


НА КНИЖНОЙ ПОЛКЕ



Журавлева В.И. Понимание России в США: образы и мифы. 1881–1914. М. : РГГУ, 2012.

Victoria I. Zhuravleva. Understanding Russia in the United States: Images and Myths. 1881–1914. Moscow: Russian State University for the Humanities, 2012

What did Americans consider to be true about Russia at the end of the 19th — beginning of the 20th century? Why would some images come to the fore and others — remain in the background? Had the growth of information about the Russian Empire and the new “discovery” of this country by Americans during this period been truly contributing to the formation of more adequate ideas about the processes that were under way there? Why had the American myths about Russia and the stereotypes in its perception proved to be so enduring? When and why had the images of Russia created within the American society begun to make rapid inroads into the American foreign policy, shaping the contents and the ideological justification of its

Russian vector? The main purpose of “Understanding Russia in the United States” is to address these and many other related questions.

Each culture has its own image of the “Other” that plays an important role in the interplay of meanings and significations that determine its “I”-concept. Ever since the beginning of the US history, Americans kept looking for “national communities” that could be presented as significant “Others” and formed their

collective identity by superimposing and projecting outwards the images of these “Others.” The present study retraces the process that began at the turn of the 20th century, through which the Russian “Other” was constructed and redefined as the key element of the American identity discourse, so that “demonizing” and “romanticizing” of Russia’s image served to revitalize the American nationalism.

The author strives to describe in a comprehensive manner and at multiple levels the process of how ideas and knowledge about Russia were formed in the United States between 1881 and 1914. This analysis takes into account the American socio-cultural context of that time, the agenda of the observer society as well as the overall patterns of Russian-American relations. The research objectives of this study are: to detect the main sources of American representations of Russia; to determine the factors that influenced the construction of its images at the societal and official levels; and to analyze the repertoires of meanings in different American discourses set by the text about Russia, including their characteristic articulation practices

that shaped and maintained the long-term American myths about Russia and Russians.

The conceptual framework of this study relies heavily on three kinds of context that engendered the American text about Russia and can be better understood through this text. The first one is the socio-cultural context that helps to identify dominant identity markers that were characteristic for the observer society in the long run. The second, short-term context closely related to the first one, is the agenda or the political context — the specific configuration of domestic and foreign policy issues that are important at a given stage of development of the observer society — that explains the mechanisms through which the Russian “Other” is being used. The third and final one is the auxiliary context of Russian-American bilateral relations. In analyzing these interdependent contexts, the author relies not only on the findings of the “linguistic turn” research tradition that places the emphasis on the study of the “Other’s” image in terms of discursive practices (the subjective context), but also on the attention that the advocates of the “cultural turn” drew to the objective contexts that are important for the construction of texts about the “Other.”

It must be noted that, during the period under consideration (with the exception of the 1903-1905 crisis and the abrogation of the 1832 treaty on commerce and navigation in 1911), the interstate interactions remained relatively unaffected by the changes that occurred in the American positioning of Russian image and that the diplomats also attempted to neutralize this influence. Nevertheless, this objective context allows to highlight several important issues. First, there is a correlation between the agenda of Russian-American relations and the perception of Russia, that is, between the “internal” process of identity formation in the United States and the “external” construction of the Russian vector in its foreign policy. Second, the American society elaborated mechanisms for putting pressure on the decision-making process in the realm of foreign

policy, and these pressure mechanisms directly affected the overall character of bilateral relations. Third, it was precisely during this period that the ideological factor became a negative constant in Russian-American relations. However, if ideology is defined as an aggregate of ideas, values, and myths that shape a worldview, then the ideological factor has been present in these bilateral relations ever since their beginning.

Methodologically, “Understanding Russia in the United States” is based both on traditional methods of historical research, used to create the historical narrative, and on the interdisciplinary methodological framework that came to be known as the imagology of international relations. This framework is grounded in the findings of social constructivism, cultural anthropology, and ethnopsychology and is focused on comparative study of background ideas, images, cognitive stereotypes, and myths that operate at the normative level in a given national environment, as well as on the study of communication traditions that are imprinted in the cultural and historical memory of a nation and use the conceptual pair “Self/Other.”

In creating a methodological base for her book, the author relied especially heavily on the work of those scholars who based their studies of identity problems in international relations on the concept of dialogism introduced by Mikhail Bakhtin. This framework posits the existence of the “Other” as a necessary condition for defining the “Self” and includes research on mental geography with an emphasis on the study of mythologization of time and space as well as studies that present the US foreign policy as a field of identity construction and analyze the ideological and cultural dimensions of this policy. The author list for the former current includes such researchers as Tzvetan Todorov, Edward Said, Larry Wolff, and Iver Neumann; the latter current is represented, among other authors, by Emily Rosenberg, Michael Hunt, David Campbell, and Walter Hixson.

Given such a methodological framework, the author does not limit her task to studying

the process of mutual perception through the lens of narrative analysis — a customary tool for describing images of other cultures that allows to assess how different these images are from reality. Rather, she is striving to answer a broader set of questions. Why were Americans imagining Russian reality in a given way and not otherwise? What kinds of discursive practices were used to create an image of Russia and its inhabitants and how malleable was this image? What was the logic of verbal and visual writing used for its construction? Finally, what role did it play in the identity formation of the American society? Hence, we are talking not only about reflection, but also about self-reflection, since the answer to the *why* question is found in the American political and socio-cultural context that engendered these images of other nations.

For these reasons, even though the author does pay attention to the Russian context itself, she is not interested in it for its own sake. There is no doubt that the realities of Russian Empire's development influenced the evolution of its images and sustained the long-term myths about it on the other side of the Atlantic: any myth that emerges and is capable of reproduction needs to have some grounding in real events and phenomena. Nonetheless, for the purposes of imagological analysis, the first and foremost concern is the motivation that stood behind the interpretations of this reality and determined which of its characteristics were emphasized and which — marginalized. The book shows that, at the turn of the twentieth century, the collective American conscience had formed images of Russia that correlated with the national and foreign policy interests of the American society and with the socio-cultural traditions of its development. These correlations determined the hierarchy of Russia's images, giving some of them central roles and delegating others to the periphery. Focusing the analysis on the central images allows the author to detect long-lived perception trends that emerged in the 19th century and have remained important up to the beginning of the 21st.

The American discourses about Russia form the substantive content of this book. The author follows Michel Foucault's definition of discourse as an aggregate of statements that form part of a single system, while not forgetting about dialogism that is inherent to the fundamental discourse structures. She is also conscious of the fact that this discourse is based on a theme (in this case, a text about Russia), a repertoire of meanings (ideas and images, metaphors and concepts articulated within a discourse), to which the discourse participants refer, consciously or unconsciously, as well as on a structure of oppositions. In the case of Russia, the relevant oppositions are the dichotomous models, such as the West — Asia/the Orient, Civilization-Barbarism, Modernity-Medievalism, Freedom-Slavery, the ethical dichotomy of Good and Evil and the Manichean duality of Light and Darkness. In addition, one has to include the conceptual dichotomies shaped by the agenda of the American society: Russian anti-Semitism versus American racism, Russian peasants versus Afro-Americans and Native Americans, the American policy of "open doors" in China versus "closed doors" for the Chinese immigrants in the United States, the "Manchuria question" in Russia versus the "Panama question" in the US, etc. Some of these dichotomies refer to personalities, for example, the contrast between the Russian Tsars and the US Presidents.

The author sees the discourse as an umbrella concept that includes both the macro-discourse — the text about Russia that existed within the American socio-cultural context — and its individual components, or micro-discourses: the liberal-universalist (optimistic), the Russophile, the conservative-pessimist (Russophobic), and the radical. Each one of these micro-discourses comes with its own vision of the Russian national character, the modernization prospects of the Russian Empire, the construction of a "romantic" or a "demonic" image of the Russian "Other," the set of mythologems and articulation practices.

“Understanding Russia in the United States” is based on a wide variety of secondary sources that include, apart from subject- and theme-specific bibliographies, the classic general texts on the history of bilateral relations of such masters of American historiography as William Williams (“American-Russian Relations 1781-1947,” 1952), Thomas Bailey (“America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day,” 1950), and John Gaddis (“Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History,” 1990).

On the one hand, the “revisionist” William Williams and the “realist” John Gaddis almost never consider the problem of mutual perception as a separate theme. Hence, Williams explains the changes in the way Russian image was positioned in the US with references to economic factors, and Gaddis — with references to the “Russian context” and to the growing availability of information. Besides, John Gaddis reduces Russian-American relations mainly to the interstate interactions and sees them through the lens of mutually shaping interests and ideologies in each country’s foreign policy. By interests he means the conditions that a nation-state needs in order to preserve its status and authority in the world, and by ideology — the justification that the nation-state gives for exercising this authority. The author of this book considers such an interpretation of ideology to be too narrow and restricting for the task of studying Russian-American relations from a broader, interdisciplinary perspective. For this reason, she defines ideology as the system of ideas and values that determines how a society perceives itself, the rest of the world, and its place in the world through the aggregate of myths about itself that arise from the matrix of national cultural symbols.

On the other hand, Thomas Bailey’s book about the evolution of ideas about the Russian Empire and the Soviet Russia in the United States is a high-quality research text that is written from a completely nationalist perspective. Thomas Bailey belonged to

the conservative camp of the American foreign policy historiographers, and the purpose of his book, written at the beginning of the Cold War, was to denounce the autocratic state power in Russia in all its forms — from the Tsarist to the Bolshevik, and to highlight the efforts of successive presidential administrations and of the American society to defend the ideals of freedom and democracy, for which the Russian people fought, yearning for help from the other side of the Atlantic. Bailey’s study is structured around two oppositions — “Civilization vs. Barbarism”, “Freedom vs. Slavery” — and puts great emphasis on the fundamental role that the public opinion played in shaping the course of the US foreign policy. Furthermore, it draws multiple parallels between the Tsarist and the Bolshevik regimes that in Bailey’s opinion were equally despotic, deceitful, masterful in the art of window dressing, and imbued with the spirit of Orientalism. In his search for causal mechanisms behind the changing perception of Russia, Bailey refers exclusively to the Russian / Soviet context and does not consider the American socio-cultural context at all as a possible source of explanations.

However, Bailey’s study cannot be ignored for at least two important reasons. First, it is based on an extremely wide variety of American primary sources, including political cartoons, and provides many valuable insights. Second, together with many other research texts on this topic that were produced in the US in the second half of the 20th century, this work itself becomes an important source for the study of images in international relations, since Bailey’s conception fits well into the universe of long-term American myths about Russia and into the process of using the Russian “Other” to justify the supremacy of the American “Self” and the American right to reform the world.

A work that does not belong to the core literature on Russian-American relations, but is of great importance for the methodological approach of this book is the general text authored by Martin Malia (“Russia under Western Eyes. From the Bronze Horse-

men to the Lenin Mausoleum," 2000) that captivates the reader by intellectual epiphanies, bold generalizations, logic, and clarity of presentation. This study has a special place in a series of American scholarly works that examine the long-lived evolution of Western representations of Russia, since it presents a critical analysis of concepts, evaluations, and interpretations proposed by Western scholars who thought about Russia and Russians. Malia's main argument is that Europe does not exist and has never existed as a homogeneous cultural whole opposed to Russia and that Europe must be studied as an aggregate of "special paths" (including "the Russian path") that form a descending ladder from the shores of the Atlantic to the foot of the Ural Mountains. Thus, Russia's never-ending race to catch up with the most progressive nations of the world has to be seen as the factor that determines its development trajectory. This explanatory framework undoubtedly belongs to the liberal-universalist discourse whose origins go back to the turn of the 20th century and are examined in the main body of the present study.

The substantive framework and the story lines of "Understanding Russia in the United States" have been shaped by the books of three authoritative American scholars: David Foglesong ("The American Mission and the «Evil Empire». The Crusade for a «Free Russia» since 1881," 2007), David Engerman ("Modernization from the Other Shore. American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development," 2003), and Norman Saul ("Concord and Conflict. The United States and Russia, 1867-1914," 1996).

The first two authors focus on the study of the long-term evolution of particular components of Russia's image in the United States after the 1917. Yet neither of these two historians saw his research objective as the study of the entire aggregate of Russia's dominant images through a comprehensive analysis of the American socio-cultural context, the agenda of the American society, and of the overall patterns of Russian-American relations during a given period.

The author of this book has a special affinity to David Foglesong's explanatory scheme that broadens our ideas about the mechanisms through which romantic and demonic images of the Russian "Other" were created and reproduced and about the political, economic, cultural, and religious dimensions of the "new messianic idea" that was linked to the perception of Russia's prospects for renewal and became a projection of the US domestic political situation. This intellectual affinity has resulted in many years of collaboration and several joint publications on the history of Russian-American relations with an emphasis on their socio-cultural dimension and on a broad interpretation of the concept of ideology. The conceptual framework of this book expands, deepens, and elaborates on Foglesong's scheme by drawing upon additional source materials, explanatory models, and synthetic analysis of different perception levels relevant for its focus period (1881-1914).

According to David Engerman, the most important factors that have been influencing the perception of Russia in the United States since the 19th century are: stereotypes related to the ideas about the Russian national character, growing levels of enthusiasm about the progress of Russia's modernization, and the growing professionalism of those who studied Russia from the other side of the Atlantic. However, Engerman does not consider alternative, competing images of Russia in American society that can also be discerned in the actions and writings of the American intellectuals that are the object of his masterful study.

It is hard to overestimate the importance of Norman Saul's monograph on the history of Russian-American relations between 1867 and 1914, the second volume in the series of his texts that covers the period from the late 18th century to 1941. In this work, Saul has brought to light a multitude of primary sources, and his historical narrative is of the highest quality. Yet, this neopositivist "encyclopedia of bilateral relations," with its mosaic-like structure and an overwhelm-

ing number of characters and events, cannot be considered an imagological study. In explaining the changes that occurred in the American perception of Russia, Saul referred primarily to the Russian context and tended to create an impression that positive factors dominated in the positioning of Russia's image, while paying particular attention to "the Jewish question" in his analysis of the negative factors. However, Saul set himself a different task and has accomplished it brilliantly. He has produced a high-quality historical narrative and a work of fundamental importance that creates attractive prospects for further interdisciplinary studies of Russian-American relations in the period between the sale of Alaska and the First World War.

Since "Understanding Russia in the United States" has a more complex research methodology that includes the study of the socio-cultural context, the political agenda of the American society, and the overall process of positioning Russia's image, the author had to radically change her approach to the structuring of the historical narrative, to make the story lines more complex, and to integrate the American sources already used by Norman Saul into other explanatory frameworks and thus to interpret them differently.

This monograph draws heavily on the works of Russian researchers, such as Edward Ya. Batalov, Ivan I. Kurilla, Victor L. Mal'kov, Alexander Etkind, and Vladimir O. Rukavishnikov who studied different periods in the history of bilateral relations and focused on their socio-cultural dimension and on the problem of mutual perception.

Chronologically, the coverage of this book begins in 1881, with the onset of a new period of political reaction in Russia. This period coincided with certain changes within the American society and in the overall system of international relations that induced the former to reconsider "the equation of Russian-American friendship" and the image of the Russian Empire as a different, but friendly country. The analysis ends in the 1914, with the start of the First World War

that marked the beginning of a rapprochement between the two countries and placed the need for better mutual knowledge and understanding on the agenda of the Russian-American relations.

This study analyzes a wealth of primary materials from Russian and American archives and libraries. The author has collected data from diplomatic and private correspondence, memoirs, diaries, travelogues, tourist guidebooks (including the first ones that were published in the US specifically for travelers to the Russian Empire), pamphlets, American textbooks on world and European history, and fiction. Most of the documents on which this work is based are unpublished and make their first appearance in the scholarly literature. The author also offers her own interpretations of previously studied sources.

Among this multitude of primary sources, American press materials have a place apart. These include verbal texts and political cartoons from newspapers, magazines, and journals of different political and party orientations and from different states and regions of the country. It is important to note that the political cartoons are used in this study as a source of primary evidence with very particular characteristics, and not simply as illustrations.

Such a comprehensive set of sources allows the author to present the relationship between Russia and the United States as a multi-tiered phenomenon, to analyze different facets of perception, and to reconstruct in their full complexity the American discourses set by the text about Russia. It also enables the author to give her narrative a human dimension by including historical figures of all hues, famous and little known, key actors and secondary characters.

Structurally, "Understanding Russia in the United States" is divided into *three main parts* that correspond to the main chronological subperiods within the narrative. Each part is structured according to the political, economic, and cultural aspects of Russian-American relations that were especially relevant to the transformation of ideas about

Russia in the United States during that sub-period. Each part has an *Introduction* that contains an overall description of the diplomatic context, the American socio-cultural context, and the agenda of the American society. This approach allows to examine the relative importance of internal and external factors in the positioning of Russia's images and to trace the connections between the "internal" process of identity formation and the US foreign policy. It also enables the author to evaluate the extent to which the changes in the perception of Russian Empire and its inhabitants influenced the foreign policy rhetoric of Washington policymakers and their propensity to use the Russian "Other" for the construction of the American "Self". Finally, it makes possible to assess how strongly these transnational images, myths, and perception stereotypes affected the general environment of Russian-American relations.

Conclusions to the parts also have important substantive content. Apart from drawing generalizations about the material presented in the chapters, their purpose is to shift the discussion from individual discourses that were constructed by intellectuals in a broad sense of this term to the level of everyday conscience. They integrate the mosaic of images, personal impressions, individual and collective representations that arises from the aggregate of primary sources into a single perception picture. Thus, we can detect permanent and temporary components of ideas about Russia, the reasons for which they turn into stereotypes, and the mechanisms through which the Russian "Other" become integrated into the American identity discourse.

Part One covers the last two decades of the 19th century — a transitional period in the history of the construction of Russia's image in the US. It analyzes the basic trends in American representations of Russia and shows how a dichotomous vision of Russia first began to emerge at the societal level, while "the equation of Russian-American friendship," pluralist perception and cooper-

ative orientations were still maintained at the interstate level of relations.

This part of the book opens with the analysis of the role that the Jewish question played in the formation of ideas about Russia in the United States. The American movement against the discrimination of Russian Jews was related to the domestic immigration issue and to the process of identity formation in the US itself and thus became the prologue and then an important complement to the first stage of the American "crusade" for the cause of Russian freedom. Journalists, religious leaders, businessmen, congressmen, and politicians who criticized the discriminatory policies during the reign of Alexander III have made an important contribution to the elaboration of the rhetorical devices that spread through the American society as the "demonic" image of Russia was being positioned and to the shaping of the messianic rhetoric of the "friends of Russian freedom" movement in the United States (Chapter 1). Its participants developed their own vision of modernization prospects for the Russian Empire, as they "demonized" its political regime and kept their faith in that the Russian national character was but a product of despotism and arbitrary power, so that, given the right conditions, the Russian people would be capable to overcome their peculiarity and backwardness and to join the universal process of modernization (Chapter 2). The charitable campaign organized in the US during the Russian famine of 1891-1892 was an unprecedented event in the history of US-Russian relations that made evident the social demand for these new representations that entered in direct competition with the old image of a different, but friendly country. At the same time, as Americans became acquainted with the reality of the "famished Russia," these events became an important marker of the country's backwardness (Chapter 3).

In this manner the Americans had "discovered" Russia to be an empire of despotism and arbitrary power, of ethnic and religious discrimination and repeated famines,

of backward peasantry and Westernized intelligentsia, ready to offer its life on the altar of Russian Freedom. This learning process led to discussions about the Russian national character and the peculiarities of the Orthodox civilization, and to arguments about “the ignorant people” waiting for help from the other side of the ocean and the prospects of creating “the United States of Russia”. This “Russian mirror” turned out to be of great convenience, because, as Americans looked into it in times of troubles and stock-taking, they pushed aside their own fears, doubts, and problems and gained confidence in their right to act as global reformers. Reforms abroad were thus seen either as a continuation of the reforms at home or as a justification for their absence.

Yet at the same time, a different Russia was being discovered by the United States: the liberal-universalist (“crusader”) interpretation coexisted with the Russophile vision. Moreover, in the middle of the 1890s, the Russophiles gained a definitive victory over the “crusaders.” Russophiles recognized that the Russians had the right to be different, saw the ruler and the people as a unified whole, talked about the compassionate paternalism of the Russian autocratic state and the slow rates of modernization, and thus constructed its “Orientalist” image without becoming dye-hard Orientalists themselves. Russophiles contributed to the emergence of Russian studies as an academic discipline in the US and inculcated in their compatriots a taste for Russian literature, music, and paintings during the period when Russia was turning into a real exporter of cultural values. This process was neither unambiguous nor always conducive to a better understanding of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, it added much nuance and complexity to the American ideas about Russia and eroded simplistic perception schemes (Chapter 4).

The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the onset of industrialization were read as unequivocal signs of Russia’s progress, and this encouraged a search for similarities in the development trajec-

ries of the two countries while some began to see Russia as an attractive international partner. The lucrative prospects of entering Russian markets both weakened negative perception trends and gave additional weight to the idea that the Russian Empire was one of the main objects for the US mission of world commercialization and Americanization. All the more so, since the Hague peace initiative advanced by Nicholas II and the early years of his reign seemed to justify hopes of future political renovation (Chapter 5).

At the same time, as the conflict in the Far East went escalating over the last years of the 19th century, a conservative discourse acquired its definitive shape in the American society. This discourse was characterized by the myth of “Immutable Rus” (*Izvechnaya Rus*), the inclination to “demonize” the Russian national character and to deny Russia the right to a civilizing mission in East Asia. It is precisely during these years that the image of Russia as a hostile “Other” that presented a threat to the American interests made its first appearance.

One of the main conclusions for Part One is that, during the two last decades of the 19th century, Americans could learn about Russia through both direct and indirect information channels that were infinitely broader than those available during the preceding period. Yet, although ideas about Russia became much more complex and several competing images were present in American representations, the reliance on stereotypes had not diminished, as new stereotypes came to coexist with the old ones.

The author draws the reader’s attention to three important caveats that must be taken into account in the analysis of the American observers’ evaluations and opinions. First of all, travelers’ perception of Russia were greatly shaped by the conditions that they faced upon their entry into Russia, the purpose of the journey, worldviews, individual capacity to select information, and the flexibility of their thinking. It must be noted that the latter three factors are equally important not only for first-hand Amer-

ican observers of Russia but also for those who never went there. Second, the propagation of myths and stereotypes was fostered by the fact that the majority of those who wrote about Russia were not professional scholars, but journalists, political and religious leaders, entrepreneurs, and literary critics. The third point, closely linked to the previous two, is that writings about Russia vary greatly according to their authors' ability to avoid one-dimensional vision and to accept a complex image, to pay attention to the dynamics of changes that were under way in Russia, and to see its many faces. Thus, one has to ask about each American observer what facet of Russian reality attracted his attention and got reflected in his writing — modernization, urbanization, economic revival, colonization of Siberia, or the political, agrarian, and social backwardness, famines and epidemics. The accounts vary widely depending on which traits of the national character were emphasized and how these traits were related to the prospects of modernizing this enormous country.

The development of a sophisticated and multifaceted perception of Russia in the US was inhibited by the negative attitude of British channels of information that was due to the strained Russian-British relations and was repeatedly mentioned by the Russian diplomats stationed in the United States. This fact did not escape the attention of American Russophiles who felt the need to study Russia seriously and advocated for the accreditation of American correspondents in Saint-Petersburg. It was also highlighted by the journalists who made it their goal to disentangle the bundle of perception stereotypes that formed on the other side of the Atlantic. The significance of this factor increased in the early 20th century, as Great Britain and the United States grew closer and the latter felt a pressing need to revise the image of Russia as a “historical friend of the US.”

Nevertheless, the author sees the main causes of the transformation of Russian image in the fact that the Russian “Oth-

er” had turned into a significant reference for the construction of American identity and, therefore, in the agenda changes of the American society itself and in the evolution of its ideology. These were the contexts into which policy-makers fit their actions and society — its understanding of these actions.

At the end of the 19th century, the agendas of Russian and American societies still left ample opportunities for encountering similarities, although the list of these similarities was obviously different from what it was during the previous period. Analogies were made between racial segregation in the US and discrimination of national minorities in the Russian Empire; between the “exclusion acts” against Jews in Russia and against Chinese immigrants in the United States; between former slaves and the Russian “dark people” (*tyomny liud*); and, finally, between the problem of the Russian peasants living on communal lands and the tribal landholdings of Native Americans. Besides, in the second half of the 1890s, the image of Siberia as a place of exile competed with an equally compelling image of Siberia as the Russian equivalent of the American West, since the difficulties of daily life in Siberia were similar to those that existed west of the Mississippi and so Russian and American colonists lived and acted alike. Finally, the tendency to draw parallels between American and Russian policies of territorial expansion was maintained in the American discourse about Russia. For example, analogies were made between the Russian endeavors to establish control over the Black Sea and the Straits and the American actions in the Panama Canal Zone; between the messianic enthusiasm of the Russians during the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 and that of the Americans during the 1898 Spanish —American War.

Therefore, Russia’s image evolved not because similarities in the agenda of the two societies had disappeared, as Ivan Kurilla argues. Instead, the causes of this evolution are to be found in the ways that the parallels between the two societies were used in American representations. At the end of the 19th

century, the process of drawing analogies to Russia's development trajectory helped the citizens of the United States to keep the faith in its special status and in its right to promote democracy in the entire world. It was precisely under these conditions that the Russian "Other" became the significant one in the construction of the American "Self." Thus, the attitude toward Russia that had not previously played any role in the maintenance of the myth of American exceptionalism was now becoming crucial for the revitalization of this myth.

The author's key conclusion is that during the last two decades of the 19th century competing images of Russia interacted in a very complex manner and fit into different American discourses set by the text about this country. This situation had not led to serious investigations about Russia, although the need for such investigations was being felt, as the study of the US history was becoming more professionalized. Instead, it prompted the invention of its mental images that could fit well into the American context and laid the foundation for a dichotomous vision of the processes that went on in Russia. The creation of competing images was an important phenomenon in its own right, because it only became possible due to the growing availability of information about Russia and the continuing willingness to get to know another country better. Yet, although the new discovery of Russia did encourage the creation of these competing images, it did not lead to a better understanding of this country. Moreover, sometimes it brought about the "demonization" of Russia and facilitated the integration of the ideological factor into Russian-American relations.

However, until the beginning of the 20th century, a friendly *status quo* was maintained at the inter-state level, so that neither the American "crusade" for Russia's freedom, nor the campaigning of the Jewish lobby, nor the Russophobes' deliberations about the Russian national character influenced the foreign policy of the Washington administration, while the American society maintained

a pluralistic vision of Russia and the willingness to learn about different facets of Russian reality.

Part Two is dedicated to the first crisis in the history of Russian-American relations and guides the reader through the environment of ideological and geopolitical conflict that began to develop in 1902 and reached its climax in 1903-1905. Its three principal facets were the Kishinev pogrom, the Russian-Japanese War, and the Russian Revolution of 1905. The imagological background for this crisis was shaped by fears of Russia's expansion in the Far East and a wholesale revision of Russia's image as the "historical friend of the United States," by the American perception of Japan as the "Yankee of the East" and the emphasis that was placed on hostile Orientalism as the essential feature of Russian civilization, by the Americans' hopes for the liberalization of the Russian Empire and believe in their own responsibility for this process.

According to John Gaddis, the changes that occurred in the American perception of Russia between 1875 and 1895 indicate that the period of friendly relations that lasted most of the 19th century was coming to its end. By contrast, *Part Two* of this book demonstrates that the real shifts in the positioning of Russia's image in the US, the stressing of the conflict component in the bilateral relations and a fundamental revision of "the history of Russian American friendship" all came at a later time. Chapter 1 shows that this process started to intensify in 1901-1902. However, pluralism of the images and a real conflict of representations endured until 1903.

Chapter 2 shows that the onset of the Russo-Japanese War made serious corrections both in the formulation of the Russian vector of the US foreign policy and in the process of its perception at the other side of the Atlantic. It has to be noted that the expansionist ambitions of *both* countries contributed to the escalation of the Russian-American conflict in the Far East, with the exception of 1903 when the Russian "new course" in this region turned into a kind of

provocation. Yet, the “war of images” against the Russian Empire was provoked directly by the United States, which turned this country into Japan’s moral ally.

A further integration of the ideological factor into Russian-American relations and the use of the Russian “Other” as the significant one in the construction of American identity discourse was fostered not only by the Russo-Japanese War, but also by the Revolution of 1905-1907. This transformed the US foreign policy into a vital sphere where national identity was redefined and reaffirmed (Chapter 3). The formation of persistent American myths about Russia was catalyzed by oscillations between the “romantic” image of the Russian people ready to create the “United States of Russia” and the ideas about the “Immutable Rus” and between demonization of Russian government and the construction of the image of a strong ruler, capable to reign in the anarchy and to facilitate the process of gradual renewal of a country that remained alien and incomprehensible to the West. Real events did feed these myths and facilitate their reproduction. Yet, these myths were also products of the cognitive schemes dictated by the socio-cultural system of coordinates of the American society, the agenda of its development, and the eagerness to use the “Russian card” in the domestic political game.

A “demonic” image of the official Russia that took roots within both the liberal-universalist and the conservative discourses came to occupy the front stage in the American representations. The elements of this image included, on the one hand, criticisms of despotic and arbitrary power, policies of discrimination and russification, and of the aggressive character of Russia’s expansion in the Far East, which threatened America’s “open doors” policy in China. On the other hand, this image was shaped by the growing levels of immigration of ethnic and religious minorities into the US and the ensuing “visa scandal” and of economic competition that threatened trade interests of the American entrepreneurs.

The alternative vision was provided by the “romantic” representation of the Russian people led by the liberals and ready for a Western-style revolution that would place it on the road to progress already walked by the United States and other world leaders. This version of the “romantic” image entered into the repertoire of meanings of the liberal-universalist discourse and coexisted with a distinct version created through the efforts of the American Left, including the “gentlemen-Socialists.” These actors participated in the creation of the radical discourse that insisted on Russia’s special role in promoting ideals of equality and drew inspiration for the revival and development of the American Socialism from the experience of the Russian social revolution.

In the end, during the first crisis in bilateral relations the voices of “realists” who called for a nuanced vision of a many-faced Russian Empire were drowned by the choir of “pessimists” and “optimists,” while the conflict of representations and the plurality of images were replaced by dichotomies. Moreover, the crisis period of 1903-1905 contributed both to the defeat of the Russophiles at the hands of the “crusaders” and to the eventual victory of conservatives over liberal-universalists.

The consolidation of a dichotomous vision of Russia’s development was facilitated by a significant increase in the spreading of information about Russia in the American society, especially through the press. Stories about the Russian Empire, its foreign policy and its domestic political situation flooded the pages of newspapers and magazines and turned into front-page news.

1903-1905 was the first occasion when the American press had launched an “war of images” against Russia. Although there was no military conflict between Russia and the US, both United States and Japan had violated the rules of peaceful image interaction between countries — a situation when one nation creates its own image of another, and this image, although not always very adequate and veracious, is not used for hostile

purposes. The prevalence of British channels of information, the success of Japan's propaganda campaign in the United States, and the hunt for news sensations were the chief reasons for the fact that misinformation became one of the key weapons in this war. A galaxy of talented newspaper cartoonists made a tangible contribution to the American "war of images" by turning into pictures the "demonic" image of the official Russia that suited Washington policy-makers. By highlighting oppositions such as Darkness-Light, the Orient — the West, Barbarism-Civilization, they strengthened the simplistic notions of what went on in Russia and helped to place Russia in the role of the essential "Other" in the American identity discourse.

The author comes to the conclusion that the overall effect of the American political cartoons both during the period of Russo-Japanese War and during the 1905 Revolution was to provide a distorting mirror that reflected simplistic ideas about Russia (while in verbal texts its image remained much more nuanced). These ideas could be well expressed in the grotesque and symbolic language that is so characteristic of a cartoon. They included the image of the "Empire of Darkness and Barbarism" that had fallen hopelessly behind the progressive countries in terms of its political and military development. They depicted a nation that was a prison for political dissidents and members of religious and ethnic minorities — an image that was propagated by George Kennan and "the friends of Russian freedom." They presented "demonic" image of its ruler as the Evil incarnate and "romantic" vision of its people and fostered the idea that Americans were not simply observers, but mentors and teachers.

American cartoonists undoubtedly belonged to a distinct socio-cultural and political environment, and this affected by their perception angle, the information they chose to present, and the manner of its representation together with the political stance and purposes of the periodicals to which they contributed and individual pictorial lan-

guage. At the same time cartoonists worked under the influence of images that were propagated by champions of different American discourses about Russia and of their own ideas about the subject. Besides, the events that were under way in the Russian Empire were truly dramatic and bloody and its defeat at the hands of Japan was so devastating that all of this created real grounds for criticism. However, reasons must also be given for their blatant lies and fabrications, for the omission of the positive side of the picture and the hyperbolization of the negative one. These reasons are found in the rules of the "war of images" that, in the author's opinion, Russia had lost both to the US and to Japan.

Yet, this "war of images" left a very curious and long-lasting heritage. As John Dower has demonstrated in his brilliant study, during the Second World War, the American cartoonists used the very same pictorial devices for portraying the Japanese that can be found in the Russian *lubki* from the times of the Russo-Japanese war: the Japanese appear as yellow-faced primates, parasitic beings that are barely human. One can also draw clear parallels between the central symbols of Japanese backstabbing: Port Arthur for Russians and Pearl Harbor for Americans. But in 1905 all of this was still a matter of the future. Meanwhile, all the laurel wreaths went to the agile and modern "Japanese David," this "Yankee of the East" that seemed to defend the principles so dear for the Americans and that entered a war with a clumsy and backward "Russian Goliath".

From this time on, the "David versus Goliath" metaphor has held a special place in the arsenal of rhetorical devices that the US has used when referring to the imperial ambitions of authoritarian Russia, ever ready to attack smaller, but more progressive states. To date, the most recent use of this metaphor occurred in the summer of 2008, when it appeared in the American press and on Internet-sites in reference to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. During this last "war of images", the role of David fell to the "small democratic Georgia" that suffered the ag-

gression of the “Russian Goliath — the authoritarian post-Soviet Russia.”

One of the most important consequences of the 1903-1905 “war of images” was that the Tsarist government became conscious of the role that the American public opinion played in the US foreign policy in general and in the construction of its Russian vector in particular. The evidence for this growing awareness can be found in the discourses of Russian statesmen published by the American press, in the “public relations” efforts undertaken by the Russian Embassy, and also in the way that Melville Stone, the head of the “Associated Press,” had been received in Russia and by its Emperor. The end result of it all was that the Russian authorities uncensored the writings of journalists accredited in the Russian Empire not only by the “Associated Press,” but also by other foreign news agencies.

Part Two of the book pays particular attention to the role of the Russian “Other” in the analysis of the domestic and foreign policy agenda of the American society. This phenomenon became reflected in the deliberations of members of the political and intellectual establishment, public and religious leaders, journalists and political writers, as well as in the drawings of the editorial cartoonists. Parallels between Russia and the US were drawn not only in order to criticize Russia or the domestic political situation in the US and its policy of double standards, but also in order to demonstrate that the United States, in spite of its imperfections and social conflicts, remained a bastion of freedom and democracy in comparison to the Russian Empire.

First of all, deliberations about the nature of Russia’s imperialist policy formed part of the socio-political controversies within the US about the change of its foreign policy course and the debates between the anti-imperialists and the advocates of transforming the US into a world power. This context made comparable the actions of the Russian Empire in Manchuria and the US actions in the region of the Panama Canal

Zone. Some were of the opinion that in both cases the governments had spent huge sums of money and thus had the right to defend their property; thus Russia’s “Asian doctrine” was compared to the Monroe doctrine in the US. Russophiles went even further and tried to westernize Russian imperialism in Turkestan and Manchuria, drawing analogies not only to the US policy in the Western hemisphere, but also to the actions of the European powers: Great Britain in Egypt and Sudan and France in Algiers. This idea was at one time voiced by Archibald Coolidge. Others, by contrast, depicted the Russian Empire as the “dark twin” of the United States, arguing that Washington’s “civilizing imperialism” could never be compared to the “barbaric imperialism” of Saint-Petersburg. Still others drew the sign of equality between Russian and American varieties of imperialism in order to criticize the latter. These anti-imperialists compared the US policy towards the Philippines to the Russian policy in Finland in order to highlight the double standards and the negative characteristics of the former.

Second, the problem of anti-Semitism in the Russian Empire resembled the racism issue in the US. The search for analogies between the Jewish *pogroms* and the lynching of African Americans and the state policies towards these two ethnic groups turned into a very common communicative strategy. The critics of racism in the United States compared the “Jim Crow laws” with Russian anti-Jewish laws, drunken White Americans who lynched Black Americans with vodka-intoxicated Russian peasants killing Russian Jews. Atlanta, the site of an especially cruel African American *pogrom*, was compared to Kishinev. Quite understandably, these kinds of analogies were faithfully reproduced by the official and semi-official Russian press and eagerly used by the Tsarist government and its diplomats every time when the US seemed ready to intervene into the solution of the “Jewish question” in Russia. At the same time, quite a few others used Russia as the “dark twin” of the US and insisted that the Jewish *pogroms* in Russia were

infinitely worse than the ones against African Americans. At the other extreme of the social spectrum, some white Southerners made use of Pleve's murder in Russia in order to show that lynch trials could at times be justified.

The plight of the Russian Jews also served as a reference point for the discussions about Native Americans, who were often declared to be more oppressed than even the Jews in Russia. Besides, the discriminatory laws against the Jews were likened to the laws against the Chinese immigrants, and this critique of the American anti-immigration measures was complemented with the opposition "open doors in China — closed doors in the US."

Third, mass disturbances in the Russian Empire during the 1905 Revolution were compared to the social unrest in the US, especially to the events in Chicago, the city that became the center of the workers' movement and the site of a powerful strike in May 1905 that was marked by bloody clashes with the police. American Russophiles pointed to the social unrest in Chicago in order to highlight that the Americans who criticized Russians would do well to pay more attention to the events at home. Meanwhile, the conservative press had appropriated the image of "Russian nihilist bomb-throwers" as the symbol of the hostile "Other" and used it in their critique of political radicalism in the US in order to show that this phenomenon was completely alien to the American model of development and was brought in by immigrants.

Fourth, Russia's image was used on a broader scale as a negative marker in the discussions of the sour points of domestic political development, as the American society was going through a period of racial confrontations, social unrest, and ideological disenchantments. Thus, the Grand Dukes of Russia were mentioned in critiques of political bossism, the captains of the US industry were called Siberian wolves, despots, and bloody autocrats of the monopolist world, who lived in luxury and sent their "personal Cossacks" to disperse workers' strikes. Life in the slums of Boston and New York was said to be no

better than the existence in miserable huts and hovels in the Tsar's domain, etc.

Fifth, the Revolution of 1905 provided a new mold for the analogy between the abolition of slavery in the US and the end of serfdom in Russia that was commonly used on both sides of the Atlantic and had a tradition of growing stronger whenever the bilateral relations became closer. The opposition Freedom-Slavery that was already integrated into the American discourse about Russia thanks to the efforts of the participants in the first "crusade" for the cause of Russian freedom now acquired new overtones. The image of Abraham Lincoln was thus established as a firm reference for all occasions when Americans had to form an idea about the current figure that "liberated the Russian people from the shackles of political and spiritual slavery," be it Sergei Witte in 1905, Pavel Miliukov in 1917, Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1974, or Boris Yeltsin in 1991.

Such was the context for the crystallization of the long-term American myths about Russia that have not lost their importance until our days. The liberal-universalist myths framed the image of the romantic Russian "Other" and formed the repertoire of meanings for the liberal-universalist discourse. This discourse had come to dominate at the time of the 1905 Revolution, the event that marked the culmination of the first American "crusade" for Russian Freedom. Its components included the vision of the Russian Revolution that originated in the lowest classes of society, was directed by liberals, and followed the model of the great Western Revolutions; the beliefs that Russian society was capable of relatively rapid Westernization, that the Russian people was resisting its xenophobic authorities and waiting for help from overseas, and that Americans are responsible for the process of reforming Russia. It was argued that Russia had no other choice but to follow the path of democracy and capitalism already traced by the more developed Western countries, the United States first and foremost among them.

The book gives detailed accounts about the activities of Aleksei Alad'in and Niko-

lai Chaikovsky, who came to the US in 1907, Pavel Miliukov, Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya, and Maksim Gorky — some of the Russian liberals and radicals who have made a special contribution in the maintenance of the American liberal-universalist myths about Russia, especially the “myth about the Russian Revolution.” These myths came to the fore during the ascending phase of the first cycle of “hopes and disappointments.”

During the descending phase, the center stage was occupied by the conservative-pessimist Russophobic myths that played an important part in maintaining the image of the demonic Russian “Other,” although the liberal-universalists have also contributed to its official component. These myths formed the repertoire of meanings of the conservative-pessimist discourse that became dominant as the disappointment with the outcomes of the First Russian Revolution kept rising. They emphasized the perpetual gap between “the Immutable Rus” and the West that was due to insuperable cultural differences, the unalterable Russian national character that placed Russia in the Eastern/Asian camp, the aggressive and barbaric nature of Russian imperialism that threatened not only American interests, but also those of the entire civilized world.

The origins of all these myths and perception stereotypes, obviously, go back to earlier times that were described in the first part of this book. Yet, they acquired their final shape during the “war of images,” at the moment when the first American “crusade” for Russia’s renovation had reached its culmination, and during the first crisis in Russian-American relations. Under these conditions, when the plurality of images had disappeared, albeit temporarily, they encouraged the formation of a dichotomous, simplistic vision of the processes that were under way in Russia and at the same time became the product of such a perception angle. It was precisely at that time that the Russian “Other” first became integrated into the foreign policy ideology of the United States and was first used to justify the new foreign policy pri-

orities of the Washington administration and the new American worldview at both the official and the societal levels.

Part Three covers the period between the end of the 1905 Revolution and the beginning of the First World War and shows that the trend towards a dichotomous vision of Russia had not yet become dominant at that time. The ideological factor was still not exerting a permanent influence in the sphere of interstate relations, and the conflict component did not interfere with the mutual inclination towards cooperation and restoration of the “former friendship.” On the other hand, after the enthusiasm for “the Russian theme” that the American society experienced between 1903 and 1906, the interest towards all things Russian began to subside, and, consequently, political cartoons with Russia as the main subject have all but disappeared from the press.

During this period, the positioning of Russia’s image in the US was still being influenced by the factors that have been mentioned in the first part of this book. *Chapter One* (of Part Three) focuses on the discussions about the nature of Russian imperialist policy in the light of the US interests. *Chapter Two* revisits the theme of Russian political development, its logic, and dynamics in the context of the long-standing debates about the influence of the national character on the process of political modernization, and the national question in all its manifestations. *Chapter Three* demonstrates, how the ideas of the first American “crusade” for Russian freedom were updated in response to the visits of Russian liberals and radicals, the controversy around the extradition of Russian immigrant revolutionaries, the campaign for the abrogation of the 1832 US-Russia Treaty for Navigation and Commerce, the escalation of the Jewish question, as well as the religious enthusiasm of the American missionaries. *Chapter Four* analyses the influence of those who were promoting the exports of American goods, capitals, and technologies to Russia. The emergence of Russian Studies and the Americans’ ea-

gerness to understand the peculiarities of its development by entering the world of Russian culture and spirituality are discussed in *Chapter Five*.

The author argues that during this period preexisting American discourses with their characteristic repertoires of meanings and structures of oppositions were clearly framing the perception space, in spite of the fact that the first crisis in Russian-American relations had already passed, the influence of the ideological factor was weaker, and a dichotomous vision of Russian events was being rejected.

The well-developed communicative strategies and rhetorical devices were easily reproduced and used in the elaboration of verbal and visual messages to update distinct ideas about Russia and Russians that were already present in the American society. This pattern emerged in reaction to the “Morgan Shuster case” in Persia, to the controversy around the extradition of Russian revolutionaries who fled to the US to the Tsarist government, to the campaign for the abrogation of the 1832 Treaty, and to the latest famine in Russia.

The Russian “Other” kept performing its role in the interplay of meanings that were significant for the American “Self”. It had secured its place as the essential component in the societal discourse, but had not yet become a constant in the US foreign policy rhetoric. Washington was not yet ready to strain its relations with Russia by making the Russian vector of its foreign policy conditional on the implementation of a reform program in the Russian Empire. Nonetheless, the American politicians had proved to have certain sensitivity to the demands of making Russia an object of the US world-reforming mission.

The imagological analysis of the bilateral relations conducted by the author for the period between the end of the 1905 Revolution and the beginning of the First World War clearly demonstrates that, in spite of the demand for myths and perception stereotypes of a dichotomous vision and of the deep-

ly rooted desire to build Russia’s future according to an existing scheme, the American society recognized the need for an image of a many-faced Russia and for drawing attention to the dynamic nature of the changes that were under way in this country and to the factors that made Russians similar to other people but at the same time brought out their idiosyncrasies.

The latter approach was championed by the Russophiles who paid special attention to the world of Russian literature, music, art, religion, and philosophy, the American pioneers of Russian Studies who strove to show that the development of the Russian Empire could be studied in the context of worldwide political processes, and, finally, the American advocates of mutually beneficial trade relations and economic cooperation. These developments did not eliminate the problem of stereotypical ideas about Russia, which existed in a space that was already rather rigidly structured by the existing repertoire of images and mythologems, set by distinct discourse, but they did place on the agenda of the American society the need for careful studies and multifaceted knowledge about Russia and Russians.

After the end of the first crisis, the voices of those who worried about misrepresentations of Russia grew louder within the American society. They were preoccupied by simplistic and stereotypical ideas of their compatriots, to whom English and American stories about Russia seemed more Russian than the Russian stories themselves. These Americans did not ignore the negative characteristics of Russia’s political development, yet also demonstrated that the vexing issues of Russian reality were not as unambiguous as they seemed from the United States. They drew parallels between Russian and American experience in order to prove that the Russians deserved not only blame but also praise in many senses and that the ideas about them were twisted through a very skillful concealment of the complete spectrum of facts.

This emergent trend became stronger during the First World War — the time when

the two countries not only grew closer, but also, for the first time in the history of their bilateral relations, became aware of the need to expand the flow of reliable information about each other and to reformat their mutual perceptions. Later, special organizations dedicated to these purposes were created in both countries.

In the conclusion to Part Three, the author goes beyond the chronological limits and discusses the period of the First World War in order to illustrate the importance that the context of Russian-American relations (in this case of military, political, economic, and humanitarian collaboration) had for the formation of mutual representations. At that time, the propensity to search for similarities and to get to know the other country and its people grew stronger. Since the role of the demonic "Other" was temporarily transferred to Germany, the image of Russia that got activated was the "romantic" vision of the country that was ripe for spiritual rebirth and ready to engage in reforms and to join the universal process of modernization, following the lead of the United States. Even the Russophiles became involved in the task of "westernizing Russia," and the entire American society gradually got drawn into a new "cycle of hopes" related to the current stage of Russia's modernization, only to suffer once more a very bitter and long-lasting disappointment with its outcomes.

The *Epilogue* summarizes the author's main ideas and puts the American myths and perception stereotypes about Russia into a historical perspective by drawing parallels between the turns of the 20th and the 21st centuries.

The author is aware that the conflicts among different American representations of Russia that she describes in her book took place in a space that was significantly more flexible than the Cold War environment with its clearly marked and all-embracing ideas about the Soviet Union. And if we compare the two turns of the century that represented periods of transition in Russian-American relations, we find qualitative differences in

the preceding experiences (that of friendship in the 19th century versus a confrontational one in the 20th), in the depth of misperceptions that were solidified by the "enemy studies" during the Cold War years, in the degree of integration of the correspondingly Russian or American "Other" into the national foreign policy, and, finally, the overall characteristics of international reality.

Nevertheless, the author thinks it possible to draw parallels between these two century turns in order to detect the stable long-term perception trends that emerged during the period covered in this book. These trends originated from the discourses that were set by the text about Russia due to the heightened attention to the "Russian question," the correlation of the latter with the current agenda of the American society, and to the new discovery of Russia, which often turned into its concealment.

First of all, since ideas about Russia and Russians were an American cultural construct, they tended toward a simplified, dichotomous vision of processes that were under way in (Tsarist, Soviet, or post-Soviet) Russia, toward predictions of its already known future and a readiness to rapidly transition from enthusiasm about changes in Russia to disappointment about the outcomes of its latest modernization stage. Americans "invented" its romantic and demonic "mental images" on the basis of their ideology of progress and expansion, their own vision of ideal political and social arrangements, true revolution, the place of the US in the world, and its role in the process of its democratization and harmonization.

Throughout the entire 20th century, as the American society witnessed the events in the Russian Empire, USSR, or the post-Soviet Russia, it repeatedly oscillated between universalistic euphoria and the myth of the "Immutable Rus," enthusiasm about rapid westernization of Russia and pessimism on the account of its "orientalism," and between the faith in the readiness of Russian civil society to break the grip of the rulers and in the liberals' capacity to lead the con-

structive process of modernization on the one hand, and deliberations about the immutability of the Russian national character on the other. Naturally, the liberal-universalist myths came to the fore during the ascending phase of these “cycles of hopes and disappointments,” while the conservative-pessimist myths dominated during the descending one.

Second, the eagerness to remake Russia in the image and likeness of the United States had reached its peak during the First Russian Revolution. As David Foglesong persuasively argues in his last book, the first American “crusade” for the democratization of Russia provided the blueprint for the subsequent campaigns: for the liberalization of the Russian Empire in 1917, of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, and of post-Soviet Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Moreover, David Foglesong emphasizes that “the crusade for Russia’s renewal” also went on between these episodes of heightened activity, and this never-ending quest strengthened the Americans’ faith in the special destiny of their country to be the torchbearer of freedom and democracy for all the people of the world.

During the period covered in this book and the subsequent ones, these messianic feelings had four dimensions that originated from the socio-cultural characteristics of the American society itself and also from the agenda of its own development. The first dimension was a political one and consisted in the opposition to the Russian political regime and in the sense of responsibility for the process of its formation in the context of the US global democratization mission; thus, the Americans appeared in the role of “political mentors.” The second one arose from the attractive prospects of economic expansion, exports of goods, capital, and technologies into Russian markets, and participation in the modernization of Russian economy; Russia was supposed to learn “the lessons of American capitalism.” Religion provided the third dimension: the goal of replacing

the Orthodox faith with a rational one and the projection of the Manichean worldview on the positioning of the Russian image allowed the Americans to present themselves as “the bearers of true faith.” Finally, the humanitarian dimension turned a famished and poverty-stricken Russia into the object of aid from the rich and prosperous America and the Americans — into “international philanthropists.”

On the one hand, Americans experienced a feeling of discomfort, because it was impossible to denounce the evil in other countries, while the American society itself could easily become the object of a fierce critique and was in need of serious renewal (the metaphor of the “glass house”). On the other hand, the American reformism was clearly acquiring an international dimension. As a result, at the end of the 19th century, the fight for freedom far beyond the US borders was already seen as an important tool for preserving democracy within the country and as a peculiar mechanism for overcoming the national identity crisis. These developments gave rise to two important issues that still remain relevant in our days: the right of humanitarian intervention and the expediency of imposing American ideals regardless of the wishes of those to whom the Americans wanted to bring “the blessings of freedom.”

Third, the Russian “Other” was used as the essential element of identity construction not only at the societal, but also at the official level. The US policymakers strove to integrate it into the foreign policy ideology in order to justify the new foreign policy priorities and the new American worldview, as well as to employ it in the domestic political game. And although this factor only turned into a permanent one at a later stage, it first became fully evident during the short period of the first bilateral relations crisis.

Fourth, the author considers the American inclination to see Russian foreign policy as a continuation of its domestic politics to be a typical example of the outward projection of the essential component of American self-representation. This self-represen-

tation is based on a firm belief that America's actions on the world stage can be directly deduced from the democratic character of its political system.

Fifth, those Americans that aspired to the liberalization of the Russian Empire and hoped for its speedy modernization tended to exaggerate both the scale of the changes that took place in Russia and the degree of American influence. It must be noted, that Russian liberals and radicals did much to perpetuate this trend, as they kept coming to the United States for moral and material support and appealing to the Americans' messianic feelings and their faith in liberal universalism. At the turn of the 20th century, they and the American "friends of Russian freedom" created a very particular image of the Russian revolutionary. It was for this reason that George Kennan, William Foulke, and Edmund Noble saw Leon Trotsky and Vladimir Lenin as impostors who had usurped the fruits of the battle fought by Liberals such as Pavel Mil-iukov and "moderate Socialists" — Sergei Stepaniuk-Kravchinsky, Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Nikolai Chaikovsky, Aleksei Alad'in, etc. In this sense, Americans got caught in their own "imagological trap."

Sixth, the Russian revolutionary "Other" had turned into the essential element in the identity construction of the American Left, especially of its Communist wing. This transformation occurred within the framework of the radical discourse that had acquired its final shape during the First Russian Revolution thanks to the efforts of the American "gentlemen-Socialists" and other representatives of Leftist ideologies, especially the Russian-Jewish emigrants of radical views. In this context, Russia was allowed to appear as America's mentor, but only in relation to its social message to humanity and the universal importance of its social revolution.

Seventh, Americans tended to "personify" the processes that were under way in the Russian Empire and to attribute all negative and positive changes to the actions of the Tsar and his prime ministers. Thus Nicholas II, as he appeared to the Americans during the

first crisis in bilateral relations, became the first in the long series of Russia's two-faced leaders that were often given the attributes of Oriental-type rulers. This representation became a favorite subject of the 20th century political cartoonists, who kept drawing on the same set of devices and precedent images (such as Ivan the Terrible) in order to highlight the duplicity and cruelty of any Russian ruler, be it Nicholas II, Joseph Stalin, or Vladimir Putin.

The author pays special attention to the issue of how the repertoires of meanings from different discourses set by the text about Russia made their way into the 20th century American historiography and the works of specialists on Russian/Slavic Studies and Sovietologists and who continued the long-winded debate on whether Russia was an "ordinary" or an "exceptional" country, whether it did not belong to Europe or formed part of a different Europe, and whether the Russian national character could change or was an unchangeable entity.

The Epilogue has two parts — "One-dimensional Russia: the Russian Other" and "Many-faced Russia: a right to identity" — and this structure is meant to highlight one of the main ideas that appear throughout the book: that Americans' attitude toward Russia was a function of their attitude towards themselves. Thus, it is no accident that the challenge issued by Melville Stone during his audience with Nicholas II remains germane in our days: Americans cannot become the advocates of Russian political course, but they can tell the truth about it in a friendly tone and describe its different faces.

In order to meet this challenge, the United States should build relations with the real Russia, instead of an imaginary one, reject the temptation to fit Russia's future into previously constructed blueprints and to mythologize its development by emphasizing some of its components while marginalizing others. It is necessary to accept that there can be no single vector or process that fully describes the trajectory of a huge country that sometimes halts in its movement and

at other times moves in circles or even backwards, as it lives through a very complex transitional period of political, economic, and social renewal.

In the author's opinion, the "resetting" of the Russian image in the United States at the start of the 21st century becomes impossible without such awareness, and this in turn makes impossible the "resetting" of the bilateral relations in general, while the decon-

struction of American myths about Russia becomes highly problematic. In other words, without this awareness, the US cannot make the transition to the level of perception that Tzvetan Todorov called epistemological and that involves recognizing the Russian right to be different, to have its own identity discourse, rather than just playing the role of the "Other" in the construction of the American "Self".