change in security culture also didn’t prevent major political disagreements of the last years. However, the evidence suggests that NATO-Russia security culture does step by step overlap key fields of the partners’ autonomous cultures and is drawing them closer together. Whether NATO and Russia will succeed in converging their cultures more completely in the long run, irrespective of short term disagreements, remains to be seen. Despite serious splits, which occasionally occurred in the NATO-Russia dialogue over the last several years, it can certainly be said, that this future dialogue will depend upon both the continued political will of the 27 (from April 2008 — 29) nations to bring their civilian and military actors together and the success with which these actors share attitudes and practices to meet the growing scope of 21st century threats and challenges.
II. New Challenges For Security Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space

Vladimir Petrovsky

Crises Response/Rapid Reaction Capabilities in Eurasia: Problems and Prospects

The creation of an effective regional security arrangement has been an immediate task for Russia and its post-soviet neighbors after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia and its partners within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992 in Tashkent, have since the early 1990s fully experienced all merits and demerits of collective security. However, the Treaty stood the test and even moved into the new century, upgraded and reinforced.

It would be quite in place here to recall that as early as in 1993 the Council of the Heads of State of the CIS resolved to carry out the first joint peacekeeping operation by the CIS in Tajikistan and prescribed Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan to provide their military forces for the purpose.

However, Kazakhstan’s parliament did not ratify the resolution and, as a result, the peacekeeping forces of only three countries were stationed in Tajikistan, with the Russian 201st Motorized Infantry Division as the main task force. The total strength of the troops made up 7,000 men instead of 16,000 provided for in the resolution of the Council of the Heads of State of the CIS.

In 1995-1996 Kyrgyzstan unilaterally withdrew its peacekeeping battalion from Tajikistan, attributing the decision to the lack of funds to support it. Uzbekistan came next in 1998\(^\text{20}\).

The absence of the effective coordination mechanism, embedded in the collective action, led to the collapse of the idea of a multilateral peacekeeping operation, triggering a storm of criticism in the West in respect of Russia’s “unilateral interference” in Tajikistan’s internal affairs.

\(^{20}\) Krasnaya Zvezda, 23March 1999.
Thus the creation of crises response/rapid reaction capability within the vague CIS structure was far from possible in the 1990s. But, as the new security threats emerged for the CIS member States in the beginning of this decade, including that of the international terrorist attacks, the Collective Security Treaty mechanism turned out to become a useful tool for building sound collective security system in Eurasia.

**The CSTO: Towards an effective collective security system**

The Bishkek summit of the Collective Security Council in October 2000 gave fresh impetus to military integration within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty. At the Bishkek summit it was agreed to establish a joint collective security force over the next five years.

At the Yerevan summit in May 2001, the Collective Security Treaty Heads of States signed a protocol to set up the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in Central Asia.

At the anniversary summit in Moscow on 14 May 2002 the organization’s status was enhanced by the decision to transform the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS into a separate Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Its new status was confirmed with the introduction of a Charter, providing a clearer legal basis for operation, and the creation of some permanent bodies to manage and coordinate its activities.

The increased CSTO’s functions were defined by the Charter as follows: “The member States shall coordinate and harmonize their efforts in combating international terrorism and extremism, the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and arms, organized trans-national crime, illegal migration and other threats to the security of the member States” 21.

However, there was a completely new aspect of interaction that the Central Asian member States were enthusiastic about, namely, the military-technical cooperation. It was boosted by a well-known fact that Central Asian armies are in need of modern weaponry and communication technologies. The CSTO establishment allowed for arms and technologies to be bought within the Organization at Russian domestic prices. Furthermore, plans are built up (although

---

their realization is very slow) for the member States to cooperate in producing and maintaining weapons and military technologies and to engage in joint research and experimental design of weapons, military technology and multi-functional technology. All of this would help to bolster the defensive capacity of Central Asian armies and make membership of the organization a far more attractive option.

The leaders of the six CSTO members States nominated Russia’s former border-guard chief and former head of the Presidential administration, Nikolai Bordyuzha, to serve as the organization’s Secretary-General, signaling their intention to transform it from a “paper tiger” into a full-fledged military-political alliance. Previously, the organization was run by Russian diplomat Valery Nikolaenko, who had no experience in military planning.

In March 2004 Moscow hosted a joint meeting of the CIS and the CSTO Committees of General Staff Chiefs. The participants discussed the development of military and military-technological interaction within the framework of these international organizations. Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General Anatoly Kvashnin chaired the meeting.

The high-ranking military also discussed a plan for the joint activity in the sphere of operative and combat training of the CIS peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They considered the possibility of further unification of a number of laws on defense and security issues.

In the CSTO format the meeting participants focused on the plans for operative and combat training in 2005 and a number of issues pertaining to the upgrading of the CSTO military component up to 2010 and beyond. The participants of the session familiarized themselves with advanced samples of weapons and armaments. The Command of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force recommended the CSTO to add new weaponry to its tables of equipment.

Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization Nikolai Bordyuzha told at a news conference in Yerevan on 10 April 2004: Nowadays our key problems are terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, but not the military threat. According to him, the CSTO should have been “adapted to the security challenges which the CSTO countries were facing.” “We propose the CSTO leaders to define the CSTO’s military component for the next few years and decide whether we are going further towards collective forces
or rapid reaction units. We are currently working on this issue,” the Secretary General said.

The CSTO’s crises response capabilities

The idea to create rapid-reaction forces that could eliminate localized military conflicts, initiated by small groups of extremists, was first brought up among the Collective Security Treaty member States at the end of 2000. At a special meeting, deputy defense ministers, heads of General Staff and deputy foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Russia confirmed that such military units were necessary.

The rapid-reaction forces were expected to be special units consisting of both professional and regular service soldiers and sergeants. They will serve in regular capacities and be present at their permanent bases.

Thus the CSTO had created its own military structure — the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF), stipulated by an agreement in Bishkek in October 2000. The CRDF originally consisted of 4 battalions from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (to 2008 it was increased up to 11 battalions). This force is to be used to respond to regional crises across Central Asia and to fortify porous border areas against terrorist attacks and incursions.

At the Yerevan summit in May 2001, the Collective Security Treaty Heads of State finally signed a protocol to set up the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in Central Asia.

Almost from the start, it was planned to reinforce the CRDF by creating special-purpose forces, and to widen the CRDF sphere of employment by entrusting to it the task of carrying out specials operations. However, the fulfillment of this decision is very slow. The CRDF were intended to be used to control drugs trafficking, particularly to blockade some areas of the likely circulation of drugs, and for some other special operations associated with drugs traffic control.

To increase defense cooperation, the CSTO member States agreed to set 1 January 2004 as a final term for establishing a headquarters of the rapid-reaction forces in Central Asia. It was planned at that time to have 6,000 service personnel and some two dozen warplanes deployed in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.

The decision to set up Joint Headquarters of the collective force and on deploying its aviation component in Kyrgyzstan was adopted by the heads of the CSTO member States at the session of the Collective Security Council in Dushanbe.

In July 2003 it was announced that the Russian air staff sent more than 20 aircraft and 700-strong troops to Kyrgyzstan on mission, separate from that of the international anti-terror coalition forces led by the United States in Central Asia. The Russian troops were authorized to defend the CIS southern border, in full compliance with the international law. They were to operate within the framework of the CIS collective security system. De-facto the deployment started early in December 2002, when Russian combat and transport planes first landed on the airfield.

The Kant air base was officially opened on 23 October 2003. It was the first Russian military base to be opened abroad since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Kant military airfield, located twenty kilometers to the east of Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, is one of the two Kyrgyz facilities capable of handling warplanes. One of them, the international Manas airport, is now being used by the forces of the international anti-terrorist coalition, which played an important role during the military operation in Afghanistan (in 2009 there was an official decision of the Kyrgyz president and parliament to withdraw this base).

In the Soviet times, the Kant airfield was used to train air force pilots. The pilots from the armies of 34 countries were trained there. Among the trainees were, at different times, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Syrian ex-President Hafez Asad, flyers-cosmonauts of Mongolia and India – Gurragchaa Zhugderdemidiin and Rakesh Sharma, and Indian Air Marshal Singh.

The airfield went to the jurisdiction of Kyrgyzstan in 1992. It was extensively used when international terrorist gangs of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan invaded Batken Region of Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000. Military units, armaments, ammunition and food stuff were airlifted from there for the troops taking part in the operation to wipe out the invaders.

In accordance with the 2002 agreements between Bishkek and Moscow, the Russian military group had to make up the backbone of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces in Kant. Up to five hundred Russian servicemen and about twenty aircraft - Su-25, Su-27, An-26 and Mi-8 helicopters were to be deployed at Kant. Russia obliged itself to annually allocate at least fifty million U.S. dollars for the
upkeep of the base. The Kyrgyz side was to hand over to Russia, free of charge, its four L-39 training planes that were stationed there.

The base had to be manned by servicemen from the 5th Russian Air Force Army and the Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces of the Volga-Urals Military District. The Kant air force group of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force is to be used to repulse an aggression of international terrorists against any of the Central Asian countries affiliated to the CSTO.

Stationing of the aircraft at the base would allow, if necessary, to avoid stopovers on the Central Asian members’ airfields of the CIS. The more so since the Headquarters of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force is in Bishkek.

An inter-state agreement was signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan on 22 September 2003, on the status and stay of this Russian air force base. The agreement was signed for a term of fifteen years and can be immediately extended for the next five-year period.

In May 2004 the parliament of Kyrgyzstan ratified an inter-state agreement on the status of Russian military personnel serving at the Kant air force base. In line with the document, the Russian military serving at the base as part of the CSTO Collective Rapid Deployment Force receive the same status as the diplomatic mission’s technical staff. This makes them immune to the criminal prosecution in Kyrgyzstan.

The size of the rapid reaction force in Central Asia continued to grow. Originally it made up about 1,500. Then it more than doubled. Each CSTO country assigned one more battalion to the force, and Tajikistan assigned two battalions in 2004.

The special CSTO ministerial conference in Moscow (2003) approved a large set of documents on the rapid reaction force and gave instructions to the General Staffs of the national armed forces to consider “the force’s format in respect of the western and eastern directions.”

The CSTO rapid reaction forces conducted exercises code-named Rubezh (Frontier) in late July - early August. In course of the maneuvers, the troops regularly practiced prevention of terrorist threats to the CSTO member States and interaction of CSTO units in the liquidation of a maneuvered enemy group supposedly invading Central Asia from Afghanistan.

---

In 2003 Nikolai Bordyuzha pointed out the necessity of qualitative changing of the CSTO Collective Rapid Deployment Force. “Apart from increasing their personnel, we want to change them qualitatively, to change their armaments, equipment, control systems and logistics” he said. The CSTO Charter designed dynamic development of the military component of the CSTO, providing for “joint measures to organize ... an effective collective security system, to establish coalition (regional) groupings of forces and the corresponding administrative bodies and create a military infrastructure, to train military staff and specialists for the armed forces and to furnish the latter with the necessary arms and military technology.”

Real breakthrough in the development of the CSTO military forces was achieved at the February of 2009. A decision to establish a new Collective Forces of Operative Reaction (CFOR) was made by the CSTO’s supreme body. These new CFOR will include the units of all the members of the CSTO including Armenia and Belarus. Earlier, CRDF included only the forces of Russia and 4 Central Asian nations. Besides, CFOR would include not only military, but also police forces. The nucleus of the forces will be Russian (about 10,000 men, mostly, paratroopers). Kazakhstan is planning to give to CFOR about 3-4,000 men. All other countries should provide one battalion, about 400 – 800 men.

**CSTO’s anti-terrorist potential**

The CSTO member States signed nine documents enhancing cooperation against international terrorism and political and religious extremism in May 2000. Cooperation was further enhanced on 11 October 2000, with the signing in Bishkek of the agreement on the establishment of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force to be deployed in conflict areas on the territories of the signatories.

In the last half of 2001 the former Secretary of the CIS Collective Security Council Valery Nikolayenko credited the Force with countering terrorist activity in Central Asia, and in January 2002 the Force commander declared the CRDF combat readiness if the security of the region were seriously threatened.
The CIS Anti-terrorism Centre and the command of the CSTO rapid reaction forces regularly jointly perform an exercise code-named South-Anti-terrorism. Central Asian countries, security forces and special agencies of some CIS member States regularly join the rapid reaction forces within the framework of this military exercise.

The operation highlighted techniques for breaking terrorist sieges and freeing hostages. Originally, this large-scale military exercise was organized by the CIS Anti-terrorism Centre in June 2000. Later, in April 2001 the Centre carried out its first military exercise, code-named South-Anti-terrorism, in Kyrgyzstan. Nine CIS countries participated in this operation.

“The Committee of Secretaries of the Security Council is developing practical measures to counter terrorism and related illicit trafficking in drugs and weapons, illegal migration and trans-national organized crime”, said the CSTO document. The CSTO members declared to the point:

“Arrangements are being made for the mutual use of relevant infrastructures of the States-members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to carry out counterterrorism measures. The intelligence services and counter-terrorist divisions are increasing their combat readiness; joint exercises are being conducted; and coordinated plans of action are being drawn up” 26.

In recent years, the CSTO structures in anti-terrorist sphere work side by side with the SCO anti-terrorist centre (see below).

**The SCO: Model of Eurasian cooperative security?**

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the former Shanghai Five, involves Russia, China and four former Soviet states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It emerged with a related decision at a maiden summit in Shanghai, on 15 June 2001.

Globalist trends were evident in the summit documents and, even more so, at the closed-door presidential conference. No one of the summiteers attempted to bar the Organization off from outsiders. The

---

26 *Statement by the States - members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization: The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan*. Annex to the letter dated 3 December 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Tajikistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

post-Soviet area accounts for a considerable part of Central Asia. It was a zone of the USSR’s exclusive influence in the not-so-distant past, so one could expect the SCO to spread exclusive influence of the two superpowers — Russia and China to the entire area.

Globalization, however, renders ventures of that kind pointless, so the Organization pursues quite a different goal — to incorporate post-Soviet Central Asia into the global politics and security arrangements.

The SCO summit in St. Petersburg in June 2002 adopted a Charter, the Organization’s basic statutory document.

At the end of May 2003 the SCO’s institutionalization was completed, establishing the group’s permanent bodies, including a secretariat to be based in Beijing, and a regional anti-terror structure.

The SCO agreed plans to set up a regional anti-terrorist centre in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek, to transform their fledgling six-nation body into a proper international organization by 2004. In 2008 the headquarters of this center were transferred to Uzbek capital Tashkent. The SCO anti-terrorist centre is based side by side with the Central Asian branch of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Anti-terrorism Centre established in 2002. The SCO held its first anti-terrorism exercise in August 2003 in Kazakhstan27. In March 2007 the first deputy director of the Russian FSB declared that the same year a unified bank of data of the SCO member-states on terrorists should start functioning.

The CSTO and the Shanghai Five began taking first steps towards addressing the new regional security challenges almost concurrently. At the Minsk summit in May 2000, the CST heads of state ratified a number of significant documents. The most important were a ‘Memorandum on Increasing the Effectiveness of the CST and its Ability to Adapt to the Present Day Geopolitical Situation’ and ‘A Model for a Regional Collective Security System’.

Both organizations started to modify the nature of their activities. Great emphasis was placed on fighting terrorism and on the need to form a collective rapid-response peacekeeping unit. Furthermore, a committee of the Security Council Secretaries was set up to ensure that the Security Councils of the member States coordinate approaches to the region’s strategic security.

---

In the same period, the Shanghai Five began to widen its range of activities. At the Dushanbe summit on 5 July 2000, it announced the intention to transform the union into a regional structure primarily concerned with multilateral cooperation. A year later, on 15 June 2001, the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed a declaration that transformed the Shanghai Five into the SCO.

The aims and tasks of the SCO differ from those of the Shanghai Five. The SCO’s priorities are to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal arms proliferation. The Central Asian Regional Anti-terrorist Centre was set up within the SCO to ensure that these objectives are met.

Following the terrorist attacks in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the CSTO and the SCO adjusted their activities to emerging circumstances. Both organizations have identified the fight against international terrorism, separatism and religious extremism as their chief priorities and have set up structures to achieve these goals.

The SCO had undergone a relevant transformation. A major declaration was passed at a meeting of the member States’ defense ministers on 15 May 2002. Reference was made to “the expediency of carrying out joint exercises” and the need to set up “permanently standing working groups within the SCO to implement any opportunities which arise for joint cooperation on regional defense and security issues”.

By mid-2001, therefore, Central Asia had devised a more or less structured system for addressing traditional and contemporary security challenges in the region. This new security system included four of the five post-soviet Central Asian republics, thus covering 90% of the region’s territory and people. In June 2006 this system was still strengthened with Uzbekistan (already a member of the SCO) joining the CSTO.

The defense ministers’ intentions were institutionalized with the signing of the Shanghai Convention on the Fight against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism at the June 2002 St. Petersburg summit. These are commendable amendments that are aimed at strengthening the regional security system in Central Asia.

The secretariat of the SCO was opened in January 2004 in Beijing. The launch of the SCO administrative organ indicated that the SCO

had ended its primary stage and entered its new stage of substantial cooperation. Formal and practical preparations had been over, and the Organization was ready to start full-scale work.

In February 2004 the Russian parliament (the State Duma) ratified the agreement on the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure, signed by the SCO member States in St. Petersburg on 7 June 2002. The document instituted the Regional Anti-Terrorist Centre as a permanent body intended to assist coordination and interaction of the competent bodies of the parties in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism. The document also determined the structure, major tasks and functions of the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure, principles of its formation and relations with other international organizations.

The SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Centre had to be officially launched at the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June 2004 in Tashkent. According to the SCO Charter, the regional anti-terror center is a permanent body with headquarters in Uzbekistan’s capital of Tashkent.

The summit was aimed to fix the SCO’s future development, outline its concrete cooperation in various fields and further promote its role for international and regional issues. The SCO heads of state underlined their cooperation in diplomacy, security, economy, transportation and culture, and signed a declaration. All SCO members inked an agreement on cracking down on illegal drugs trafficking. A new legal document on foreign relations of the SCO was also ratified at the summit.

Western analysts believe that the SCO had developed into a regional security organization of a serious content, first conducting two sets of joint military exercises during August-September 2003 in eastern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Later, members of the SCO regularly conducted different antiterrorist exercises: Peaceful mission-2007 in Xingjian and Volga-Ural military district, Volgograd-Antiterror 2008, etc. The SCO provides for Russia and China a non-negligible counterweight to the US influence, and is attractive to the former Soviet Central Asian republics because of its broader and more practical focus on the issues such as Uighur separatism in China and Islamic radicalism in Central Asia, which are perceived to be serious local security threats29.

---

GUUAM: An attempt for “soft” security arrangement

GUUAM is a sub-regional formation of five states created in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, later joined by Uzbekistan in 1999 (Uzbekistan left GUUAM in May 2005). It primarily concentrated on joint economic projects, which included:

- Creating free trade area;
- Coordinating economic policy in energy supply, transportation, tourist and recreation business, and food industry;
- Drawing up rules for transporting transit shipments through the territory of the member States;
- Creating an international chamber of commerce and industry;
- Entering a multilateral agreement on the mutual conversion of the national currencies; coordinating standpoints on key issues in the negotiation process on joining the WTO;
- Harmonizing the attitude of the member States towards creating new international economic order30.

In terms of defense and security, all five GUUAM members proved incapable of concentrating their resources (very weak, in several cases) to address the main objective: uniting in a coalition security system at the regional level. It became apparent that the governments of several states (Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan) were striving for closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic structures, viewing them as guarantors of a stronger position for these states not only within their own region, but across the whole CIS. However, such foreign policy agenda proved unworkable in the absence of cooperation with Russia.

In May 2003 it was reported that the US administration was ready to grant funds for financing the first stage of creating a “virtual centre” for information exchange between the law enforcement structures of the United States and the countries of the GUUAM inter-state association whose members were Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia.

This has been reported by the press service of the US Department of State. According to it, this was a centre for exchanging information on the fight against terrorism, illegal drugs trafficking and other dangerous crimes, as well as on issues concerning the guarding of

30 Central Asia and the Caucasus No 2, March 2003.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

borders, customs and foreign trade. It was planned to be created in the form of the Inter-State System of Processing Information with the participation of the United States and the GUUAM member States.

The documents on the implementation of this and a number of other joint programs with the USA were submitted for signing to the Presidents of the GUUAM countries during their summit in Ukraine in July 2003 in the city of Yalta (the Crimea).

Despite strong effort undertaken by the GUUAM, over the next several years, to transform itself into a powerful geopolitical actor, it so far never had unequivocal positive effect, but had side-effect of Uzbekistan’s breaking off with the Organization in May 2005. Most probably, the GUUAM could further evolve as a sub-regional security arrangement only if it survives as a sound economic cooperation mechanism. A free trade zone and/or transport corridors projects, if successful, could in the future require a joint effort to secure common economic interests of the GUUAM member States.

Nevertheless, the GUAM even after the withdrawal of Uzbekistan continued to exist and develop. In 2005 it got the status of international organization headquartered in Kiev. The New Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko who came to power as a result of the “colored” revolution in Ukraine in 2005 actively tried to develop military and security cooperation with other GUAM members, especially with Georgia that also had its own “colored” revolution. The GUAM countries also continued to develop relations with the Western and Eastern European countries, especially, within the framework of the Community of Democratic Choice. It is very important that during the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 the GUAM countries mostly supported Georgia, while the CSTO and SCO countries mostly (although very carefully) supported Russia.

Cooperation and coordination of Eurasian security arrangements

The current Eurasian security picture represents a controversial combination of competition and cooperation between the former adversaries in the Cold War, who at present strive to become partners and friends.

Despite the growing acrimony between Russia and the West (which was especially acute during August-September of 2008),
they remain interdependent in many areas of vital mutual interest. The West still needs Russia to assist in the global campaign against terrorism. Moreover, stability in the increasingly volatile CIS, which now borders the EU and NATO, cannot be achieved without Russia’s constructive engagement with the West. This interdependence makes a substantial barrier against the emergence of a new strategic rivalry.

Western analysts believe that Moscow should further recognize that Russia and the West have common concerns about the stability of the CIS. Russian military doctrine states that local conflicts along its borders as well as potential failed states threaten Russia’s security. The EU, OSCE and NATO share this worry. This could become a conceptual basis for further cooperation between the EU and NATO, on the one hand, and the CSTO and SCO, on the other.

“The Collective Security Treaty Organization is developing cooperation with the relevant organs of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the groundwork has been laid for contacts with the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other international security organizations”, read the Statement by the CSTO member States, addressed to the UN Secretary General.

Thus the CSTO manifested its willingness to develop cooperation with the Western counterparts. “The Collective Security Treaty Organization meets the requirements to actively participate in the system of cooperation among regional organizations evolved by the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council”, - the Statement further reads. A direct proposal to start a dialogue on the concrete areas of cooperation, made by the Secretary-General of the CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha, as long back as in summer 2004, did not yield an answer from NATO. However, the desire to cooperate with the CSTO and SCO was expressed in the new EU Central Asian strategy.

The CSTO rapid reaction forces have not yet interacted directly with the troops of the anti-Taliban coalition deployed in Central Asia, the Forces Commander Major General Sergey Chernomyrdin stated.

---

32 Ibid, p. 128.
33 Statement by the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization: The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan.
in 2004. Nevertheless, “Russia and its partners — the United States, Great Britain and France — are working to accomplish the same task in Central Asia — that of interdicting the threat of terrorism”. This is why, said the General, the CSTO forces can possibly cooperate with the coalition troops deployed in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, if a pertinent decision is made\textsuperscript{34}. This is especially important now when the focus of the US (and Western) strategic interests is once again returning to Afghanistan.

In this respect, practical steps towards coordination and cooperation, involving the regional security arrangements, could be, as it was mentioned above, of paramount importance. This is even more important in view of the fact that more than decade of Western military outreach has not yet persuaded many Russian decision-makers, especially among the military, that the US and NATO are not a threat.

Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine adopted in 2000 are still based on the assumption of a potential conflict between the US-led West and the countries such as Russia, that clearly manifested their support of the multi-polar world\textsuperscript{35}. To achieve the goal of cooperation, the EU and NATO strategic documents need to be amended, so as to treat Russia and its Eurasian allies more definitely as reliable partners in coping with common threats and challenges in the region. Practical cooperation in the field (especially, in and around Afghanistan) should solidify this change of strategic perceptions that is still to be expected in the future.

\textit{Andrey Kazantsev}

\textbf{Post-Soviet Security Organizations With Russia’s Participation: Can the Culture of Free-riding Be Overcome?}

\textbf{Characteristic features of integration on the post-Soviet space: the legacy of the 1990s}

Uncertain national identities and uncertain foreign policy priorities were among the most important factors underlying

\textsuperscript{34} ITAR-TASS - World Service Wire 01.06.2004.

international behavior of the post-Soviet countries in the 1990s\textsuperscript{36}. For example, three key documents defining (although a bit vaguely) post-Soviet Russian foreign and security policy priorities (Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Concept and Military Doctrine) were approved only by the second Russian President V. Putin in 2000.

Absence of clear-cut priorities and popular reminiscences of the Soviet period led to the emergence of multitudinous, often mutually contradictory plans of integration on the post-Soviet space. Not infrequently, these plans resulted in institutional parallelism between the integration projects. Parallel or even mutually contradictory and rival character of the integration structures led to the wasting of time and scarce resources of the crises-ridden economies.

However, the post-Soviet political elites were realists. They understood that if different integration structures did not work properly, they could be effectively used as tools of domestic electoral propaganda (thus different, often contradictory, identities were used in the internal power struggles). For example, two integration structures (the Union State of Russia and Belarus and the Customs Union\textsuperscript{37}) were created mostly as “arguments” for Boris Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996.

Absence of clear priorities also led to a kind of opportunistic foreign policy. In the uncertain situation of the 1990s post-Soviet leaders mostly had no other choice but to cooperate with everybody, to get all possible assistance from all sides. However, this policy had one essential shortcoming. It meant that the post-Soviet countries had no genuine desire (or even opportunity) to invest into the creating of a framework for long-term mutually beneficial cooperation. In such an environment the cooperation becomes chaotic, occasional and ad hoc-based (or, as Hobbes would say, “short, nasty and brutish”).

In fact, the post-Soviet countries in their integration policies turned into some kind of short-term opportunistic profit-seekers. Theoretically, such a situation is well-known within political science.

\textsuperscript{36} Of course, those two were only some of the aspects of internal political, social, economical and cultural instability of the New Independent States (NIS).

\textsuperscript{37} This included Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz republic, Russia and Tajikistan, now transformed into Eurasian Economic Community.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

It is called a “free-rider dilemma”\(^\text{38}\). This dilemma appears, for example, when a person is not paying for using public transport and seems to get his short-term gain. However, if the majority stops buying tickets, public transport will completely disappear\(^\text{39}\). Free-rider dilemma demonstrates the reason why actors underutilize available resources. In our case, it is a resource of long-term security interaction on the post-Soviet space.

This type of situation emerges if countries try to cooperate without solid investing into the framework of cooperation and participate in different integration projects without assuming any serious obligations. If an individual country acts in this way, it can gain some immediate benefit. But if all countries concerned follow this lead, integration and cooperation become phantoms and all sides are destined to lose. Free-rider dilemma is well known inside such international security organization as NATO, where some small European countries for decades didn’t invest enough resources into the defense sphere hoping that the USA would provide security for them automatically. In our case, the behavior of the post-Soviet New Independent States (NIS) could be modeled as an “integration within the community of free-riders”. This situation is quite different from NATO where free-riding is, at least, not a recognized norm.

This model implies that most documents of regional inter-state organizations should be perceived only as declarations. If integration mechanisms work, it is not a rule, but, rather, an exclusion. All positive interactions within the framework of such organizations have occasional character and can be explained by different accidental circumstances. However, sometimes these accidental interactions lead to the reactivation of some rival or parallel integration regional organizations. In this case the organization is used as an institutional framework for occasional ad hoc opportunistic interaction. So, real resources are constantly shifted between these parallel or rival organizations.

\(^{38}\) Why rational actors neglect the actual resources that are available to them or “free-rider dilemma” (in our case, it is resources of integration and collective action within regional organizations) was demonstrated in: Olson M. *The logic of collective action*. Cambridge (Mass): Harvard Univ. Press, 1965; Hardin R. *Collective action*. Baltimore(Md): John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1982.

\(^{39}\) In fact, this is a case of all post-Soviet public transport systems. So, this type of behavior is characteristic of not only international performance of New Independent States.
Constant shift of resources and priorities brings institutional instability. Phantom institutions often appear only to be forgotten in a year or two, to be reactivated then and after all, to be overlooked again\(^{40}\). New institutions constantly spring up and old institutions are incessantly reorganized. This institutional instability creates a kind of cynicism towards regional integration and, by a feedback loop, reinforces free-rider behavior of the member states.

Besides, opportunistic policies and uncertain identities mutually strengthen each other. The first create a specific structure of interests. The second develop specific culture and world-view. Thus, policies and identities evolve into a coherent system of ideology and interest.

If member states fail to invest into the long-term cooperation, it often signifies scarcity of their recourses, but not a lack of need for such an investment. So, it requires some kind of sponsorship, which can be external or internal. Internally, within the post-Soviet space, the role of a sponsor had always been played by Russia. Externally, it had usually been played by the USA, EU and other Western donors. It should be mentioned that practically all post-Soviet integration organizations have been sponsored either by Russia (the CIS, the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Community, etc.) or by the West (the GUUAM\(^{41}\) and the Central Asian Cooperation Organization – CACO, before Russia entered this organization (see below)). Sometimes, oil rich Kazakhstan is also trying to be a sponsor, especially, in Central Asian integration processes.

In this situation, three possible models of regional behavior of the post-Soviet countries are discernible.

1. To constantly keep producing different integration organizations and projects ("opportunistic integrationist strategy"). This, in fact, can be used to solve either internal or external problems of mostly bilateral character. For example, Kazakhstan has a strong interest in creating a common trade and security zone with Russia. It would help resolve a lot of Kazakh domestic and external difficulties. To reach this pragmatic goal, the Kazakh president tried to exploit plenty of different multilateral regional integration

\(^{40}\) The Central Asian Union was reorganized into the Central Asian Economic Community. After that the Central Asian Economic Community was reorganized into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, but later on it was dissolved (see below).

\(^{41}\) It includes Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (suspended its participation in the grouping), Azerbaijan and Moldova.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

structures (the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Single Economic Space of Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus and, finally, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization), but they never worked properly.

On the other hand, this “institutional creativity” occasionally can be somehow used for settling of short-term problems. For example, half a year after Russian accession to the CACO, the Kazakh president proposed to create a new Central Asian regional organization, this time without Russian participation, simply to “ideologically” distance himself from Russia after the “orange revolution” in Ukraine (see below).

The payment for expected, but almost always not materialized short-term gains of this strategy increased chaos on the Post-soviet space.

2. The second choice is to concentrate on bilateral relations with other post-Soviet countries (“isolationist strategy”). If multilateral regional organizations do not perform, it is reasonable to withdraw from them or simply to ignore their activities, formally remaining a member state42. This way was chosen by Uzbekistan (partially) and most openly by Turkmenbashi’s Turkmenistan.

3. The third choice is to invest into multilateral organizations and to try to bring order into their activities (“responsible integrationist strategy”). Russia has too complicated interests on the post-Soviet space to simply withdraw from all multilateral institution. By doing so, it would only increase chaos in this part of the world. So, Russia is forced to continue to invest resources into different post-Soviet regional organizations trying, at the same time, to render them more efficient. However, Russian policy in this part of the world is characterized by deep contradiction. Russian authorities can not solve the dilemma. On the one hand, they tend to treat Post-Soviet space as a potential imperial sphere of interest. However, this involves unbearable costs. It would require open use of force against any external force that tries to penetrate this sphere as well as open oppression of the New Independent States’ political elites and identities. On the other hand, Russian authorities try to use integration rhetoric based on the old Soviet links and identities as

42For example, Uzbek share of the capital of CACO’s regional bank was used to finance only Uzbek projects. Inside the CIS Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan traditionally abstained from all security and economic cooperation projects. However, Uzbekistan actively participated in Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s activities, since this organization included China and was perceived as not post-Soviet.
a kind of “soft power” legitimating Russian influence in the “near abroad”. However, neither Russian, nor the New Independent States’ elites are ready to really integrate the transferring significant amount of their resources and of the degree of control over domestic issues to the collective international bodies.

Three glaring examples of the post-Soviet security organizations fully sponsored by Russia (at least, at certain period of their existence) will be analyzed below from a free-riding culture standpoint.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The CIS appeared as something in between the organization that had to ensure a “civilized divorce” of former Soviet Republics and the organization that had to ensure their integration on a new basis.

The Agreement to create the CIS was signed in Minsk on 8 December 1991. This treaty was signed by only three republics of the former USSR (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus), very secretly, without due public discussion and without any consultations with other former Soviet republics. The participants of the treaty were much more interested in dissolving the USSR, than in the institutional design of a new organization. Besides, the dissolution of the USSR had one very short-term ad hoc motive: to get rid of Soviet President M. Gorbachev and to ensure B. Yeltsin’s victory in a power-struggle for Kremlin. This combination of grand, but unreal ideas and opportunistic real motives became characteristic of the CIS.

According to the agreement, all parties to the treaty committed themselves to saving and upkeeping a single strategic military space, including a unified control over nuclear armaments. They also agreed to co-ordinate external policy and jointly fight organized crime.

However, separate action of the three republics caused dissatisfaction of other republics (especially, of Central Asian ones). As a result, on 21 December 1991 the Protocol to the Decision on the Creating of the CIS was signed in the Kazakh capital Alma-Ata by 11 former Soviet Union’s republics (except for Georgia that joined the CIS after ousting radical Nationalist President Z. Gamsachurdia, and three Baltic states). The Alma-Ata declaration

---

41 The policy of Belarus inside the union state with Russia is the best example of this.
42 Agreement on the Creation of the CIS, Minsk, 8 December 1991, Article 6.
43 Agreement on the Creation of the CIS, Minsk, 8 December 1991, Article 7.
was signed simultaneously. It repeated the principle of saving the unified command over strategic military forces and the unified nuclear controls.

On 22 January 1993, the CIS Statute was approved by the summit of the heads of states in Mink. The CIS member states committed themselves to abstain from any actions able to endanger other CIS nations’ security. The Statute provided for a coordinated security and defense policy, a system of collective defense and joint conducting of peace-keeping operations, a common border-guarding.

The Statute determined the structure of the CIS main bodies. The Council of Heads of States was defined as the supreme political decision-making body. The Council of Heads of Governments had to coordinate activities in various spheres. It is very important that the CIS Statute provided for a consensus decision-making and did not stipulate sanctions for failing to fulfill member states’ obligations. Coordination of military activities was subject to the Council of Defense Ministers and the Supreme Command of the Unified Armed Forces’ (the latter was abolished in 1994). Further development of military cooperation has been linked to the Collective Security Treaty (CST), signed on 15 May 1992 in Tashkent (see below about the CST Organization). According to this treaty, the Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation of the CIS and some other committees were formed.

The Council of Foreign Ministers is responsible for coordination of external activities of member states. Common border-guarding should be realized through such bodies as the Council of Commanders of Border-guarding Troops and special Coordination Service, a constantly working body created in 1992. In this sphere the main documents are the Concept and the Treaty on Cooperation in Border-guarding (26 May 1995). They were signed by Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1999 the Council on Border Issues of the member states of the “Customs Union” (the organization that

---

46 Agreement on the Creation of the CIS, Minsk, 8 December 1991, Article 17.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

Later evolved into the Eurasian Economic Community, or EvrAzEC) was created.

The Council of Internal Affairs Ministers (since 1996) and the Coordination Council of Prosecutor-Generals (since 1995) are the tools of cooperation of law-enforcement agencies. A treaty regulating the actions of police forces of the CIS countries on the territory of the other CIS member state (4 June 1999), an agreement on joint crime control (25 November, 1998) and drugs trafficking control cooperation (30 November 2000) were signed within the CIS.

The Council of Heads of Security and Special Services of the CIS member states coordinates countering organized crime and terrorism (since 28 March 1997). The Executive Bureau is a standing body of the Council.

Finally, the CIS nominally authorized peace-keeping operations, for example, in Abkhazia (Georgia). This operation was finally stopped when Georgia proclaimed its withdrawal from the CIS in 2008 as a result of the armed conflict with Russia.

However, all these integration institutions’ activities are “neutralized” by a simple fact: the decisions made within the CIS legally have no mandatory force for member states. In practice, they are fulfilled from time to time, when there are other occasional circumstances compelling member-nations to adhere to the CIS decisions. As a result, the CIS documents have mostly turned into declarations and propaganda for domestic electoral purposes. The CIS member states are mainly trying to get short-term gains from their participation in the organization, having no real desire to put any resources into the long-term cooperation structures or seriously commit themselves to such cooperation. That is why only a small share of the CIS agreements are realizable (mainly, in the sphere of building bureaucratic structures or common declarations). Out of the list of more or less serious cooperation projects, actually only those supported by Russian resources are fulfilled.

For example, the elements of collective security system left from the Soviet time functioned mostly at Russia’s expense (Soviet air defense system). Old Soviet strategic nuclear forces that under the spirit of the Collective Security Treaty have to provide nuclear umbrella for all member states also belong to Russia. Nuclear missiles and strategic bombers that belonged to Ukraine and Kazakhstan
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

were transferred to Russia, partially with the assistance of Western donors\(^{50}\) and partially by Russia itself\(^{51}\).

At the early half of the 1990s Russia maintained key elements of the New Independent States’ armed forces (for example, a “common army” with Turkmenistan). It also financed many former Soviet units based on the territories of other former Soviet republics and later turned into the elements of respective national armies (in Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Crimea), pulled out to Russia or turned into Russian military bases. Russian border-guards defended the borders of Transcaucasia and Central Asia during all the 1990s (Tajik-Afghan border, through which the bulk of illegal drugs turnover to the European markets passed, was especially important).

Economic integration within the CIS was also almost non-existent. The volumes of mutual trade steadily decreased. From the economic point of view, some kind of a unified space was kept alive mainly due to subsidized or unpaid for energy supplies from Russia. Unified social space was partially supported by the semi-legal migration of workforce into Russia and uncontrolled remittance of incomes (sometimes of criminal or semi-criminal origin) to such countries as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova, where they still constitute a substantial (in case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan even lion’s) share of national GNP.

Finally, from the moment of the CIS formation, its member states participated in, at least, six armed conflicts, where they (in different forms and degrees) supported different parties.

1. Nagorny Karabakh. This was the fiercest military conflict between the CIS nations. It started at the end of the USSR’s existence due to the attempt of mostly Armenian population of this autonomous region to secede from Azerbaijan. Regular army of neighboring Armenia was drawn into the conflict (although this fact was never officially recognized). The war over secession was highly successful for Armenians. Azerbaijan retaliated by an effective transport blockade that put Armenian economy on the verge of total collapse. The warfare was accompanied with the intensive ethnic cleansings committed by both sides. Besides, Azerbaijan more than

---

\(^{50}\) For example, nuclear warheads and missiles from Ukraine and Kazakhstan were transferred to Russia, which was highly important for decreasing general instability created by the dissolution of the USSR. Ukraine and Kazakhstan, in their turn, got Western assistance.

\(^{51}\) For example, strategic bombers from Ukraine were purchased by Russia for writing off Ukrainian debt for Russian natural gas.
once accused Russia of assisting Armenia with arms supplies. Now the conflict is in a “frozen” state.

2. South Ossetia. The attempts of Radical Nationalist Georgian President Z. Gamsahurdia to violently restrict the autonomy of South Ossetia led to this region’s secession. Georgia many times accused Russia of being biased towards South Ossetia\(^{52}\). Until the August of 2008 Russia was the major peace-keeping operation actor in the region. Other peace-keeping units consisted of the forces of Georgia and South Ossetia themselves.

3. Abkhazia. The attempts of Georgian President E. Shevardnadze to restrict the autonomy of Abkhazia led to its factual secession. Georgian government repeatedly accused Russia of giving assistance to Abkhazia. Until the August of 2008 Russia was conducting a CIS-authorized peace-keeping operation in the region.

4. Transnistria. This region seceded from Moldova since its mostly Russian and Ukrainian population was afraid of the attempts of Moldovan nationalists to join the neighboring Romania, thus changing ethnic balance of the country. The conflict was ceased mostly due to the spontaneous intervention of Russian military units stationed in the region. Now Russia is conducting a peace-keeping operation aimed to prevent violence recommencement. However, the Moldovan government had accused Russian side of being biased towards Transnistria.

5. Tajikistan. During the first period of the Tajik civil war Russia and its CST partners, on the one hand, and Uzbekistan, on the other hand, militarily supported different rival factions of the victorious Popular Front (see below about the CSTO) against the Islamic-Democratic coalition. Later, Russia supported the Rakhmonov government against the Uzbek-supported military coup and invasion.

6. In August 2008 Georgian President M. Saakashvili tried to recapture the South Ossetian territory. This led to a full-scale involvement of Russia. As a result, Georgian forces in Abkhazia

\(^{52}\) It should be taken into account that although in some cases accusations of this kind had some substantial grounds, in other cases they were simply driven by the desire to draw some other international players into the conflict (mainly, the US and major European countries), and, simultaneously, to rally the people around unpopular government by creating the image of enemy. This is true mainly in case of Georgia in some periods of its post-Soviet existence, but it can be also applied to international behavior of some other NIS.
and South Ossetia were destroyed. Russia officially recognized the independence of both states (*this step was not supported by any of the CIS and CSTO member states*).

It could be presumed that a serious threat posed by international terrorism would increase the effectiveness of the CIS security activities. Fighting terror is equally important for all CIS member states, besides it correlates with the activities of the US-headed global antiterrorist coalition. However, real cooperation in this sphere turned out to be quite limited.

On 4 June 1999, the Treaty on Cooperation of the CIS Member States in Fighting Terrorism was signed during the Minsk summit. On 21 June 2000, the Program of Fighting International Terrorism and Other Extremist Activities, valid until 2003 was signed by all CIS countries except Turkmenistan.

On 1 December 2000, a decision to create antiterrorist centre of the CIS was made. The centre, staffed with 60 officers, is located in Moscow and fulfils mostly analytical and coordination functions. On 7 October 2002, a decision to create a Central Asian branch of this centre in Bishkek was adopted at the Chisinau summit. However, this decision was not supported by the two Central Asian countries – Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Thus, this decision was backed only by the then CSTO’s Central Asian member states (see below).

As an organization, in the sphere of fighting terror the CIS also turned out to be quite inefficient. For example, both Georgia and Russia signed the CIS treaty on fighting terrorism (1999). However, even after signing the treaty Russia constantly accused Georgia of harboring Chechen terrorists (especially, Ruslan Gelaev) for a long time.

The infectiveness and nominal character of many CIS activities became quite evident not only to experts and political decision-makers, but also to wide public. Consequently, the attempts to reform this organization, raising its efficiency, were regularly undertaken. However, they mostly came to be purely bureaucratic changes and did not lead to a qualitatively increased cooperation.

Creating of other interest- or identity-based subregional unions was another attempt to raise the post-Soviet countries’ integration effectiveness. One can name in this respect the Union of Russia and Belarus, the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Community, the

---

53 However, Azerbaijan supported the decision to create the Anti-terrorist centre only partially.
Common Economic Space of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, the GUUAM and the Caucasian Group of Four. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of most of these organizations was not much higher than that of the CIS.

So, the CIS activities still bear some kind of link between opportunism and free riding behavior model, stamped with the lack of stable identities and priorities, constant need in sponsorship (in this case, mostly Russian) for constructing long-term interaction framework, institutional instability and practical ineffectiveness.

**The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)**

Paradoxically, the CSTO, which later evolved into relatively viable (according to the standards of the post-Soviet space), although very modest by the scale of its activities, organization, had appeared as a classical CIS combination of short-term ad hoc agreement and grand post-Soviet bureaucratic phantasmagoria.

The Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed by the CIS states on 15 May 1992 in Tashkent. It came into effect in 1994. The treaty reproduced the principles that were declared in the basic CIS documents. It said: “In case of threat to security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several States Parties or threat to international peace and security, the States Parties will immediately put into action the mechanism of joint consultations with a view to coordinating their positions and taking measures to eliminate the threat that has emerged.” “If an aggression is committed against one of the States Parties by any state or a group of states, it will be considered as an aggression against all the States Parties to this Treaty. In case an act of aggression is committed against any of the States Parties, other States Parties will render if necessary assistance, including military one, as well as support with the means at their disposal through an exercise of the right to collective defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.”

The Collective Security Treaty is defensive by its character; it is not directed against other states. Moreover, it views the collective security system on the post-Soviet space as a part of the universal

---

54 It includes Russia and three Transcaucasian countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia).
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

European and Asian collective security system, should it emerge in future.

Security and defense cooperation between the CIS member states was to some degree inevitable. They faced similar threats, possessed the same defense technologies, similar military, security and police structures, similar education and culture of military, special service and law-enforcement officers. We have already shown that, irrespective of all those positive preconditions, military and security cooperation between the CIS countries did not work properly.

As a result of signing the CST, some institutions for coordination security and defense policy of the CIS countries were created (the Council of Defense Ministers, Council of Chiefs of Staffs of the CIS (CST) Armed Forces and some other committees). Military-technical cooperation between the CIS members was somewhat spruced up, some small-scale exercises were conducted and a unified air defense system was consolidated. In 1995 some important documents were signed within the CST (the Declaration of CST Member States, Concept of Collective Security, Main Directions of Military Cooperation).

However, the real actions within the CST were mostly focused on Central Asia. Uzbekistan, who initiated signing of the CST, was initially the main proponent of applying the Treaty to Central Asia.

It was mostly concerned with the situation in neighboring Tajikistan. After a coalition of Islamists and Democrats overthrew the post-Communist President Nabiev57, a civil war started between this coalition and the post-Communist Popular Front. The clashes went on along regional and sub-ethnic lines. One of the factions of the Popular Front had close ethnic and political links with Uzbekistan. Besides, the representatives of the Islamic-Democratic coalition had territorial claims to Uzbekistan58. At the same time, Uzbekistan (which is the biggest Central Asian state) had serious domestic problems with religious extremism (especially, in the overpopulated Ferghana valley). Besides, at the end of the Soviet period, at the Kyrgyz side of Ferghana valley ethnic clashes between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz broke out. Finally, a “war of all against all” started in neighboring Afghanistan, after pro-Soviet regime of Najibulla

57 In fact, this vivid and strange for the Westerners coalition resembled that of the initial phase of Iranian Islamic Revolution.
58 Besides, they threatened Russian ethnic minority (proclaimed a collective hostage by some field commanders), which also was a reason behind Russian involvement.
was toppled down by the Mujaheddin coalition. So, the threat of a full-scale destabilization loomed large in the region.

In this situation Russia was drawn into Tajik civil war, where it (and, even to greater degree, Uzbekistan) supported the Popular Front. The Collective Security Treaty became, to some extent, a legal basis of such involvement. After bloody battles, accompanied by sub-ethnic cleansing, the Popular Front captured Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe. The leader of the Front E. Rakhmonov (later, Rakhmon) became the president of Tajikistan. Simultaneously, there was a heavy crackdown on any opposition in Uzbekistan. Thus, the situation in Central Asia was temporarily and partially stabilized.

However, the forces of the Islamic-Democratic coalition (officially transformed into the United Tajik Opposition) launched an effective guerrilla war from the territory of Afghanistan, where they were assisted by Tajik faction of Interim President B. Rabbani and warlord A. Masud. In this situation Russia was forced to defend the Tajik-Afghan border actively. Simultaneously, Russia, Iran and the Central Asian countries promoted a peace process between the Rakhmonov government and the United Tajik Opposition. This led to the power-sharing agreement between the parties.

Uzbekistan, which played a crucial role in the Popular Front’s victory, was dissatisfied with the application of the agreement, which was not in favor of the Uzbek-patronized Leninabad faction of the Popular Front. It even organized an abortive Colonel Chudayberdoyev’s invasion and coup d’etat attempt from the Uzbek territory into the Tajik corner of Ferghana valley. In this collision Russia supported the new ruling Tajik coalition, while the dissatisfied Uzbekistan abstained from any activities within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty.

The mechanisms of the Collective Security Treaty were employed in the second half of the 1990s for guarding the Tajik-Afghan border, which was increasingly used by Afghan drug traffickers. Two Central Asian CST members (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) provided their battalions for this purpose. However, the effectiveness of these

---

59 At that moment the Russian 201st mounted infantry division and border-guarding units were stationed in Tajikistan. They were engaged in the conflict.

60 Later, after Tajik peace accord, this Tajik faction became Russia’s ally, but Uzbekistan supported other anti-Taliban faction of ethnically Uzbek warlord A.-R. Dostum.
forces was very low\textsuperscript{61}. So, these forces were pulled out of Tajikistan and concentrated on guarding their national borders (especially, with Afghanistan). Simultaneously, Russian border-guarding units were pulled out of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and concentrated on guarding the Tajik-Afghan border (and in the new millennium slow withdrawal of Russian border-guards from Tajik borders started, now there is only a special FSB consultative group).

In 1999 and 2000, the threat of great scale destabilization re-emerged in Central Asia. Afghanistan was fully occupied by the “Taliban” forces. Rabbani’s government, on the other hand, became the most important Russian ally and also an ally of some Central Asian states. The “Taliban” (assisted by Al-Qaeda) formed a coalition with different radical Islamic groups in Central Asia. Thr Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan of T.Yuldashev and J.Namangani was the strongest among those groups. In 1999-2000 it tried to make use of the weak control of Kyrgyz central government over the Kyrgyz part of Ferghana valley and set up a base for attacking neighboring Uzbekistan there. The CST member states (as well as Uzbekistan that abstained from any CST activities at the time) militarily assisted the Kyrgyz Republic in repelling that aggression\textsuperscript{62}.

The threat posed by the Taliban and other extremist movements was one of the reasons for the reactivation of the CST. On 2 April 1999, the Protocol on the Prolonging of the CST was signed in Moscow by 6 CIS members (out of original 12): Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Russia. On 7 October 2002, the Statute of the CSTO and the Agreement on the legal status of the Organization were signed. On 18 September 2003, those documents came into force. Thus, the CSTO as a security organization different from the CIS was created.

In accordance with the CST (1992), the CSTO Statute prioritizes political means of guaranteeing security over military ones\textsuperscript{63}. At the same time, it reads: “In order to attain the purposes of the Organization, the member states shall take joint measures to organize within its framework an effective collective security system, to establish coalition (regional) groupings of forces and corresponding

\textsuperscript{61} According to some press reports, they let drug traffickers to pass the border for bribes.

\textsuperscript{62} Although, the forces of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were finally destroyed only by American-led antiterrorist coalition in Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{63} The Statute of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Chisinau, 7 October 2002, Article 3.
administrative bodies and create a military infrastructure, to train military staff and specialists for the armed forces and to furnish the latter with the necessary arms and military technology” 64.

The CSTO Statute sees neutralizing new threats and challenges as the main direction of organization’s activities. “The member states shall coordinate and harmonize their efforts in combating international terrorism and extremism, the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and arms, organized transnational crime, illegal migration and other threats to the security of the member states” 65.

The structure of the CSTO bodies is as follows. The Collective Security Council is the supreme body of the CSTO. It consists of the heads of the member states. The Permanent Council consisting of representatives of the member states functions on the regular basis between the sessions of Collective Security Council. The Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Defense Ministers and Council of National Security Councils’ Secretaries coordinate the activities of the respective national bodies. The CSTO has a constantly functioning Secretariat (headed by the Secretary-General) and the Unified Military Staff. The most important distinction of the CSTO from the CIS is that the decisions of CSTO’s supreme bodies are obligatory for all member states. The Statute envisions sanctions for non-fulfillment of national commitments within the CSTO (for example, exclusion from the Organization) 66.

Three components or three collective security regions can be distinguished within the CSTO: 1) European (forces of the so-called Union State of Russia and Belarus); 2) Transcaucasian (allied forces of Russia and Armenia); 3) Central Asian (forces of Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). So, in fact, all three CSTO’s regions of collective security have only one thing in common: Russian participation. Moreover, Armenia and Belarus still do not have any forces integrated into the CSTO institutional structure (the plans to create such structure were proclaimed only in 2009). The forces of Armenia and Belarus operate on the basis of bilateral agreements with Russia.

It should be noticed that the motives of participation in the CSTO are also different for the countries belonging to each “subregion”. For the Central Asian countries fighting Islamic extremism, international terrorism and drugs trafficking is the key problem. Armenia is mostly interested in the CSTO as a mechanism for neutralizing the potential military coalition of Azerbaijan and Turkey (which is dangerous for this country, taking into account the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict). The Belarussian participation in the CSTO is a part of a more ambitious plan of creating the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Besides, Belarusian President A. Lukashenko sees the major potential threat for his country from the enlarged NATO.\(^{67}\)

The Creation of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) for Central Asia in 2001 is the major achievement of the CSTO. Originally they consisted of four battalions, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan giving one battalion each. The force was 1,500-strong and had a military staff. At the end of 2004 the strength of the CRDF was increased more than two-fold, each country adding one more battalion (and Tajikistan — two). Besides, in case of crisis, the CRDF can be supported by Russian 201st motorized infantry division stationed in Tajikistan.\(^{68}\) It can also have air coverage of Russian aviation unit stationed at the military base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. The CRDF can be used not only for antiterrorist and anticriminal operations, but also for peace-keeping.

The CSTO’s potential highly increased after Uzbekistan’s return to the organization on 16 August 2006. It was the result of the spoiled Uzbek-American relations after bloody suppression of the Andijan rebellion in 2005. However, the improvement of the Uzbek-American relations in 2008-2009 puts in doubt further perspectives of Uzbekistan’s participation in the CSTO (in 2008 Uzbekistan left other Russian-favored organization EvrAzEC).

The CSTO annually conducted antiterrorist exercises of the CRDF called “Border” (“Rubezh”), as well as anti-drug police operation “Channel” (directed mostly against the drug-traffickers from Afghanistan). In 2004 the CSTO decided to develop cooperation with NATO in fight against international terrorism and organized crime. This is quite logical, as NATO is conducting

\(^{67}\) This was well illustrated by A. Lukashenko’s statement that his country can stop cooperating with the CSTO, as this organization does not oppose NATO (information of Rosbalt news agency, 14 May 2004 (http://m1.rosbalt.ru/2004/5/14/160829.html)).

\(^{68}\) In fact, this division consists of Tajik rank-and-file soldiers and Russian officers.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

crisis management and nation-building operation in Afghanistan (ISAF), while the CSTO’s security efforts are mostly concentrated on Afghan borders. However, NATO has not given a positive reply to the CSTO’s proposals yet. The only positive sign in this direction is the desire of the EU proclaimed in its new Central Asian strategy to cooperate with the CSTO.

During the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008 the CSTO showed itself as a rather inefficient mechanism of political coordination. The CSTO’s member states condemned military action of the Georgian government in South Ossetia. However, they did not follow Russia in the recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence.

In this situation Russia tries to consolidate this organization. In 2009 Russian president Medvedev declared that the existing CRDF forces in Central Asia are inefficient. In February 2009 the Collective Security Council of the CSTO decided to create new Collective Forces of Operative Reaction. These new forces should include the units not only of the Central Asian members of the CSTO, but also units of Armenia and Belarus. It is also planned to include different security and police units into this new force. However, there are two main potential sponsors of this structure: Russia and Kazakhstan. Russia would give 10 000 men to this new force, Kazakhstan is planned to provide 3–4 000 men. All other member states should guarantee one 400 – 800-strong battalion.

In general, at the present moment the CSTO is relatively effective, compared to other post-Soviet organizations. Still, it should be noticed that this is connected with some specific circumstances.

1. The CSTO’s effectiveness is partially the result of allegiance (compared to the other CIS nations) of the CSTO member-nations’ political elites towards Russia. However, high political volatility, which is characteristic of the post-Soviet space⁶⁹, can radically alter the situation.

2. Some of the CSTO achievements (for example, the CRDF’s creation) are related to the existence of common threat posed by a combination of Islamic extremism, religious terrorism, state failure and drugs trafficking. However, it does not automatically imply that the CSTO would be effective in opposing other threats. Moreover, the CSTO forces since the period of its creation as independent of

---

⁶⁹ One can remind of the “colored” revolution in Kyrgyzstan and constant shifts of Uzbek position.
the CST of the CIS organization has never been used for real combat purposes.

3. Joining forces for fighting terrorism and extremism within the CSTO’s framework was, to a substantial degree, possible because it did not contradict the efforts of the US-headed global antiterrorist coalition. So, the CSTO is not a mechanism that Russia can use against the West (as some parts of Russian political and military establishment hope). It can be said that some CSTO member states simply utilized a unique situation that allowed them to get military assistance simultaneously from Russia and the West. For example, such CSTO member states as Armenia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan get military aid from both Russia and NATO countries. On the Kyrgyz territory Russian military base still coexists with the military base of the US-led antiterrorist coalition (now used also by NATO for ISAF operation in Afghanistan).70

4. The existence of the CSTO is possible only because Russia is mostly paying for it. Russian military bases in Central Asia made up the nucleus of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (air support, etc.). The new planned collective force is also mostly Russian. The participation of several New Independent States in the CSTO is also paid for by Russia’s decision to sell them arms at the internal market prices (which are much lower than the world market prices) and to give their military personnel the possibility to get special military education and training in Russia at subsidized costs.

So, in case of emergence of the presently latent challenges — e.g., another shift of the unstable political situation in the CSTO countries, appearance of new security threats apart from international terrorism, some conflict of interests between Russian and Western sponsors of the CSTO member states, or Russia’s refuse to pay the costs of security integration, — the CSTO may turn into a phantom organization, as it had already happened with the CIS.

Many Western experts believe that the CSTO is not efficient

---

70 It should be noticed that Kyrgyzstan failed to observe all official procedures stipulated for by the CSTO Statute for permitting foreign military forces to be present at national territory. It coordinated giving national territory for antiterrorist coalition base with Russia, but, for example, not with Belarus, and the President of Belarus was quite bitter about it. See Yelensky O. Post-soviet countries create a counterbalance against NATO // Independent Military Survey, N23, 25.06.2004, P. 3 (In Russian).
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

From their point of view, the Organization has substantial weakness, namely, over-dependence on Russia. It is augmented by weak ties between different regions of the “collective security” and different interests of the country groupings within the CSTO. Some observers argue that the CSTO is too dependent on the Soviet heritage and too much resembles the Warsaw pact.

However, it should be noticed that the CSTO differs from the CIS in its relatively higher efficiency and legally obligatory character of decisions. This organization is also characterized by a kind of institutional stability (from the moment of its separation from the CIS). In the long run, the elements of common security and defense identity, that are still linked, of course, to the Soviet heritage, on which the CSTO is grounded, can be, step by step, reinterpreted on a new, democratic basis. In the future the CSTO can more and more resemble NATO and cooperate with NATO and the EU. It should be mentioned that not only Russia, but also other CSTO member states (especially, oil rich Kazakhstan) try to make some material contributions into the Organization (the CRDF was a good example). So, all shortcomings that still exist in the CSTO activities can be overcome in course of development of this organization.


In general, if the CIS is an organization in decline, the CSTO (at least, potentially) can be regarded as a security organization on the rise. The Central Asian Cooperation Organization, in its turn, could well be reckoned as a disappeared phantom organization.

**The Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO)**

The idea of Central Asian integration appeared at the end of the 1980s. It became apparent that rural societies and agrarian economies of the Central Asian Soviet republics are not ready to adapt themselves to the new market environment that started to emerge as a result of Gorbachev’s Perestroika. So, in 1990, in the Kazakh capital Alma-Ata a treaty directed at integrating national economies inside the renewed USSR and defending regional interests in the market environment was signed. On 14 August 1991 in Tashkent an agreement to set up the inter-republican Consultative Committee was inked. However, it was not fulfilled for the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The idea of creating some kind of union of the Central Asian republics re-emerged just after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Staggered by the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, the president of Turkmenistan proposed, at the Ashgabat summit, where the Central Asian leaders discussed post-Soviet future of the region, to create an alternative Turkic Central Asian Union. The idea was not realized at the time due to the emergence of the CIS.

On 23 April 1992, in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek a protocol providing for coordinated economic reforms in Central Asia was signed. This decision was not implemented either, and each of the countries adopted its specific forms of economic and political development. On 29 July 1993, in Alma-Ata, an agreement between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on deepening economic integration between the two countries was signed. Kazakh president N. Nazarbayev, who is well-known for his constant integration initiatives, brought forward an idea to create a common economic space (and, potentially, even a common state) between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. On 10 January 1994, in Tashkent, a treaty establishing

---

75 Paradoxically, Turkmen president since then opposed any attempt to involve Turkmenistan into any form of international integration that could restrict its independence (it was formally explained by desire to maintain official neutral status of Turkmenistan, informally – by Turkmenbashi’s intention to control everything in his country, not sharing authority with anybody or anything).
common economic space between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was inked. On 16 January 1994, the Kyrgyz Republic joined this agreement. As a result, on 30 April 1994, in Cholpon-Ata (the Kyrgyz Republic), a Treaty on the creation of the unified economic space of the three nations was signed. So, in 1994 the Central Asian Union was founded on the basis of the previous arrangements.

In fact, the creation of the Central Asian Union was the result of the dissatisfaction with slow speed and ineffectiveness of the integration projects between the Turkic Central Asian and Slavic ex-Soviet republics.

Economically, the Central Asian Union was aimed at creating regional economic and monetary union resembling the EU. From the geopolitical standpoint, this union was intended to keep the balance of political forces inside Central Asia, to prevent conflicts between them, and to form a unified coalition in different intercourses with external forces (including security aspects).

Within the Central Asian Union such bodies as the Inter-State Council (including heads of states), the Councils of Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers were created. The Executive Committee was set up as a permanent working body of the organization.

In 1998 another Central Asian country – Tajikistan – joined the Union. At the same time, the Central Asian Union was transformed into the Central Asian Economic Community. This shift meant that more ambitious plans to create a common state were abandoned for the sake of a more pragmatic economic cooperation.

However, on 28 February 2002, the Central Asian Economic Community was once again transformed into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization. This transformation was the result of recognition of inefficiency of the Central Asian Economic Community. The new organization planned to develop cooperation in various, not only economic, spheres (including security and defense).

The ambitious economic plans of the Central Asian Union – Central Asian Economic Community – Central Asian Cooperation Organization to create a single economic space were not realized. Until Russia’s entrance into this international structure, the trade between the member states was meager. For example, the share of

---

76 Interview with the Presidents of Uzbekistan I. Karimov and Kyrgyzstan A. Akayev, radio Liberty (http://www.svoboda.org/programs/SP/1997/SP-01.asp)
other CACO members in external trade of Kazakhstan (which has the biggest economy in Central Asia) was 3% (taking in account illegally smuggled goods — 5-6%).

Moreover, different member states repeatedly committed actions that had negative impact on the economic security of the other member states. For example, Uzbekistan stopped gas supply to Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic; the Kyrgyz Republic stopped irrigation water supply to Kazakhstan; Kazakhstan blocked international telephone communications for Uzbekistan, etc. By the end of the 1990s, as a result of the emerging markets’ crisis, even a trade and tariff war started between the members of the Central Asian Economic Community.

The organization tried to gain economic cooperation momentum within the EU-supported program of reviving the ancient “Silk Road” between Europe and Eastern Asia, — TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia), and with the support of other international donors (Japan, China, etc.). Nevertheless, this project did not bring to Central Asia the awaited prosperity.

The aid of the international donors also helped to realize the project of creating joint peace-keeping force. The idea of creating a Central Asian military formation, independent of the CSTO, modeled after the Baltic battalion (coalition peace-keeping unit, formed by three Baltic states), was supported by NATO’s Secretary-General J. Solana. The decision to create 600-strong Central Asian battalion (Centrazbat) was adopted at the Central Asian Union’s summit in Chimkent (Kazakhstan), in April 1995. Each member state (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan) gave one company to the battalion. From 1997 to 2000 the Central Asian battalion annually participated in military exercises, conducted according to the Partnership for Peace program on the territories of NATO’s member states, as well as in Central Asia. Russia and other former Soviet republics also participated in those exercises.

However, the battalion was sustained only due to the financial aid of NATO countries (mostly, the USA). At intervals between the exercises it existed more nominally, than really. Three companies were collected together only for maneuvers. They did not even have common language because they did not speak English well enough, while Russian was prohibited due to political reasons. So, when the US financial assistance stopped, the battalion disappeared. The formation of national peace-keeping units (for example, Kyrgyz and
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

Kazakh peace-keeping battalions), as well as the CSTO coalition forces (with Russian assistance), became the priorities.

In general, security and defense cooperation between the member states did not materialize because of serious contradictions and even actions endangering other member states’ security. For example, Uzbekistan unilaterally occupied the disputed territories on the border with the Kyrgyz Republic. It built fortifications and laid mines there. It also often stopped the transit on the only road linking northern and southern parts of Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek militia conducted different operations in the south of the Kyrgyz Republic without official permission of the Kyrgyz authorities. As we have already mentioned, Uzbekistan sponsored abortive Colonel Chudayberdoyev’s coup d’etat in neighboring Tajikistan. On the other hand, Tajikistan was often accused by Uzbek authorities of giving safe haven to Uzbek Islamic militants. Tajik territory was in 1999 and 2000 used by the forces of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan for attacking South Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Activization of Islamic extremists in Central Asia compelled the member-states to increase cooperation in the sphere of fighting international terrorism. In April 2000, at the summit in Tashkent, a common concept of fighting Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism was worked out. In August 2000, at the summit in Bishkek, it was decided to enhance cooperation in this sphere. Special representative of the Russian Federation S. Ivanov took part in the summit. When, on 28 February 2002, the Central Asian Economic Community was transformed into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, it was especially decided to increase the cooperation in fighting terrorism, Islamic extremism and drugs trafficking.

Russia had a status of observer in the Central Asian Union since 1996. Without Russia it would have been impossible to realize cooperation in the sphere of security. On 18 October 2004, during the summit in Dushanbe, the Russian Federation officially joined the Central Asian Cooperation Organization. At the summit, regional security was discussed. As a result, a document titled “Regulations on Consultations of the Heads of Security Services, Law-enforcing Agencies and Border-guarding Structures of the CACO Member States” was approved. The Consultations were aimed at coordination of measures in the area of fighting terrorism, religious extremism and drugs trafficking. It was decided to compile a list of terrorist and

---

77 Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine also have observer status since June of 1999.
extremist organizations, their leaders and members that should be outlawed on the territories of the CACO member states.

After officially applying for Russia’s membership in the Organization (28 May 2004), the Secretary of Russian Security Council, former Foreign Minister I. Ivanov said that the reasons behind Russian accession to the organization were to enhance economic, humanitarian and security interaction. He specially stressed the importance of such spheres of cooperation as fighting terrorism, religious extremism and illegal drugs trade78.

However, on 18 February 2005, Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev proposed to create another union of Central Asian nations, this time without Russia. On 24 of February 2005, this idea was supported by Kyrgyz President A. Akayev. Some observers believed that this initiative was connected to the change of political environment on the post-Soviet space after the “orange revolution” in Ukraine, and by the desire of the Central Asian leaders to distance themselves from Russia79. Now some forms of Central Asian integration sponsored by Kazakhstan exist in its relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The situation around the CACO became even more complicated due to the revolution in Kyrgyzstan in February-March of 2005. In May 2005, a rebellion in Andijan (Uzbekistan) was stifled by Uzbek army. There were lots of victims. Harsh actions of Islam Karimov were widely criticized by the West. In this situation Karimov turned to Russia and China for support.

Political maneuvering around the CACO ended up in its actual disappearance from the international arena. In October 2005, Uzbekistan applied for membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzEC). On 26 January 2006, Uzbekistan’s membership in the organization was officially acknowledged. The Eurasian Economic Community is pivoted on a purely socio-economic partnership, and, before Uzbekistan’s entering, included Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. As a result, the CACO turned into a virtually dead organization. It was proclaimed that all CACO socio-economic activities would be transferred to the Eurasian Economic Community, which is prompted by cross-membership (Belarus, Kazakhstan, 78 Answer of the Secretary of Russian Security Council to the question during press conference following the founding summit of the Central Asian Cooperation, Astana, 28 May, 2004. (www.mid.ru).
79 However, Uzbek officials immediately expressed their skepticism about one more integration initiative of N. Nazarbayev.
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were the members of Eurasian Economic Community, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were the members of the CACO). According to the same logic, all CACO security activities were transferred to the CSTO after Uzbekistan became a member of this organization at 16 August 2006. However, in 2008 this country once again withdrew from EvrAzEC.

The whole period of existence of the Central Asian inter-state cooperation structures was characterized by low efficiency, search for external donors and institutional instability. This finally led to the actual death of the CACO. It testifies, once again that a community of free-riders is not capable of creating effectively functioning and stable organization.

**Post-Soviet international security organizations: can free-riding culture be overcome?**

The free-riding culture dominating inside the international security organizations on the post-Soviet space creates very negative prospects for their future performance, or even their very existence. The consequences for global security, in the event that this scenario is fully realized, can be very dangerous. It means that almost all post-Soviet countries (with the exception of Russia, and, probably, Kazakhstan) would constantly need substantial external assistance for guaranteeing their security. At the same time, the resource of possible security cooperation between the post-Soviet countries will be systematically under-exploited. Complicated structure of international organizations would lead to misappropriation or ineffective use of this assistance (as, for example, was the case with Centrazbat). The situation will be also aggravated by the proximity of the unstable Islamic South (to which Central Asia and the Caucasus, in fact, belong) and dangers of religious extremism and state failure.

According to this negative scenario, external security assistance would go through competing regional inter-state organizations, each affiliated with some donor (the West, primarily the EU and
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

the USA\textsuperscript{80}, Russia\textsuperscript{81} and China\textsuperscript{82}). The competition of organizations can add more fuel to rivalry between the respective donors, and, in a feedback loop, further increase tensions between their “clientele”. As a result, a big security gap would continue to exist and even to increase in the Central Eurasia.

However, it is also possible to formulate a potential positive scenario for gradual overcoming of this free-riding culture. But this scenario demands intentional efforts of external and internal sponsors (in this case, Russia, the USA, the EU and China). Let us concentrate on the Russian side of the puzzle. As we would show Putin’s and Medvedev’s Russia is already trying to optimize its security assistance to the “near abroad” avoiding wasting of resources and restricting free-riding culture of its allies on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

For this purpose, Russia chose the way of transferring all security interactions in the post-Soviet space to minimum number of international organizations. Table 1 shows parallelism only if fully controlled by Russia security and defense organizations on the post-Soviet space that existed during the first and beginning of the second Putin’s presidential term.

\textsuperscript{80} The GUUAM and the CACO (in case they are reanimated) are most probable candidates, as well as the Community of Democratic Choice, established in 2005 (it includes Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine).

\textsuperscript{81} The CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union are Russia favored organizations. The situation is even more complicated since even these Russian-sponsored organizations are sometimes rivals irrespective of their cross-membership. The CSTO is not satisfied with China’s involvement into post-Soviet space, as well as with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s expansion into security issues. It would rather prefer the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s activities to be restricted to socio-economic sphere. However, in this sphere the Shanghai Cooperation Organization competes with the Eurasian Economic Union.

\textsuperscript{82} China’s favorite is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Table 1. Institutional parallelism of controlled by Russia security and defense organizations on the post-Soviet space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Type of interaction</th>
<th>Collective defense</th>
<th>Peace-keeping and anti-crisis operations</th>
<th>Anti-terrorist activities</th>
<th>Anti-criminal activities (organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, etc.)</th>
<th>Forum for discussing security and defense issues, information exchange and making ad hoc deals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Originally, yes, but now mostly transferred to the CSTO</td>
<td>Nominally, yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACO (ceased existence in 2005, for a short period was under Russian control)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, but peace-keeping force has disappeared since 2000.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But, of course, there were much more international security organizations with Russian participation except for those three. Russian leadership understood that it was highly important to clarify its relations with different international security organizations operating in the region of Central Eurasia. In the European context these organizations included the OSCE and different institutionalized forms of cooperation with the EU and NATO (the NATO–Russia Council, Partnership for Peace Program, etc.). In the East and South-East it was the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the South it was the Caucasian Group of Four, Kazakh-initiated Conference on the Measures of Trust in Asia and different mechanisms of international consultations around Afghanistan (that are not functional today).

83 Includes Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The Organization is not active.
To the end of Putin’s second presidential term, Russia defined two of its favorite international organizations on the Post-Soviet space, one for security sphere (the CSTO) and one for economic sphere (the EvrAzEC). This created the opportunity for combining Russian economic and military influence by stopping rivalry between different organizations. This was mostly possible due to the cross-membership of the organizations (only Armenia and Uzbekistan are now members of the CSTO, but not members of the EvrAzEC). Within these organizations Russia can more efficiently use its resources. At the same time it is backed within this framework by soft and economic power (commonalities of culture and language, common transportation routes) created during the Russian Empire’s and Soviet periods. Sometimes, with a strong Kazakh support, the ideology of Eurasianism is also used for supporting these organizations (this ideology is represented already in the name of Eurasian Economic Community, EvrAzEC). Russian influence within these two organizations was used from time to time to bring some order into the chaotic and free-riding behavior of its allies. These two organizations, at least, helped to save the illusion of existence of the former USSR transformed into Russian sphere of influence.

In this context, some experts and segments of the political elite expressed the opinion that it was very important for Russia to ensure institutional stability on the post-Soviet space, and to ensure that, at least, small-scale cooperation started. This could be achieved only by giving up different fantastic and overambitious plans (for example, the “Common economic space of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan”, or the “Union State of Russia and Belarus”). It would give Russia the opportunity to concentrate scarce resources on developing a purposeful cooperation within a strictly defined group of the post-Soviet nations. Of course, it meant that cooperation with other New Independent States might slow down. But only this way Russia could demonstrate that the post-Soviet integration really paid off. Besides, it also implied that for a time, needed to start really deep cooperation inside the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Community, the membership of the organizations would not grow. And, finally, such institutional stability should stop hollow multiplication of international organizations on the post-Soviet space.

Of course, all these measures are possible only if Russia refuses from declarative attempts to re-create the Soviet empire’s contour
of integration. In fact, it served more to the domestic electoral needs, than for the real integration progress. New approach also means affirming Russian new national identity and clearly defining its foreign policy priorities. All these things were from time to time firmly supported by V. Putin and D. Medvedev.

However, this logic has been irreversibly broken by three factors that until now do not give Russia the opportunity to optimize its “near abroad” policy.

First, deep uncertainties still exist in Russian policy itself. We have already mentioned that Russian political elite is still unable to make a choice between the creation of Russian sphere of influence and the creation of integration structure resembling EU (in fact, this was the choice that president Putin put before Belarus — to be included into Russian state saving a kind of autonomy, or to integrate like the EU countries). Russian partners suffer from this ambiguity as well as exploit it. On the one hand, Russia often does not ratify the decisions that made within the organizations that it controls (such as the CSTO). On the other hand, it does not demand to use the sanctions for not fulfilling the collective decisions that are presumed by the CSTO and EvrAzEC basic documents.

Second, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is one of Russian priorities on the post-Soviet space. However, it breaks the logic of recreation of the post-Soviet space with Russia at its centre. Within the SCO Russia shares its influence, for example, in Central Asia, with China. China can, in fact, use Russian soft and military power in order to diminish the costs of conquering new markets and getting new sources of raw materials’ supply. Besides, the SCO is creating a new geopolitical space destroying the old post-Soviet space as a geopolitical reality.

Third, it is very important for Russia to realize that the majority of the CSTO’s and the EvrAzEC’ members would support Russia only until its steps do not contradict the essential interests of, at least, three other major external actors (and donors) in Central Eurasia: the USA, the EU and China. So, the activities of both organizations cannot be directed against any of the three (or against the organizations they sponsor). This was manifested by firm refusal of all Russian allies inside the CSTO and the EvrAzEC to support the unilateral proclamation of the independence by South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In this context, it would be very good for Russian interests, if both Russian-patronized organizations discover and develop some kinds
of cooperative interactions with three important external actors (and organizations that they support such as, for example, the GUAM, or the Community of Democratic Choice). However, it is not a task that Russia can solve on its own. Many post-Soviet political regimes (especially Saakashvili’s regime in Georgia) sometimes exploit contradictions between Russia and the West in order to oppress domestic opposition and get assistance from the USA and the EU. In this context, it is quite reasonable for the major donors (Russia, the USA, the EU, China), paying for establishing a long-term cooperation framework on the post-Soviet space, to coordinate their policies. Otherwise, they would simply neutralize the efforts of each other by creating rival organizations.

In this context, the ideology of “Eurasianism” that implicitly stands behind both Russian-sponsored organizations, can be gradually reinterpreted as a kind of security and development bridge between Europe and Asia, as a kind of route towards economic and political modernization, towards free market and democracy, and, slowly, but surely, transformation of the heritage of the Russian and Soviet empires. This seems to create the most effective and stable identity and public image background for the CSTO and the EvrAzEC. This would also mean that all the potential of opposition between these organizations and the West will step by step disappear.

However, finding this optimum model of co-operation between Russian, Western and Chinese interests on the territory of the post-Soviet states is a puzzle that can not be easily solved.

YULIA GRIGORIEVA

Conflicting Views on the Conflict. The Nature of Ethnic Conflicts and Modern Political Dilemmas

Paradigms and classifications. Do they matter?

Most security tasks of international security organizations in Eurasia in 1990s and 2000s are connected to solving different ethnic conflicts. This is also a very good area to revise old and establish new paradigms of cooperation between the international security organizations.
At the first look at the ethnic problems, probably the most surprising thing is that, being almost as old as the world, ethnicity did not become completely clear to human beings. As it is noted in the thorough surveys, including Victor Avksent’ev’s *Ethnic Conflictology* (Stavropol’, 2001), there are three basic theoretical approaches to the nature of ethnicity: primordial, or mostly traditional, instrumental and constructivist. The interpretations of ethnicity, reflected in such approaches, roughly correspond to the possible views of it: 1) as extended feeling of kinship, gifted by nature (primordial dimension); 2) as a convenient instrument for mass mobilization, usually used by elites for concrete purposes (instrumental dimension); 3) as a socially ‘imagined’ phenomenon, which has been, to the large extent, ‘constructed’ by objective social demands on the ground of some endemic commonality (constructive dimension, Benedict Anderson’s renowned *Imagined Communities* exemplified).

In the 1990s, a significant change of paradigm took place in the western conflict studies in favor of the instrumentalist-constructive dimension. But, as V.Avksentiev argues, the earlier ‘traditionalists’, including such eminent authors as Donald Horowitz, Anthony Smith and many others, made a great scientific contribution and probably were not overcome by their successors.

In Russian socio-anthropologist studies the most popular has been a classic definition, given by a well-known ethnologist Yu.V.Bromley:

“Ethnos is ‘a persistent intergeneration commonality, that has historically developed on a definite territory, and consists of people who are sharing not only biological traits but the cultural ones, including language and some psychological stereotypes, and who feel certain of their unity and distinction from other ethnic groups, which has been impressed in their self-given name.”

But, from the standpoint of applied analysis, the grand theoretical discourse on the nature of ethnicity may look like some unnecessary scrolls on the design of real research. Unfortunately, there is no full concord about these more concrete types of analysis, either.

---

85 *Ethnic groups in conflict.* Berkley, Cal. 1985, etc.
Any recommendation to the practitioner always tells to clarify parties to the conflict, their positions, genuine goals and potentials. But, probably, that is the only common thing on the list of universal instructions. Nevertheless, it seems justified to contend that, despite possible divergence of opinion, most western and Russian conflict researchers have one special feature in common. They often do not draw clear distinction between underlying reasons, immediate causes, or “triggers”, and subjective drives to the conflict. Very often all of them are simply qualified as ‘factors’.

Let us take, as a good example of a practical tool, a widely-known scheme, developed by the researchers of the CASCON project (Computer-Aided System for Analyzing Conflicts) in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In the 1960s they first created the famous computer data-base on conflicts, which presently embraces more than 85 cases (from 1945) and 570 factors. Their chart of the conflict dynamics reflects parallel shifts of phases and factors of the conflict:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
<th>RESOLUTION (settlement)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Controversies of phase I settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Open Dispute (quarrel)</td>
<td>Phase 2 Conflict (armed/military option is resorted to)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td>Factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is noteworthy, that, as this scheme shows, the underlying reasons may stay untouched finally, despite open hostilities are ceased. Not rarely an adequate attention is not paid by the experts themselves, until ‘dispute’ and ‘quarrel’ already gave way to the ‘military option’. But in some cases, on the contrary, the experts’

---

warnings are mostly ignored by politicians and decision-makers, practically to the last moment.

In relation to the Yugoslavian crisis of 1992-1995 the latter was especially evident. It was, among others, observed by Susan L.Woodward, who witnessed events as an UN employee. Warnings of the impending explosions were mostly disregarded by politicians, including the new leaders of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, socio-economic grievances, skillfully exploited by the “ethnic entrepreneurs” in the course of flaring fighting, remained, as S.Woodward believes, miserably underestimated. They persist being attributed to the exclusively ethnic skirmishes.

As a matter of fact, it seems actually not possible to calculate the precise moment of violence eruption, if gruesome tensions have already developed. But, paradoxically, in case of ethnicity, the search for a straightforward logic also may turn fruitless. Scramble and violence are not always directly proportional to the actual degree of discrimination. Historic territories of hostilities are most vulnerable in this sense.

In the ‘stable zones of instability’ (possible to label it like this) any small “trigger” may be enough to start the nightmare of ethnic hatred. Even more so, if the deterioration trends were not staved off in time. The Balkans of the 1990s exemplified conclusions of Donald Horowitz, which he made in a very extensive comparative study. Their gist can be put as follows: the more violence took place in the region in a relatively recent historical past, the less pretexts are needed to kindle public opinion and provoke armed confrontation. “Triggers” even may be meager, in view of common sense. They do not necessarily reflect deep discrimination or socio-economic disparities.

The Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh situations may be cited as fully matching examples. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh were not suffering strong discrimination in the 1980s. But they still had a feeling of deep historical injustice, as the disputed region of Karabakh, with its mixed, but Armenian-dominated population,


was first promised to Armenia in 1920 by the Russian communist leaders\textsuperscript{91}. Kosovo, in total, was not a seat of discrimination also, until the Kosovo’s autonomous status was pulled down by Serbian president S.Miloshe\textsuperscript{v}ich in 1989.

The latter, for example, was strongly emphasized by the CASCON experts’ analysis. Albanian nationalism reached a high perch in Yugoslavian Kosovo. The teaching in schools was in Albanian (in contrast to all other parts of Yugoslavia), and the most jobs and administrative posts were controlled by ethnic Albanians — Kosovars\textsuperscript{92}. According to the CASCON estimation, the clashes were initiated by Albanian radicals after Tito’s death in 1980, with the ‘Greater Albania’ on mind\textsuperscript{93}. And, it is possible to add, fatal proved to be obstinacy by the Serbian leadership of the country, who in fact had given Kosovo equal position with the Yugoslavian republics, but continually refused it formal republican status.

The positive and negative factors to the conflict, sketched in the above-given famous chart, need further classification. As a whole such a chart for analysis would be of convenience for a practitioner. Although, it is obvious that some distinction is relevant in relation to the deep-laid reasons, “triggers” and drives to the conflict.

Traditional, ‘classic classification’ of the underlying causes covers existing historic, economic, social, socio-psychological phenomena and contradictions, including territorial and confessional disputes. On the other hand, very significant factors from the ‘pool’ are linked to the parties to the conflict: their final goals, potentials and modes of action (which may be called \textit{drives}). With regard to the conflict

\textsuperscript{91} See, for example: ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh affair can be divided so far into two phases, the first beginning in November 1987 and the second phase beginning in September 1989. Most articulate Azerbaijanis claim that the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh started in November 1987 when Aganbegyan, one of Gorbachov’s economic advisers who is of Armenian ethnic origin, declared that he believed that Nagorno-Karabakh should be handed over to the administration of the Armenian Soviet Republic’. - Tamara Dragadze. Azerbaijanis. // The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union. Ed. by Graham Smith. L.NY. 1990, p. 175.

\textsuperscript{92} Http://web.mit.edu/cascon/cases/case_kos.html

\textsuperscript{93} The independent state of Albania was created in 1912, with the support of Austria-Hungary, as a counter-balance to Serbia. But before that the Albanian territory, as well as Macedonian one, was striving to be divided by the newly independent Balkan states. Independent Albania also expressed territorial claims to her neighbors (especially Serbia and Montenegro), which she tried to realize during the Second World War. Up to this time the idea of \textit{Greater Albania} is reiterated by Albanian extremists. For more details see: Misha Glenny. The Balkans 1804-1999. London, Granta Books, 2000.
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

parties, immediate and third parties, as well as elites, factions of elites and masses is a subject for distinction.

The developers of CASCON and some other experts were very enthusiastic about the idea to find universal key factors, decisive for settlement of the ongoing military conflict. For this purpose they tried to use the ‘checklist’ method. On the basis of analysis of three groups of conflicts (varying in pace, origin and settlement modes), they came first to the 25, and then to the 4 key factors, which were assessed to be very conducive to the rapid resolution of military confrontation. Namely, these were:

1. Some great power(s) is interested in the cease of hostilities.
2. Some emerging external pressure urges to stop confrontation.
3. New military effectiveness is given to one of the conflicting parties, that undermines the other’s chances and confidence in victory.
4. Aims and methods of mediators and peacekeepers do not serve to aggravate the conflict.

It is easy to see the echoes of this approach in the US current international policy. All the factors in the above checklist may be defined as drivers to the conflict; they do not refer to the underlying grounds. This spectrum does not cover the realities that must have been basic for the emergence of hostilities and mass radicalization, often connected with territorial or religious disputes, unique historical past, bulk demographic shifts, and so on. Nevertheless, it is directly addressed to a policy-maker and practitioner, not only an armchair scientist.

But opinions may differ in this practical respect too. In the same article of L.P.Bloomfield another checklist is cited, made by known diplomat Chester A.Crocker, as a summary of his own experience in the Southern Africa. The former diplomat’s list of necessary elements to stop military fighting is not the same:

1. Coordination of military and political measures.

---


2. Focussing main efforts on disarmament of fighting groups, avoiding extra movements, able to complicate the situation much, for instance, premature election campaigns. (!) [marked myself, Yu.G.]

3. Initiative should not be lost from the hands of peace-keepers and mediators to the hands of fighting parties.

4. The clear-cut defining of agreements prior to their timing.

5. Avoiding idealistic expectations and overestimation of the parties agenda. (!)

6. Coordination of management in process of goals achievement.

So, the conclusions of a ‘field’ practitioner and computer-handed researcher may be different, even if it concerns only consequences, not real roots, of the conflict.

Besides, it is not so easy to drive a distinction between what is currently observed, and something more elusive – ideas of the expert, derived from his/her previous experience. The latter might be automatically applied to the case in question, in hope that it will work because it should work a priori.

In this sense, it is no way to turn a blind eye to the fact that, actually, any expert first juxtaposes the scheme he (or she) already has in mind with what it is in sight this time. So, it is possible to tell about some inductive factors, derived from the previous expertise, which are subject to verification in every case.

This topic also has serious practical connotations. Most typically, the preconditions for cessation of hostilities are theoretically defined by experts as mutual exhaustion of conflict parties; real interest of the third parties in the cessation of arms and effective mediation; rule of law and human rights imposition, and, maybe most intriguing, clear-cut victory, or final and evident victory of one of the conflict parties.

Some of this universal spectrum, inductive by nature, could be rather questionable in concrete situations. But, quite logically, ‘phantoms of expert imagination’ sometimes can take flesh and blood, irrespective of their adequacy to reality. It may be argued that this may be the case with the decisions by the US and the EU in favor of Kosovo official independence, unilaterally proclaimed by Kosovo on 17 February 2008. They put stake at noble intentions to upgrade and integrate both Kosovars and Serbs to/into the EU, morally, judicially and physically. But calls to Kosovars to be civilized in relation to the Serb minority, control ‘on the ground’ by means
of a new EU’s ‘mission of stability and of law to Kosovo’, and ‘the cooperation between NATO and the European Union, today and in the future as long as [their] missions are deployed on the ground’\textsuperscript{96} of Kosovo may prove not enough to overcome consequences of this new major shift on the Balkans.

The Kosovo tangle has often been associated with Chechnya in the RF. By the way, it is quite clear that in Chechnya, like in Ulster in the UK before, civil rights observation and personal safety should be necessary, but not only condition to get out of the crisis. But, concerning Chechnya, in 2000–2001 the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly just demanded to cut the federal army presence, neglecting the strong Islamic extremist groups, already there, as well as mere banditry thriving in conditions of instability.

In \textit{Why Wars End: CASCON’s Answers from History}\textsuperscript{97}, Lincoln P.Bloomfield wrote:

\ldots Realistically, wars usually end when one side wins or the parties experience significant war weariness. Thus, World War I was only a temporary end-of-war because there was no clear-cut victory. The imperfect quality of the armistice helped Adolph Hitler to rise to power with the claim of a 1918 sell-out.\ldots On the other hand, World War II was a successful end-of-war because Germany and Japan were decisively defeated militarily, thanks to U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s controversial insistence on a policy of unconditional surrender. When, in the 1990s, the Palestinian-Israeli, Northern Ireland and Bosnia conflicts showed halting signs drawing towards their ends, the key factor was not victory, but exhaustion of the parties and recognition by some of the most zealous partisans that neither side could really win.

It is evident that NATO and the western community actually employed such approach during the crucial talks on Kosovo in March 1999:

\textquote[\ldots] {Extensive autonomy from Belgrade was the most that the international community would sanction for the Kosovars. But it


\textsuperscript{97} Http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/
did agree to guarantee this autonomy with the presence of a NATO peace-keeping force. From the summer of 1998, a variety of Western representatives hoped to persuade the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army] to drop its demand for independence. They also had to convince Milosevic to accept the presence of a NATO force in Kosovo. Until the very last minute in March 1999, they failed on both counts. As Western diplomacy faced total defeat, the KLA changed its mind at the Paris peace talks, accepting autonomy in place of independence. The Serbian authorities agreed with most of the political plan for autonomy but refused categorically to countenance a NATO presence in their hallowed territory of Kosovo.

...If NATO backed down, it would lose its vaunted ‘credibility’. It had announced the bombing and so it must go ahead regardless of consequences98.

This context produces a set of questions. Does the ‘clear-cut victory’ make compromise useless? Is compromise meaningful, if clear-cut victory is the only pledge for stability in the future? And is it safe, if the ‘defiant’ Islamic countries are treated only this rigorous way? May the democracy goals be seen as justification for violence? Are they always true to the situation? The unconditional positive answers may be extremely risky, as the modern state of affairs in Iraq manifests.

**History as the nest of today’s problems**

Among the underlying factors of conflicts, which, in all opinion, deserve great attention, are repercussions from the historical past. It is of special interest to analyze the historical implications of modern conflicts. Some experts tend to see current events as some unavoidable continuation of the past collisions. In this respect, for example, the situation at the Russian Caucasus in the 1990s was not once defined as a new, modern, phase of the Caucasus War (or, as it was often called by the contemporary Russian officers and observers in the XIX century, ‘the Caucasus conquest’) by the Russian Empire. But, more than anybody else, historians are aware that, to the very large extent, history may be seen as a ‘collection of the unprecedented precedents’ (in wording of V.V.Degoev99).

---


99 V.V.Degoev. *Bolishaya igra na Kavkaze: Istoriya i sovremennost* [Big Game at the Caucasus: History and Modern Times], Moscow 2004, p. 446.
Indeed, if we start blaming our contemporaries for the sins and brutalities of their forefathers (or distant forefathers!), it looks rather strange: no nation-building was completely free of violence. Nevertheless, images from the past often persist to hurt by their outrage severity. And there is the sharp point for discussion here: Should the State always pamper and understand these feelings, provoked by historical wrongs? Would it not thus reiterate memories of offences which is necessary to set aside for the sake of the whole nation’s future? Or, maybe, it had better keep the skeletons of the past just untouched, as long as possible?

History, and especially experience of the former independence, may be turned into a powerful drive to the modern conflict. Worsened conditions of life (or threat of it) usually do not prompt the decolonized or seceded people to dream about joining their ‘colonizers’ back, in literal sense. Modern developments testify that it is quite a real opportunity – to mobilize the public in a very short time by exploiting images (memories) of injustice and suffering imposed on the people decades, or even hundreds, of years ago. This happened in the Balkans in 1990s, despite the fact that the socialist Yugoslavian Federation was among the leaders in the so-called socialist camp by standards of living. And in Chechnya in 1991-1994, on the eve of the 1st military campaign, sore social-economic problems were widely accompanied by the conspicuously vivified pictures of the Caucasus War of the Russian Empire and Stalin’s soviet-time deportations. It was inspired by that part of the new elite who was dashingly climbing to political power. But, paradoxically, all hopes on economic improvement were pinned exclusively on Russia. Financial floods from the RF budget and market (including illegal one) were not cut off during the 1st Chechen war and aftermath, which was among the most contradictory things about the modern Chechen conflict.

Of course, it is quite natural that many persons tend to read history romantically. Although, it may lead to unexpected results – both for the person and for the whole people. Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, in their Chechnya: A Small Victorious War (London, 1997), cited evidence that Soviet senior officer Djohar Dudaev (who spent almost all his previous life outside Chechnya), when he served in Estonia (1988-1991), became extremely fond of Michael Lermontov’s poetry, with its grand description of the fight in the Caucasus in the XIX century. Dudaev even composed verses himself, dedicated to the freedom-loving mountaineers. He started to believe that Chechnya, like Estonia, is rightful and capable to strive
for state independence. But, as Gall and de Waal remarked, it was ‘dangerous temptation’, as, unlike Chechnya, Estonia was, before 1940, an independent state with appropriate potential for sovereignty, while Chechnya completely lacked experience of state independence in modern world\textsuperscript{100}.

The practical dilemma, for the policy-makers, is clear, but unresolved. What is more proper? To shrink from asking pardons before compatriots on behalf of the ‘conquerors’ of previous generations, who are now ‘gone with the wind’? Indeed, too many of such pardons may mean to concede to bigotry, to sanctify racial hatreds, by extracting them from the dust of history. Or, on the contrary, it is necessary to take it as a matter of principle, which helps to stave off further possible discriminations? It seems that both approaches must be discretely measured in each concrete case.

Straight to the point is the nowadays discussions in some republics of the North Caucasus. Will it be correct, like in Canada, to officially apologize and promise compensations to indigenous peoples that were drastically reduced in numbers and territories in the result of the Caucasus War of the Russian tsars? (First of all, it concerns Adyge). But liberalization of the regional secondary school curricula already led, in some local textbooks, to outrage disproportions and extremely enlarged descriptions of the atrocities of Russian troops during the Caucasus War, — regardless that it was a matter of war, mutual hostilities and historical past. It is impossible to ignore that, on the other hand, the Caucasian people had material and cultural gains by joining the Empire which were evident already at the tsar time. They benefited from plain territories, given in their disposal, enjoyed mighty economic sponsorship and rather liberal ruling; their nobles were incorporated into the Russian aristocracy. In general, despite cruel pages available in the henceforth common history, massive education and cultural development opportunities were given to indigenous people. (Good chance for comparison is presented by neighboring Turkey, where all nationalities were officially abolished as late as in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century).

Although, it is not unique, specifically Russian, problem. Similar phenomena are echoed in the estimations of many Western experts. For instance, it was discussed in the book of a known Arthur Schlesinger’s \textit{The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural}

International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation


He argued that The Ethnic Heritage Studies Program Act was adopted by the Congress under the pressure of those who saw in the *melting pot* ideological ‘conspiracy’ of the white against the black. In essence, he concluded, the Act of 1974 rigorously spread ethnicity over all Americans, thus ignoring the wishes of vast majority, or ‘millions of Americans’, who were more inclined to identify themselves with a nation, not a separate ethnic group. Schlesinger’s warning was that such approach, strongly incorporated in the secondary education system, holds grains of the nation’s disruption.

So, where is the proper outcome from this labyrinth of ‘sense and sensibility’? Especially considering that the ethnic origins and distinctions are still extremely precious to many people? In addition to the non-discriminative social framework, propped by law, real personal interethnic contacts and communications – in political structures, at work, at school, in the pub, and so on, are rarely seen by historians and experts as the only reliable device.

---


III. The CSTO as a Growing Security Arrangement for New Independent States

Anatoly Lysiuk

Belarus’ Entrance To The Collective Security Treaty Organization: Cultural Foundations

Belarus’ entrance to the Collective Security Treaty Organization was called forth by pragmatic considerations, of which the following were the most important: a) optimization of military and technical cooperation; b) coordination of efforts in “combating international terrorism and extremism, the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and arms, organized transnational crime, illegal migration and other threats to the security of the member States” (Article 8 of Collective Security Treaty Organization Charter); c) increasing country’s geopolitical influence.

At the same time, the impossibility to explain Belarus’ entrance to the CSTO only by “hard” national and state interests is evident. Many arguments in this respect were put forward by the opponents of Belarus’ CSTO participation. At first, to a considerable degree, the interests of Belarus do not coincide with the interests of other member States of the CSTO, including those in military and political sphere. At second, a “disagreement” is seen among the CSTO member States concerning the identification of external dangers, as well as the degree of their actuality. At third, undoubted is the fact that the majority of problems, which are covered by the CSTO terms of reference, can be solved easier and more effectively on the bilateral level, rather than inside this organization. At fourth, there was and still is a real danger of increasing, with the aid of the CSTO, a number of “idle” structures, which would profane the mission, potential, and perspectives of this organization. At fifth, interests of the member States in creating and functioning of the CSTO, as well as in defining the content and priorities of its activity, are different. At sixth, the risk of drawing into the solution of “foreign” conflicts remains significant. At seventh, there is a lack of convergence in the forms and ways of presentation by the CSTO member States of their interests.
However, the accession of Belarus to the CSTO is connected with one more risk. According to Article 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, “the Republic of Belarus has an aim to make its territory a nuclear-free zone, and secure neutral status of the State”. Belarus’ entrance to the CSTO, undoubtedly, compromises its neutral status. Within the CSTO, in comparison with the Collective Security Treaty, the executive component is significantly reinforced. Taking into account the fact that in the concerned group of states the political will of certain persons is more important than the law and procedures, we might suppose that, though the decisions within the framework of the CSTO take on the obligatory power only after the consensual decision and are realized through national legislation procedures, the presidents nevertheless, by faulty assumptions can drag their states to the “alien wars”.

Therefore, it is impossible to explain the Belarus’ entrance to the CSTO and its relatively active role in this organization solely by the interests described. For Belarus, the entrance to the CSTO has also a definite cultural and identification meaning, the determining role of which in this process is significant and undoubted.

We are speaking, first of all, about the positioning of Belarus in the international context as the Eastern-Slavic civilization leader. As President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko mentioned, “by the time, destiny, and situation Belarus has stepped forth to the great role of the leader of Eastern-European civilization”. Also, he was quoted as saying that “other nations are looking at Belarus as a savior of the Slavic civilization, and we should save this civilization... Seemingly, God has appointed Belarus to do it, as it was put into the centre of this process”. Such mission, in Lukashenko’s view (it was actively expressed in the 1990-s, before Putin’s ascend to power), acquires a special importance due to a specific position of Russia, which has “betrayed” “the Slavic idea”. As the Belarussian president declared at that period of Yeltsin’s Russia, “today Russia, unfortunately, is no longer the spiritual and cultural stronghold of the Eastern-Eurasian civilization”.

Speaking about salvation, i.e. about life and death of the whole civilization, it seems logical to suppose that there are certain external forces, which pose all these dangers. Belarussian leaders defined these dangers unambiguously — NATO, driven by the USA.

Certainly, opposition to such a powerful “monster” requires proper resources. Being aware of this, Belarus, “in epoch of A. Lukashenko”, is in the permanent search of strong allies, which
would help to localize the above-mentioned threat. The possible ways are very different: formation of a defensive strategy in the framework of the allied state with Russia; initiation of the “Minsk-Moscow-Beijing-Deli-Teheran” axis directed against NATO, or building up military and political cooperation in the framework of the collective security system.

According to the logic of Belarussian leaders, membership in the CSTO would give a chance for salvation of the Eastern-European civilization values. However, it will be possible only if one of the organization’s top priorities is the resistance to American expansion and limitation of NATO’s sphere of influence, with which many partners inside the coalition do not agree. Here, Belarus can rely, probably, only on Russia’s support, whose foreign policy concept accepted after Yeltsin stated: “According to a number of parameters, contemporary political and military purposes of NATO do not coincide with the security interests of the Russian Federation, and sometimes directly contradict them” 103.

Against this background, a question arises, how natural and how logical military and political coalition of Belarus with the “Muslim states” aimed to protect the idea of the “Slavic unity” would be, especially in the light of current “clash of civilizations?”

From the point of view of some Orthodox church representatives, there is no problem here, because, due to a number of reasons, the “Islamic factor” seems to be less dangerous for the Slavs’ spirituality, than the Catholic or Protestant ones. Moreover, the whole “Western world” is perceived by some members of the Orthodox community with a certain suspicion. Very indicative, in this relation, was the Christmas message of 2005 by the Patriarchy Exarch of Belarus Filaret, in which he critically evaluated the internal and external policy of the USA and the EU states, but, at the same time, did not even mention the Islamic terror. In such a situation, the allied relations of the “Orthodox Belarus” with the Muslim states seem not only necessary, but, to a certain extent, very natural.

Belarus’s orientation towards the CSTO is, to some degree, linked to the “Soviet factor”. The point is that in the contemporary Belarus the ruling elite had accepted as a worthy pattern the Soviet model of political structure, the break-up of which is still bemoaned. Besides, the identification with the Soviet past prevails among the

population. One of the features of the modern Belarussian state is the tendency to the maximum reproduction of the Soviet society’s basic elements, including its military and political system:

1) Belarussian army was proclaimed a “direct successor” of the Soviet army;

2) Victories, heroes, and military culture as a whole are the derivations of the Soviet military culture;

3) The external enemy is identified in a Soviet style (“two worlds – two systems”), and the Western society is seen as the main danger to Belarus. It is stated that Western civilization is still in the insolvent debt to the heroism of Soviet soldiers, with all sequential material consequences;

4) Despite scarcity of resources, aspiration for the performance of global political role is articulated. As it was rightly mentioned by V Karbalevich, “the ruling elite of Belarus, as it seems, continues to live in the USSR and conducts the foreign policy of a powerful state... A. Lukashenko acts in the name of such a superpower” 104.

The entrance to the CSTO will enable Belarussian leaders (one would say in illusionary forms), to soothe the popular nostalgia for the USSR, as well as to solve a practical task – to increase the military and political weight of the state and, consequently, make it less vulnerable in front of the “dangers from the West”.

For Belarus, moving towards the CSTO means, first of all, the way to Russia, and positioning under its military and political wing. Russia, exactly, is “a centre and a nerve” of this security structure. Belarussian side proceeds from the fact that the CSTO without Russia might loose any importance for Belarus.

Russian factor plays a key role in the military strategy of Belarus not only due to the pragmatic reasons. “Orientation towards Russia” reflects the Russophile sentiments, which in 1990s and 2000s prevailed in the country’s public opinion (although now, due to gas disagreements this tendency diminishes). Especially strong these sentiments were in the Belarussian military forces, about 40 % of which officers are ethnic Russians. The majority of those officers have been trained in Russia, or are linked to this country through family bonds, and thus associate themselves with Russian historical traditions and symbols. With reference to the Belarussian army, one can absolutely soundly cite Russian poet Alexander Pushkin: “here

it is the Russian spirit, here it smells like Russia”. In such context, an identification of Belarussian national interests with the interests of Russia occurs within a military community. The strengthening of “Russian spirit” in the Belarussian military structures is favored by the fact that the idea of national sovereignty has not yet reached the officer corps, and national military traditions are nonexistent.

There is also a broader reason for striving towards Russia: the low level of Belarussians’ national self-consciousness. In 2004 only 35 % of them considered “Belarussians as “a separate, independent nation”. At the same time, about 55.8 % of all respondents believed that Belarussians are “a part of Russians”. Also, it was disclosed that the significant number of Belarussians identify themselves with the Soviet people (it is important to mention that now there is also a growing tendency towards Russophobia)\textsuperscript{105}.

The foundation of any military bloc (union, coalition) is laid by the affinity of values. As it was rightly worded by D. Green, with reference to NATO: “as a matter of fact, NATO is an alliance of democratic states and their peoples united together for the mutual protection of their common values”. All these values are based in the traditional Western civilization. It is known that no social, economic, political, and cultural criteria of membership in the CSTO, like those for the NATO candidate states, have formally been stated. But in reality they exist, for example, in the form of the traditional for Eurasia centralized political regime.

The CSTO member states are characterized by the centralized, sometimes authoritarian, ruling style with different levels of “softness”, and the central place in their political systems is occupied by the state leader, who stands above all parties, bureaucracies, oligarchs, mass media, etc. The state, personified by the president, turned into a leading political actor, which had concentrated in its hands the resource basis of the society, settled control over the main civil society structures and consolidated the political power. Mass consciousness was proposed a figure of an authoritarian Father of the nation, which is rooted in the traditional for Eurasia patriarchal family Father, who is strict, all-powerful, and responsible for everything. At that, the patriarchal image of the Father of some presidents is supplemented with an image of a “heroic Father”, whose prototypes are found in the images of national heroes. For Belarus,\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{105} Lysiuk A.I. \textit{Populism In Contemporary Belarussian Politics// Analytical Bulletin of Belarussian Think Tanks. – 2004, #1 (23).} p. 35.
such prototypes may be seen in the partisan leaders of the Great Patriotic War. This symbolic image helps the Belarussian citizens, especially those who still consider themselves the Soviet people, to overcome the feeling of weakness, confusion, and helplessness in the new, hostile and obscure world.

Practically all the CSTO member states, to a certain extent, moved away from superficially Westernized principles of organization of political and economic life of the 1990-s. At the same time, their attitudes towards the Euro-Atlantic community significantly differ if Belarus and Russia (in a lesser extent) have a critical attitude towards NATO, Central Asian states and Armenia sometimes demonstrate very amicable position to this structure.

Speaking about the cultural identity of the CSTO member states, it is necessary also to note such components as: a) commonness of language (no wonder that by the CSTO Charter Russian is defined as an official language); b) proximity of the corporate military culture; c) similarity of military educational curricula and systems; d) proximity of military and technological culture. One expert called this “a culture of Kalashnikov submachine gun opposed to a culture of M-16 rifle”.

Belarus’ stance on the CSTO is largely shaped by a personal factor: the attitude of country’s president, his motives, style of behavior, system of values and preferences. It is represented, in a concentrated form, in the state ideology, that substantiates the specifics of the “Belarussian model” and the “Belarussian way of development”. Contemporary political isolation of Belarus can be explained, to a considerable degree, by the aversion, held by the part of international (first of all, Euro-Atlantic) community, towards Belarussian president’s personality. On the other hand, the participation of Belarus in military and political coalitions with Russia presupposes the receipt of significant economic preferences from the latter, as a peculiar payment for the maintenance of Russian military and strategic interests.

Apart from that, the positioning of the Belarussian president as a representative of the powerful military and political structure (CSTO), one of the members of which possesses nuclear weapons, enhances his might. This is even more important taking into account that the Belarussian president repeatedly articulated the idea that NATO and the USA have aggressive intentions about the Belarussian state leaders, because of the country’s independent foreign policy. Usually on this point, Belarussian leaders refer to the
Strategic Concept adopted by the Washington NATO summit, which includes statement about possible expansion of the Alliance outside the limits of the North-Atlantic Treaty (Article 5), that confines the bloc’s activities to the territories of its member states; as well as vivid examples of NATO’s “out of area” military operations in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The Belarussian president’s intense motive of power is also worth mentioning. Its key manifestation is the thirst for maximum domination inside the country, as well as abroad. However, outside the joint CSTO (mostly Russian) resources the potential for realization of this motive is very limited. Within the union with Russia, partial loss of its independence is required from Belarus, which does not satisfy the Belarussian president, either.

Membership in the CSTO allows A. Lukashenko to satisfy his need in affiliation, i.e. in recognition of persons, who have the same public status as he does. It is known, that international contacts of the Belarussian president are more than limited, thus, the communications within the framework of the CIS is of a huge value for him.

Within the CSTO, the Belarussian president’s need in self-assertion can be satisfied to a certain extent. It is possible to say about some depletion of A. Lukashenko’s internal mission, who, as a great national leader and a kind of a “tailor”, “cut out” the state according to his figure and style and satiated it with his intellect, stereotypes and temperament. But, as it is said, “a great ship needs deep waters”. Membership in the CSTO provides A. Lukashenko certain opportunities for acting on a global scale.

Examining the relations of A. Lukashenko with the leaders of the CSTO member states, we need to mention some cultural dissonance existing in his personal communications with his colleagues. This dissonance is linked not to discord in values, but to the style of the Belarussian president’s political behavior (A. Lukashenko prefers the style of a “people’s tribune”). Belarus’ movement towards the CSTO is stimulated, among other things, by the historical memories of Belarussian people. Historically, Belarus never was an aggressor, but suffered tremendous human and material losses due to aggressions from the West (for example, of Napoleon, German Empire during the I World war and Nazi during the II World war), which caused special anxiety about the state security in public consciousness. As it was put by L.Maltsev, Belarussian minister of defense, “the care for security is the most important feature of the Belarussian
International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

people’ morale”, and “defense of the Fatherland, precisely, is the highest value of national self-consciousness”\textsuperscript{106}. Belarus’ entrance to the CSTO is, in a specific way, directed towards the diminution of security dangers.

In terms of culture, Belarus is distinct by a quite high prestige of the army in the society. According to the results of the IISEPS sociological surveys (2003), index of trust to military forces in the Republic of Belarus comprised 54.1\%, yielding only to the Orthodox church – 64.7\%. 40.45\% of all respondents have stated their trust to the president\textsuperscript{107}.

Approximately at the same time in Russia, the president, was trusted by 57\% of all respondents, but the levels of trust to the church and military forces were much lower: 36\% and 31\% respectively\textsuperscript{108}.

Rather broad “moral elasticity” is one of the significant cultural resources of Belarus in the CSTO. In the traditional interpretation, it is connected with military subdivisions’ steadiness to the losses in human forces and technical equipment. Today, the term “limit of moral elasticity”, in addition to its traditional content, includes also the readiness to protect the Fatherland and its allies. As L.Maltsev has mentioned, “spiritual and moral potential of the society was and still remains today one of the decisive factors of strategic containment”\textsuperscript{109}, and “the modern peculiarity consists in the fact that patriotism and civics, being previously only philosophical ideas, became a real weapon”\textsuperscript{110}. Thanks to the moral-ideological factor, as A. Lukashenko is stating, “Iraqi people, having at their disposal outdated weapons, sustained the strike of the superior power of modern arms. They stand firm... because... they are faithful to their land. This ideological component will save Iraq”. So, for the present day Belarusian political elite Iraqi resistance to American occupation is a specimen of military value of a high moral spirit.

\textsuperscript{107} Maltsev L.S. Protection of Fatherland – The Highest Valor in the Consciousness of Belarussian People// Belaruskaya Dumka, 2003, No.2. p. 5..
\textsuperscript{108} Concept of Russian Foreign Policy// National And Regional Security. – Minsk, 2001. p. 36.
In the conditions of the centralized political regime, the key parameter of the “limit of moral elasticity” is military forces’ trust to the president. In the contemporary Belarusian army this level is quite high. There is direct coincidence of aims and values of the military and the president, despite even the fact that expenditures on the structures standing against the internal adversaries are higher than ones given for the struggle with the external.

With regard to the CSTO, the “limit of moral elasticity” of Belarusians looks different: the readiness to perform the ally duties in Belarusian society is not very high. The results of the empirical research over 2000s show slow, but inevitable estrangement of Belarus from Russia, on the inter-state, as well as on the interpersonal, level. The results of national sociological poll (September – October 2003) have shown that 29.6% of Belarusians think that there exists a global conspiracy against Belarus. 47.7% of them mentioned among the “conspirators” the USA, 18.0% – the Russian authorities and Russian oligarchs, and only 5.3% – NATO member states. \(^{111}\) The following groups have been also positioned as the “foes of the Belarusian ethnos”: Belarusian leadership – 13.3%, Russia, in its different manifestations, – 11.2%, ecological problems – 9.4%, etc.\(^ {112}\) In 2008 relation of Belarusians towards Russia was much worse due to gas pressure of Russia.

Besides, modern Belarus is characterized by a rather considerable anti-Islamic and “anti-Caucasian” attitudes, which limit the “scope of integration” in the framework of the CSTO.

Belarusian policy toward the CSTO is defined also, to use the terminology of V. Karbalevich, by the “great Belarusian myth”, i.e. the contradictory intention for maximum integration into the Eurasian (Russian) space, including military and political components, and, at the same time, striving to protect the country’s own independence. Such balancing in full measure characterizes Belarus’ attitude towards the CSTO. Certainly, there are no reasons not to believe Belarusian president, who states that “we support the active Collective Security Treaty Organization” with the accent on the word “the active”. It is certain, also, that the way Belarus have read the CSTO mission is very specific, and its activity inside the


International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

Organization is directly connected with the political conjuncture and interests of the Belarussian state and president, which do not always agree with the interests of the other CSTO member States. However, given all described characteristics of Belarus’ relation to CSTO one can say that Belarus’ loyalty to this organization is high.

Assem Berniyazova

Kazakhstan’s Membership in the CSTO: Influence upon Security Sector and Military Culture

The Central Asian region has entered the focus of international attention in the aftermath of the tragic events on 11 September 2001. Located in the heart of the Eurasian continent in the immediate proximity of Afghanistan, viewed by many as a cradle of international terrorism, the Central Asian region became especially important. The importance of this region even increased in 2008-2009, when the new US strategy foresees a strategic shift of attention from Iraq to Central Asia.

This paper will consider the ways for the improvement of security environment in the Central Asian region, in terms of the measures needed to counter the external threats to regional security and for the development of regional military forces. The analysis is mainly focused on Kazakhstan (the most developed Central Asian state) and its partnership ties with Russia, and is structured to address the following issues:

– Regional threats to security in Central Asia and ways to counter them.
– Kazakhstan’s progress in developing military forces.
– The rationale for regional cooperation in the sphere of defense and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
– The CSTO’s role in countering threats to regional security and promoting the development of Kazakhstan’s military forces
– The perspectives of regional security.

Regional threats to security

After the break-up of the USSR the Newly Independent States of Central Asia faced the challenges of new international reality — the world without the Soviet Union. This new reality demanded that each
of the new states would build its own economic system, its individual foreign policy, and a separate army. Simultaneously, these states had to attend to the external threats to their security, while the absence of the old super-power attracted to the region close attention of its immediate neighbors and the world powers. Many were worried about the future of the region in the view of the unsettled border disputes with China, civil war in Afghanistan, and, not in the least, the social instability within some of the new republics.

Over fifteen years after independence, there are still many problems the former Soviet Central Asian republics face. Each country is confronting its own set of threats and challenges and thus draws an individual security map. Nevertheless, there are certain issues that have an inevitably “common” nature, such as:

1) extremist terrorism,
2) narcotics,
3) illegal migration,
4) water supply degradation,
5) ecological disasters.

At least three out of these five common problems (terrorism, narcotics and illegal migration) stem from the weakness of the region’s Southern and Eastern frontiers. On the other hand, these three threats are likely to lead to “low-intensity conflicts in which the … army fights bandit formations”, as opposed to a regular war. Thus, to establish strong, mobile and well-trained armed forces is of key importance for the proper protection and regulation of the region’s borders.

**Military forces of Kazakhstan**

Kazakhstan and other states of the region have been facing the need to develop and improve national armies since the early days of independence. Receiving a share of the Soviet Army’s resources upon the collapse of the USSR did not guarantee the creation of a capable national army. It was imperative to foster the national military forces.

Kazakhstan started the process of the army creation in May 1992, with the announcing of the President’s Decree “On the Armed

---


International security organizations in Eurasia: Rivalry and co-operation

Forces”. In 2001 the Republic created four military districts that were later re-established as the regional commands – “Astana”, “West”, “East” and “South”. The armed forces of Kazakhstan shifted to the three-branch structure, while creating the major staffs of corresponding types: land forces, air defense forces, and naval forces. In 2003 there were further changes in the administrative structure of the armed forces. Nowadays, the army of Kazakhstan numbers about 74 thousand. The army is equipped with 5 thousand tanks, 4 thousand combat vehicles, more than 200 helicopters and about 200 combat jets. The combat trainings “Sary-Arka”, “The Frontier” and the “Steppe’s Eagle” take place regularly according to yearly plans. Because of the booming oil revenue-based economy after 2005 the Ministry of Defense drastically increased the share of contractors and improved the material and technical base of the army (it was planned long before)\(^\text{115}\). However, the present economic crisis can affect this resource abundance.

In 1994 NATO proposed the CIS countries to take part in the joint “Partnership for Peace” program (PfP). Kazakhstan is one of the regional leaders in developing this kind of cooperation. Within the framework of the Individual program of partnership the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense is able to plan its activity along the concrete directions, necessary for the effective realization of the partnership aims. Kazakhstan’s military agency was the first in the region to develop the program of creating peacekeeping forces. Thanks to the military and technical cooperation of Kazakhstan with NATO countries, the “Kazbat” (Kazakh peace-keeping battalion) was completely equipped according to the NATO standards, and, on 10 October 2003, entered the “Blue Helmets” contingent of the United Nations Organization. In 2002 Kazakhstan joined NATO program “Planning and Review Process” (PARP) and thus became the twentieth member state of this program and the first member from Central Asia. During the combat trainings “Zhardem”, “Balance – Kayak” and “Balance – Barys” on Kazakhstan’s territory the soldiers and officers of the Kazakhstan’s army refined their skills through close interaction with the military personnel from the leading world powers\(^\text{116}\).


Regional cooperation and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Nursultan Nazarbaev, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, has put much effort to encourage and support the cooperation of the post-soviet states to meet together the challenges of economic development and external security threats. Under his leadership, Kazakhstan has made some valuable input into the work of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), created in 1991, and was among the first to sign the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in May 1992.

Basing its foreign strategy on the principle of the “multi-vector” policy, Kazakhstan has been developing partnership relations both with its neighbors and the international actors outside the Central Asian region, while upholding its steady commitment to integration efforts within the CIS community. Together with Russia, Kazakhstan has been the major force behind the process of integration of the New Independent States of Eurasia. The two states have also maintained close bilateral ties in the spheres of economic, military and political collaboration and cultural exchanges. The years of 2003 and 2004 were marked as the Year of Kazakhstan in Russia and the Year of Russia in Kazakhstan correspondingly. Over these two years, the countries made considerable progress in many spheres of mutual interest, such as strengthening of trade relations. According to the Kremlin spokesperson, in comparison with 2003, the trade between the two countries grew by 150% and reached $7.5 billion in 2004. Then the trade grew even due to the oil-based boom both in Russia and Kazakhstan.

Another aspect of the Eurasian cooperation of Kazakhstan lies in security dimension and is connected to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which can be considered truly Eurasian, both in the geographical and in political sense. “Joining their efforts in the sphere of collective security, the member states see the system of collective security that they create as an integral part of the general European system of security and, also, as a part of the potential system of security in Asia,” reads the Declaration of the CSTO member states.

The Collective Security Treaty was signed in 1992 for the period of 5 years, with the following renewal. The members of the Collective Security Treaty are the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation and the Republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (the latter from 2006). In 2002 the Treaty was upgraded to the level of international organization, when the Presidents of the member States signed the Charter of the CST Organization and the Agreement on the Legal Status of the CSTO. These documents went into force on 18 September 2003.

The Treaty stipulates that member States collectively uphold their security. Article 2 reads: “In the event of the threat to security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several member States, or the threat to international peace and security, the member States will immediately activate the mechanism of joint consultations with the aim to coordinate their positions and to take measures to counter the emerged threat”\(^\text{119}\). The aim of the Organization is to jointly prevent, and, when the need arises, to liquidate the military threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity of member States. The member States agreed, in order to counter new challenges and threats to national, regional and international security, to initiate the activity by taking concrete actions that aim at the decisive fight against international terrorism\(^\text{120}\).

The CSTO is governed by the Collective Security Council (CSC), the highest authority of the CSTO that consists of the heads of member States and considers all principal questions. The Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (CMFA), the Council of Ministers for Defense (CMD) and the Committee of Security Council Secretaries (CSCS) are the consulting and executive bodies of the Organization that coordinate cooperation in the areas of foreign, military and national security affairs, respectively. The Secretary General is the highest administrative officer of the Organization and is chosen by the CSC from the pool of the citizens of the member States. The Secretary General heads the Secretariat, the permanent working body that provides organizational, informational and consultation support of the CSTO. The Joint Staff is the CSTO’s standing body


that prepares and carries out the decisions concerning the military component of the CSTO\textsuperscript{121}.

The CSTO’s role in countering the threats to regional security and promoting the development of Kazakhstan’s military forces

The cooperation within the framework of the CSTO has played a significant role with regard to two important aspects of promoting Kazakhstan’s security. On the one hand, the increasing abilities of the CSTO to address the threats to regional security increase Kazakhstan’s international confidence. On the other hand, the partnership within the CSTO helps to further strengthen Kazakhstan’s army.

**Regional security**

Aiming to safeguard the stability in Central Asian region, the CSTO conducts serious work to enhance the ability of the allied forces to offset terrorist attacks and to tackle the tasks directed to counter drugs trafficking along the region’s border.

In 2001 the future CSTO members took an important decision to further the military aspect of the Organization by creation of the Collective Force of Rapid Deployment (CFRD) in the Central Asian region of collective security. The CFRD were originally composed of four battalions from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (one from each state) with the total strength of 1,500 persons\textsuperscript{122}. Later, their number was increased more than two-fold. The forces regularly engage in combat training according to a settled plan of activities. Starting from the first large-scale training “South-Antiterror-2002”, the forces regularly hold trainings to improve their ability to stunt the infiltration of international terrorists from the territory of Afghanistan. The permanent group of the Kazakhstani officers works at the Staff of the CFRD, situated in Bishkek\textsuperscript{123}. In 2008 – 2009 the Collective Security Council of the CSTO decided to create new, much stronger collective forces based in Russia.

In 2004 Nikolai Bordyuzha, the CSTO Secretary General, expressed faith in the future prospects of the Organization. He noted the steady progress with the successful collective training operations “Channel”, aimed against the illegal drugs trafficking, and

“Frontier”, targeting the terrorist groups. According to Bordyuzha, there is also a continual progress in cooperation between the secret services of the CSTO member States\textsuperscript{124}.

The Organization is also looking into the issue of illegal migration in the region. Since 2004 the heads of migration services of the CSTO countries held consultations under the umbrella of the CSTO to work out the common approaches concerning the illegal migration. “I hope very much that the joint efforts in this direction will be even more energetic than in the sphere of illegal transportation of narcotics”, says Nikolai Bordyuzha.

\textbf{Military forces}

In accordance with the agreement between the CSTO countries, starting from 2004, Russia supplies the allied armies with weaponry and military equipment on reduced prices that are usually used inside Russia\textsuperscript{125}. For Kazakhstan the military-technical cooperation with Russia is imperative, since the republican army is basically equipped with Soviet weaponry and devices. Kazakhstan’s military forces have exploited Russian military equipment for decades and found the use and maintenance rather easy to manage. “Kazakhstan has already bought several helicopters, vehicles, modern radio stations and we are considering the purchase of other types of modern weapons and combat equipment for now”, said Mukhtar Altynbaev, the Minister for Defense of Kazakhstan\textsuperscript{126}.

Simultaneously, within the CSTO framework, a separate agreement was reached between Russia and Kazakhstan according to which Kazakhstan sends students to Russian military schools free of charge. In 2002 Kazakhstan sent 150 officers to be trained in Russia. In 2003 the figure rose to 250 persons\textsuperscript{127}. This figure continued to grow in 2004-2009. Given the fact that the regular military staff comprises only about 17 percent of the total army personnel, this


\textsuperscript{126} Altynbaev, M. (2004). We Were the First to Reach 19+1 Level of Partnership with NATO, Interfax AVN. http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm

factor is quite important to the development of armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan\textsuperscript{128}.

**The prospects of regional security**

On 12 January 2005, Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, made his fist after the inauguration official visit abroad to meet in Almaty with Nursultan Nazarbaev, the President of Kazakhstan. The Presidents exchanged views on further cooperation in strengthening integration within the frameworks of the CIS, the Single Economic Space, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)\textsuperscript{129}. The list of the organizations on the agenda of the Presidents’ discussion reflects the diversity of the integration processes in Eurasia; however, all these bodies play important roles in ensuring the future well-being of the region.

Moreover, the USA and NATO have taken a leading role in the antiterror campaign in Afghanistan. The Central Asian countries are aware that the task, the international antiterrorism coalition has embarked on, is very serious and might take a long time to be resolved. The officials in the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense view the deployment of NATO forces in the region as a stabilizing factor\textsuperscript{130}. In appreciation of the importance of re-building of Afghanistan, the regional countries refer to the events of 1999 and 2000, when the Central Asian states had to play the role of the buffer-zone in the way of proliferation of international terrorism and the militant extremism.

Developing the relations with Russia within the CSTO, and with China within the SCO, Kazakhstan simultaneously extends its military cooperation with the USA and its NATO allies. Taking into consideration the conflict potential of the region, all these ties prove indispensable, especially given the fact that the CSTO does not forbid its members to forge military cooperation with third parties, unless the aims of such partnership oppose the principles of the CST. With the common agenda of international antiterror operation such


cooperation in the region, definitely, goes alongside with the aims of the CST\textsuperscript{131}. As it was put by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kasymzhomart Tokaev, the times dictate the need to join efforts in solving the economic and political problems in the context of the existing threats and challenges\textsuperscript{132}. It is well known that Russia even in 2009 continues to be a member of Anti-terror coalition in Afghanistan providing corridor for non-military goods’ transportation to the ISAF and anti-terrorist forces.

The same understanding resides in the Moscow headquarters of the CSTO. The Organization confidently looks into the future and envisions cooperation with other international bodies concerned with promotion of international security. As its Secretary General commented on the CSTO’s international ties, “We have applied for cooperation with NATO, including the specific problems of maintaining security in the Central Asian region. We offered to NATO to take part in the operation “Channel 2005” and we are waiting for their answer. We work very closely with the antiterrorist bodies of the OSCE and the UN. We also cooperate with the SOC and the antiterrorist centre of the CIS”\textsuperscript{133}.

\textit{As it is known, the official answer to this CSTO initiative still did not come from NATO even in 2009.} On accession to Russian presidency in 2000, Vladimir Putin was widely cited in the Western media as saying “We have no intention to restore the notorious iron curtain\textsuperscript{134}. The same was stated, almost word by word by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in July 2007, when arguing about the issue of the CFE Treaty ratification gained momentum. The Secretary-General especially stressed common threats, first of all terrorism, which urge Russia and NATO to stay partners\textsuperscript{135}. The establishment of strong organizational alliances on a wide scale — including North Africa, Asia-Pacific and Near East regions, was declared by NATO leadership as one of top priorities on the eve of the April 2008 NATO summit, which endorsed joining of Georgia and Ukraine to


\textsuperscript{134} Putin: how close is he to Russia’s hawkish generals? http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/693526.stm

\textsuperscript{135} http://top.rbc.ru/politics/24/07/2007/110287.shtml
NATO in future. New Strategy of NATO, by words of its Secretary General, should make it quite clear that NATO urgently needs firm international partnerships, in order to fence the grave security challenges of today\textsuperscript{136}. Against this updated strategic background, the authenticity of the NATO interest in cooperation with the CSTO will be subject for verification in a very near future.

On the other hand, the European Union in its new Central Asian strategy underlined the necessity to cooperate with the CSTO, the SCO and other security organizations existing in the region. Within the context of continuing NATO’s military operation in Afghanistan and the increasing interest of the CSTO to this region this can lead to gradual improvement of relations between both organizations.

\textsuperscript{136} \url{http://usinfo.state.gov/russian/}
The Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security was established in 2004. It is a part of the Scientific Council for Coordination of International Studies (NKSMI) of MGIMO. Its tasks include research and analysis in the field of the Euro-Atlantic security, preparing papers and analytical reports for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) structures, Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Centre organizes international conferences and seminars, publishes scientific books and articles.

The Center has established relations with many analytical structures of the CIS countries, as well as with different American, European and Asian scientific organizations.

Some of the Centre projects are conducted in cooperation with the Independent Centre for Peace and International Studies and the Russian Political Science Association.

The subjects of the Center’s studies include:
- international security architecture,
- relations of Russia and the CSTO with NATO and the EU,
- peace-keeping operations and conflict settling,
- nuclear policy, international Programs and Treaties on reduction and restriction of arms,
- new threats and challenges to international security.

Alexander I. Nikitin is the Director of the Center. Alexander Nikitin is the chairman of the UN expert Commission on mercenaries under the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, member of the International Pugwash Counsel, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Pugwash Committee of Scientists for Disarmament and International Security; Professor at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO); Honorary President of the Russian Political Science Association; the Chairman of the CSTO Expert Council; Member of the Presidium Bureau of the International Federation of Peace and Conciliation. He is the author of more than 100 scientific publications in 6 languages.