

Elena Ponomareva

*Professor Dr. Habil of Comparative Politics Department of
Moscow State University of International Relations (MGIMO-University)*

Russia

THE NATION-STATE: TO BE, OR NOT TO BE...

*The question of the state
is now acquiring special significance
both in terms of theory and practical policy.*

V.I. Lenin

Political and territorial ideal of a national state is fading amid globalization. It is no longer the only agent having of monopoly on integrating of the interests of large social and economic entities and representing them on the international arena in the 21st century. Transnational actors are playing an increasingly greater role in global political process insisting that fundamental elementary inefficiency of the state demands reduction of its powers and limitation to its sovereignty. A growing number of researchers and politicians are trying to convince us that the national state with its attributes and social commitments is inadequate for the contemporary world.

Indeed significant changes in state prerogatives, both internal and external, cannot be denied. However one should not exaggerate problems linked with transformations of the global system and a revision of the state role in it. In spite

of the uncertainty and ambiguity of development paths of the modern world as a complex and hierarchical structure, one may argue that in the foreseeable future, states will retain the role of main actors in global affairs bearing responsibility for global security and development.

This naturally brings to the fore the search for optimal models of national state development.

These issues have both practical and theoretical political significance for Russia. Being “a sovereign and influential country” is the only way for Russia to preserve itself as an actor in global politics and provide the security and prosperity for its citizens. “But to do so we need both sustainable development and national and spiritual identify in order to remain a nation. To be and to remain Russia”¹. Therefore, both the present and the future of our country are to be understood not only in terms of the state as a political institution or an entity but also in terms of its essence and what determines its nature, i.e. stateness.

Present-day political science has accumulated rather rich knowledge in this regard. Nevertheless, debate on the subject chosen and thus researchers’ interest in it remain unabated.

“Nation-state”: evolution of the concept

N. Machiavelli was the first to liken political entities of various types of government, size, power, religious and cultural environment; he defined them as *lo stato*, i.e. statehoods which used to be an equivalent of the “political order” concept. Scientific discourse came to define the family of these political orders as “the state”. Transformations triggered by bourgeois revolutions accompanied by – development of civil society and capitalist economy, formation of new relations between the state and society and of new collective identities – created conditions

¹ The message of the Russian Federation President V.V. Putin to the Federal Assembly. 12 December 2012. <http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/17118/work> (cited 29 April 2013). Translation of: Poslanie Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federacii V.V.Putina Federalynomy Sobraniu.

for nation-states to emerge. “Since the French Revolution, as A. Smith put it, the nation-state has become the dominant and soon after that the only legitimate form of political organization and the main “engine” of collective identity”².

Modern Age brought about new standards of organization of each specific society: political authority came to be linked with a particular territory and its population through the principle of sovereignty. Ch. Tilly, in his turn, also dated the appearance of nation-states as early 19th century and singled out two conditions necessary for their existence. These are “the ability of the state to, limit and control resources (including cultural) within its own territory”³ and willingness of other states to acknowledge the right of that state to regulate the aforementioned spheres. In other words, a nation-state is to enjoy both stateness which has to do with internal development of a society, and statehood, which determines the place of this state in the global system.

Present-day nation-states are multifaceted. Yet conceptualization of this notion yields certain stable/consistent types and variants of nation-state development. Let us highlight the concepts of “size” and “political order”. The latter implies four models of rule, namely nation-state, state-nation, state-consociation and quasi-state.

Let us start with the *concept* of *size* based on parameters of a state’s scale (the size of the territory) and their functions in international systems. Using these criteria J. Colomer distinguished large structures or empires, medium-sized “sovereign states” in the normative meaning of political science and “small-sized nations”, i.e. structures of insignificant scale. According to J. Colomer, modern empires (America, China, Europe, Japan and Russia) are characterized by a very large territory and population, lack of established or permanent borders, combination of diverse groups and territorial units, and a set of multi-level and inter-crossing jurisdictions. The scientist attributed another five large countries - Indonesia, India, Brazil, Pakistan and Bangladesh - to the imperial type. Australia

² Smith A.D. *Nationalism and Modernism* (London, New York, 1998), 70.

³ Tilly Ch. States and Nationalism in Europe 1492–1992. *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23. No. 1. (1994), 132.

and Canada are comparable with empires by their size but have insufficient populations⁴.

The scientist believes that “sovereign states”, or states, are large or medium sized (in terms of both territory and population), have a permanent territory and formalized borders, sovereignty defined as the supreme authority’s monopoly on the territory and local population, and the monopoly on exclusive jurisdiction and homogenous order. Also, states can be of two types: nation states and multinational states. However, as Colomer argues, the latter retaining a heterogeneous ethnic, cultural and religious composition are dysfunctional. “Only empires can afford such luxury as multi-culture”⁵. “Small-sized” nations are political entities of a small size with a high degree of ethnic homogeneity and simple and soft forms of government.

In his opinion, current trends of global development lead to an increase in the numbers of small-sized democratic “independent and autonomous states” which replace medium-sized states and eventually make them disappear from the world political map. Thus, J. Colomer gives an intellectual explanation to the dismantlement of the nation-state convincing us that prosperity of peoples depends on such “vast democratic empires as the United States and the European Union.” Also, the scientist believes that “traditional empires of the Chinese type and other territories of a comparable size (he seems to mean Russia) could free “small-sized nations” too if they efficiently provided extensive public benefits and liberalized themselves.” The professor even claims that the project of “building a nation state” is dangerous for “democratic empires” because sovereign nations “may paradoxically jeopardize freedom and democracy as they could revive old conflicts or cause new relations of rivalry and animosity”⁶.

J. Colomer is by no means the first to have tried to link the state’s size with its statehood and stateness. L. Kohr published his size theory at the Puerto Rico

⁴ Colomer J.M. *Great Empires, Small Nations: The Uncertain Future of the Sovereign State*. XII (London, New York, 2007), pp. 3, 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 40.

University in 1957. According to him, solution to problems of political/geopolitical, socioeconomic and cultural identification depends on the *size* of the state. In his opinion, the only effective way to fight widely spread violence and crime is to form “a system of social entities so small that building-up and consolidating collective force is highly unlikely to ever become dangerous”. Kohr states that, “If we ever want to lower the crime rate in Chicago, we are not to educate its residents or invade the city with Salvation Army members. We need to eradicate communities of Chicago size”⁷ [5, p. 56].

Kohr proposed a new political map of Europe forecasting that Russia and the United States would remain big empires, which in their final battle would divide their influence over a “world state of united nations”. The scientist appeared to be right to an extent as regards Southeast Europe. “Medium-sized states like Spain, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland will produce small-sized nations, such as Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, Castilla, Galicia, Warsaw, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Ruthenia, Slavonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Transylvania, Moldova, Walachia, Bessarabia and so on,” he wrote⁸. As we know post-Yugoslavia disintegration brought about six new states, one of which, the Republic of Kosovo, has still not been recognized. Disintegration trends in the region remain in force. Two states have replaced former Czechoslovakia. Spain is still far from stable.

L. Kohr believed that his map mirrored “the natural and original landscape of Europe” and defined the great powers as “artificial structures, which appeared through conquests and therefore had to invest much effort to maintain their existence”⁹. The scientist presumed that “Europe’s return to its natural state” could solve the problems of border conflicts and minorities through acquiring or restoring sovereignty of “small-sized nations”. In fact the disintegration process has proved to have the opposite effect – conflicts and violations of minority rights

⁷ Kohr L. *The Breakdown of Nations*. (London, 1957), 56. Translation of: Rsspad gosudarstv.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 78–79.

have invariably accompanied contemporary international relations. In other words, this development model proves unsuitable not only for Europe but also for other regions of the world.

The obvious insufficiency of the size factor for analysis of statehood formation required a supplement: both L. Kohr and J. Colomer deemed natural the insertion of “small-sized nations” into imperial orbits. In fact, both researchers drew an umbrella scheme of the modern world. L. Kohr mostly foresaw that structure, while J. Colomer observed it by saying, “the present-day world is increasingly formed by overlapping with vast “imperial” spaces, with a growing number of self-governing small-sized communities”, and distinguished three fundamental networks of relations: “defense and security unions, trade and economic agreements, and language and communication zones”¹⁰.

Meanwhile, M. V. Ilyin, who largely refers to the J. Colomer concept, proposes to distinguish four main classes of states based on spatial parameters: mega, macro, mini and micro states. Mega states are large and multiple countries with relatively enhanced external dimensions of their sovereignty, the excessively emphasized status and the pronounced imperial syndrome. A key function of mega states is the organization of the international environment. This is the traditional role of the so-called great nations. In the researcher’s opinion, the United States, Russia, China and Japan hold strong positions in the list of mega states. The UK, Germany and France, as well as India and Brazil and, possibly South Africa, can be included in that class.

Macro states are rather large countries with relatively balanced external dimensions of their sovereignty and a sufficient stateness. They have sizable populations, territories and resources. A keynote function of macro states in global affairs is the determination of power lines between the poles of the international system created by mega states. These may include Argentina, Iraq, Iran, Mexico and Poland. Mini states are countries of an insignificant size, which, in the scientist’s opinion, have moderate external dimensions of their sovereignty and a

¹⁰ Colomer J.M. *Great Empires, Small Nations: The Uncertain Future of the Sovereign State*. XII. (London, New York, 2007), 31.

weakened status. Their population and territories are not large. They have a rather obvious complex of (political and economic) dependence although they can hold independent domestic or even foreign policies in certain fields. A major function of mini states is the contribution of diverse potentials to the power lines in global affairs. It is extremely difficult for mini states to diverge significantly from the power lines and take an independent position. The neutrality status may help them attain this goal to a degree, and mini states use this opportunity to one extent or another. However, this approach has its limits (the risk of being dubbed rogue states).

Micro states are marked by tiny sizes and population, significantly weakened external dimensions of their sovereignty and a low status. They have a very strong complex of dependence. A key role of micro states is purely instrumental and formal self-definition of territories which cannot be directly controlled by mega or macro states for various reasons. Main characteristics of this group of states includes de-monopolization of violent enforcement, acceptance of a foreign currency as the legal tender for domestic transactions, incorporation into external customs regimes, the reduction of armed forces up to their complete abandonment and the presence of foreign military contingents on their territories¹¹.

In spite of the criticism of the size theory, it must be noted that the territory/size of a nation and its capacity/incapacity of influencing global politics are essential factors of establishing a stable and self-sufficient statehood. So, the state typology based on the factors of size, recognition and involvement in the international system is of obvious scientific and practical interest in terms of projecting the future of the Russian state.

Amongst types of states based on the political order principles – *the political order concept* – we would like to highlight nation-state, state-nation, state-consociation, and quasi-state.

¹¹ Ilyin M.V. Is a universal typology of states possible? *Politics Science* (2008, 4), pp. 8–41. Translation of: *Vozmozhna li universal'naya tipologiya gosuderstv?*

In the broadest sense the nation-state represents a combination of a particular political form of national and territorial sovereignty and cultural (language and/or religious) homogeneity of a community, which was brought to existence by Modernity and became sort of its symbol. The specifics of this form are determined by social homogeneity requirements. Besides, nation-states are characterized with the adherence to one cultural and civilization tradition, assimilative cultural policy, the unitary state structure of the structure of a mono-nationality federation, as well as republican principles, usually with broad powers of the chief of state.

In building the state with the nation-state model in an environment comprising more than one ethnic group, the dominant nation regularly pursues a policy of assimilation of alien ethnic and religious segments. That may develop into mild discrimination. It could be, for instance, mandatory citizenship exams taken in the language of the titular nation or vertical socialization of representatives of only one particular nationality or religion, the so-called Ottoman practice. A hard form is not ruled out either; there may be religious or inter-ethnic wars leading to the expulsion of “strangers” from the new state or their complete assimilation. State building process that started in Croatia and Kosovo in the early 1990s serve as most illustrative examples of this “political order”.

The thesis of globalization bringing about significant transformations of the nation state’s nature depriving it of some functions and delegating them to the supranational level has been being actively promoted since the end of the previous century.

E. Hobsbaum said that the newest history “would be supra-national and infra-national to a considerable degree but even infra-nationality, whether camouflaged with mini-nationalism or not, will be a symbol of the decay of old nation-states as operational structures. As regards nation-states, nations or ethnic/language communities, history demonstrates, that first of all *they are moving to the background in the face of the new supra-national transformation of the world,*

resisting it, taken over by it or adapting to it"¹². So, verifying the ideas of nation-states transformation from mini and micro states to neo-imperial or supra-national entities suggested by many authors (L. Kohr, A.D. Smith, J. Colomer, Sh. Eisenstadt) testifies to a certain scientific and practical trend aimed at serious transformation of the nation-state to its complete disappearance.

However, the trend towards supra-national statehood does not mean that nations and nation states will fall into oblivion. What is more, negative consequences of globalization result in the growth of national self-awareness and the search for optimal conditions to preserve and develop nations and peoples. The state alternative to the liberal project of globalization invariably rests upon nation and nationalism in their positive historical sense.

Cultural and ethno-religious diversity of most states has raised interest of politicians and the academic community in another model, state-nation. J. Linz and A. Stepan were one of the first to pay attention to a rather dangerous trend, in which every state seeks to become a nation-state and every nation seeks to be a state. Assuming that "the nation is not necessarily equal to the people of the state", the researchers suggested forming statehood with "non-majority and non-plebiscite formulas", i.e. modern societies using the state-nation model rather than the model of nation-state.

The main distinctive features of a state-nation as a poly-cultural and multinational entity are, primarily, that the population consists of more than one cultural and civilization traditions, which, however, does not weaken "strong identification and loyalty of the citizens"¹³ to the common state, as in the nation-state. Secondly, more than one cultural identity is recognized and maintained. Finally, this model goes along with a federal system of government frequently asymmetric.

¹² Hobsbawm E. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (in Russian): http://aleksandr-kommari.narod.ru/hobsbaum_nacii.html (cited 30 April 2013).

¹³ Linz J., Stepan A. Statehood, nationalism and democracy. *Polis* (1997, 5), pp. 25–26. Translation of: Gosudarstvennosty, nazionalizm i demokratiya.

In spite of its advantages, the state-nation model is not without flaws. Its critics argue that several segments existing within one political framework may have most negative consequences for either the territorial integrity of the state or its democratic nature (if there is any) or both. “Besides, the state-nation by its nature seeks to cultural and language homogeneity, without even giving this goal a radical or metaphysical meaning”¹⁴.

The implementation of the state-nation model is complicated not as much by language and cultural differences (which some countries lack, for instance, their people speak similar languages: Croatian, Serbian or Bosnian; or the differences are insignificant, as they share a common past) as by a historical memory of symbolic landmark events and identity through opposition to the hostile environment. Identity as a way of personal or group self-determination and a source of a group affinity is directly linked with political culture, primarily, the loyal beliefs of “us or them” and the aggressive ones “friend or foe”. Referring to an external group of a particular identity creates a syndrome of external threat to one’s identity and, therefore, a desire to find a sponsor and a protector. This syndrome is strengthened by neighboring countries, which may present an real irredentist threat or exploit it. This applies to Serbia and Croatia as against Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece as against the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia; and Kosovo as against Albania.

As I. Wallerstein has rightly put it, “the existence of nations is a myth in that all nations are social entities and the main role in the creation belongs to states... The nation state concept should be viewed as an asymptote towards which all states are tending. Certain states claim to be ‘multinational’ and need no united nation; but even they seek to create a certain identity to unite the whole country”¹⁵. In other words, new states opt for national identity whenever they face a dilemma of civil and national identities.

¹⁴ Kende P. Quelle Alternative a l'Etat-Nation? *Esprit* (1991, 10), 24.

¹⁵ Wallerstein I. *World-system analysis*. Durham (North Carolina, 2004), pp. 139–140. Translation of: Mirosystemnyj analiz.

In this regard, the model of consociation state proposed by A. Lijphart and developed by G. Lembruch, D. Horowitz, B. Reilly and G. Haile arouses special interest in terms of state building process in poly-cultural and multinational communities. The main idea of consociation is to create a government model taking into account interests of all segments of society. In political practice this implies an ability of segments shaped by religious, ideological, cultural or racial distinctions and disagreements between social groups and social segments to have an equal influence on the decision-making. Simply speaking, political order based on consensus and maximum involvement of all minorities in government seems to be optimal for societies which are still working on their unified cultural code and identity. The model of consociation states is particularly relevant to post-conflict settlement and institutional building in multi-ethnic societies.

Main characteristics of a consociation include: 1) power exercised by a large coalition involving every significant group of the plural society; 2) proportionality as the key principle of political representation; 3) the mutual right to veto in making socially significant decisions as a guarantee of minority interests; 4) a high degree of autonomy of social groups in their problems settlement. Decisions concerning the entire community are made by big coalition, while group problems may be resolved autonomously.

The success of the consociation model depends not only on meeting these conditions but also on a clear division (ideological, ethnic, religious and spatial) of the segments, balance of power external threats and a smaller size of the country. These conditions create a favorable environment and facilitate the principle of proportional representation, a coalition and autonomous policy.

However, consociation can only be sustainable if the society has no more than four segments.

It should be noted that the aforementioned conditions of consociation are not always and only favourable for state building. For instance, a clear division between segments and their autonomy may easily degenerate into domestic (inter-ethnic) conflicts and lead to secessionist movement, while veto rights of minorities may drive political process into an impasse and instigate a political crisis. For

instance, the union of Serbia and Montenegro, which had had every parameter of true consociation, ended with a split. This leads to the following conclusion about this model: consociation cannot be successful unless its segments wish to preserve the single state and view strengthening common statehood as their only opportunity to meet their interests through the.

Another model of political order, actively promoted by external forces in various parts of the world amid globalization, is the model of quasi-states. R. Jackson and C. Rosberg were the first to introduce the scientific term of “quasi-state” in 1982 following their study of decolonization processes in Africa¹⁶. The core of the group was made up of the new African states, which acquired a formal statehood, i.e. were included in the world system through their full recognition. However, they did not possess the necessary degree of independence due to their inability to ensure sufficient performance of government institutions without external assistance. Whenever weakening quasi-state’s stateness reaches the limit of sustainable performance of government institutions and it is no longer possible to maintain minimal order on its territory, the state is usually defined as a failed state.

The quasi-state model is characterized by a simulation of features and functions inherent in a nation-state. Imitating external characteristics of government institutions without reproducing their essence and, most importantly, without understanding the logic of creating these institutions has negative effects. Institutions of the newly born state are, on the one hand, incapable of adequately performing the functions of foreign institutions they are imitating and, on the other, are poorly connected to the autochthonic roots to transform and adjust to the new environment¹⁷.

¹⁶ Jackson R.H., Rosberg C.G. Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood. *World Politics*. Vol. 35 (1982, 1), p. 1–24.

¹⁷ Jackson R.H. Quasi-States, Dual Regimes and Neoclassical Theory. *International Organization*. Vol. 41 (1987, 4), p. 519–549.

It must be stressed once again that foreign actors, such as states, supra-national and trans-national structures, play a dominant role in constructing the quasi-state model. Z. Bauman wrote, “Weak states are precisely what the new world order, too often appearing to be a new world disorder, needs to maintain and reproduce itself. Weak quasi-states can be easily reduced to the (useful) role of a local police station¹⁸. Quasi-statehood can be regarded as a “phantom” or a “ghost” phenomenon occurring in phantom state models (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and ghost state models (Kosovo)¹⁹. The statehood and stateness of these states depend primarily on the global context, i.e. the role played by external supra-national structures (the EU, NATO and transnational corporations) and/or illegal (criminal and terrorist) forces. The most important factor of appearance and existence of a quasi state is its being in demand by leading world political actors. Transnational structures can use such states to easily govern political space and exercise indirect influence on entire regions.

So, there is a variety of “political order” – nation state models. But if we see Russia’s future in a state-nation, we must remember its four main characteristics first described by J. R. Strayer:

- Firstly, clear-cut spatial and temporal borders;
- Secondly, de-personified and relatively stable political institutions independent from the a particular bearer of authority;
- Thirdly, a high degree of legitimacy of institutions in that most residents accepts the need for a supreme authority;
- Fourthly, a high degree of loyalty of the majority of the population to the authorities²⁰.

¹⁸ Bauman Z. *Globalization: Human Consequences* (Cambridge, 2000), 68.

¹⁹ Ponomareva E.G. A phantom state. Kosovo in the world system. *Politicheskij klass* (2009, 1), p. 30–47. Translation of: Gosudarstvo – prizrak. Kosovo v mirovoy sisteme; Ponomareva E.G. Bosnia and Herzegovina: a phantom state. *Svobodnaya mysl* (2009, 1), p. 69–84. Translation of: Bosniya i Gertsegovina: gosudarstvo-fantom.

²⁰ Strayer J.R. *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1970), 5.

Meeting these characteristics makes it possible to confirm the success of a national state – a state-nation.

Statehood as a special characteristic of a state

The notion of statehood is both one of the most important and disputed in contemporary political science. A growing number of researchers prefer to define statehood as “a special characteristic” of a state although most frequently this is a synonym of the word state and a definition of a particular stage in the development of a country at a particular period of history (Russian statehood, post-Soviet statehood).

M.V. Ilyin was one of the first domestic political scientists to pay attention to this “phenomenon”. Developing the ideas of J. Nettl²¹ he suggested viewing statehood as a conceptual category incorporating the notions of *a status*, i.e. “belonging to the community of nation-states” and stateness, i.e. “conforming to the nature of a nation-state”²².

While stateness characterizes internal development of the society, which may result in a state, the statehood helps define the place of the state depending on its size and international functions in the global system. Therefore, distinguishing two elements – statehood and stateness – allows not only finding out reasons for the statehood genesis but also projecting development results with a maximal precision. An outstanding modern student of state, Ch. Tilly, defined stateness as “the degree to which government instruments are differentiated, centralized, autonomous and formally coordinated with each other”²³. In other words, stateness mirrors the ability and potency of the society to organize a political framework of its existence, i.e. to create a state.

²¹ Nettl J.P. The State as a Conceptual Variable. *World Politics*. Vol. 20. (1968, 4), pp. 559–592.

²² Ilyin M.V. *Alternative forms of sovereign statehood*: <http://www.mgimo.ru/study/faculty/politics/ksp/docs/34538/document34545.phtml> (cited 19 April 2013). Translation of: *Alyternativnyie formy suverennoy gosudarstvennosti*.

²³ *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Tilly Ch., editor (Princeton, 1975), 32.

Judging by the world practice and the knowledge amassed by political science, I dare say that stateness is a result of historical, economic, political and foreign-policy activities of a society to create a rigid political framework providing territorial, institutional and functional unity, that is, its own nation-state and a national political system. However, the forms of stateness development and its results – whether a state-nation can obtain a certain status in global relations and play a certain role in the international system – depend on the historically determined combination of internal and external factors. So, the problem of factors influencing stateness building becomes vital for analysis of this conceptual category.

Factors as analytical units should signify material and non-material structures, institutions and processes determining the formation of stateness. It is obviously impossible to take into account the entire set of factors influencing stateness - from structures, institutions and processes to norms, perceptions or aspirations. So, it would be expedient to select the most significant factors without which it is impossible to understand the notion of “statehood”.

In my opinion, domestic factors of statehood include the size, demographic and ethnic-religious, socioeconomic, political and socio-cultural structures of a particular society. Major external factors are indicators of the level of economic, military and political dependence/independence on other countries, supranational structures and global problems of the present day. The correlation of these factors indicates ability/inability of a state to establish itself and take a certain place in the world system. The combination of these factors reveals certain mechanisms of statehood and stateness development in each particular case. This formula makes it possible to evaluate the present and predict the future of the Russian statehood²⁴.

Concepts of nation-state decay

²⁴ Ponomareva E.G. Internal and external factors of the development of Russian statehood. *Rossijskaya gosudarstvennost: istoricheskie tradicii i vyzovy XXI veka* (Moscow, Nauchnyj expert, 2013), pp. 132–147. Translation of: Vnutrennie i vneshnie facory razvitiya rossijskoj gosudarstvennosti.

Globalization not only leads to socioeconomic and political changes of the world but also transforms the internal essence of the state by depriving it of functions to organize and govern physical and political space. According to Ph. Bobbitt, the nation-state is being replaced with the *market-state*. “The government assumed responsibility for the well-being of groups in the epoch of nation-states. Yet in the market-state the government is responsible for the maximal enlargement of opportunities accessible for an individual. It reduces transaction costs of the choice made by an individual and limits, rather than reinforces the government”²⁵. In his opinion, the main task of the market-state is to maintain the operation of the global market. Ph. Bobbitt directly links the appearance of the market-state with globalization and speaks about “a global community of market-states.”

The concept of Ph. Bobbitt correlates with the ideas of K. Ohmae about the region-state and the region-economy. The region-economy, which in the political sense constructs the region-state, is driven exclusively by market factors and is closely interrelated with globalization. Ohmae regards region-economy as “a natural business unit of the global information economy”²⁶. It does not matter whether the region-economy operates within a particular state (Hong Kong – South China, Catalonia and so on) or it is an intertwined combination of regions of two or more nation-states (Northern Italy – Baden- Wurttemberg, Pinang –Medan – Phuket, Singapore – Johore – the Riau Island), but its sizes and scale must be sufficient to be a business unit of the global economy.

Ph. Bobbitt and K. Ohmae welcome the replacement of the nation state with a new type of government and clearly idealize it. For instance, Ph. Bobbitt writes about a class-free nature of the market-state, which is obviously in disagreement with the reality of the neo-liberal globalization and the surge in social polarization and various forms of confrontations. Ohmae stresses that the region-states are islands (a network) of prosperity in the world around them but does not ask the

²⁵ Bobbitt Ph. *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*. XXXVI. (London, 2002), 230.

²⁶ Ohmae K. *The End of Nation-State: the Rise of Regional Economies* (London, 1995), 149.

question what price the world pays for their prosperity. Modern empirics shows that “the possibility to reduce transaction costs” is enjoyed only by the strongest global players, while weak regions and social groups are actually kept off the “public pie” and processes and channels of the flow of resources the states used to control.

In this regard Z. Bauman and some other researchers stress that globalization forces most countries to stop implementing the functions, once deemed *raison d'être* (the essence) of the existence of the nation state because they are unable to do so. First of all, this applies to the equilibrium of production and consumption. As a result, the state turns into an economic handicap, with any attempt to find a cure punished by the global market. On the country, the states, which “provide the opportunities”, as Bobbitt says, but cannot enforce, are encouraged. The result is the formation of a particular type of the market-state, whose reverse side is in its repressive nature, suppression of lower and middle strata for the sake of global markets. In other words, the government is a strip teaser “in the globalization cabaret” and the only garment it has on in the end is the bare necessity, its repressive might²⁷. Ph. Bobbitt and K. Ohmae in fact describe the same phenomenon, the type of political order replacing the nation state.

In turn, A. I. Fursov, a fierce opponent of neo-liberal globalization, pays attention to *intensifying corporation-states*, that are replacing nation-states. In his opinion, the nation-state amid globalization in fact begins to turn, or, to be more exact, is being turned into another type of state, a corporation-state representing the interests of the young fraction of the world capitalist class, corporatocracy²⁸. The corporation-state is a form of global market government, a special type of relations between people that has a purely economic nature and aims to minimize costs of maintenance of a nation-state.

²⁷ Bauman Z. *Globalization: Human Consequences* (Cambridge, 2000), 66.

²⁸ Fursov A.I. Corporation-state. *Expert-Ukraine* (2006, 7), pp. 52–57. Translation of: Gosudarstvo, ono zhe korporatsiya.

The corporation-state is a totally new administrative and economic entity of the modern world. Its structures make political and economic interests of the country dependent on the economic and administrative (corporate) interests or view the former through the prism of the latter; they privatize power functions characteristic of the state as a national institution (primarily, enforcement and violence), abandon general commitments and functions of the state or reduce them drastically. The essence of the corporate-state is in a clan rather than an individual, unlike in the nation-state. Clans and corporation-states and the structures they form are, the scientist claims, the main aspirants for the role of the nation-state in the world politics and global governance.

Summary

It must be noted in conclusion that despite the pessimistic picture, most Russian researchers are far from thinking that the nation-state is a relic. The world crisis has demonstrated the need for the state, that would bear all costs of the most important financial and industrial groups. Russia was no exception. Under these circumstances the answer to the question “whether the nation-state has a future” is obvious: it does. What is more, preserving Russia as something integral and as a civilization is possible only within the political framework of a nation-state the concept of which must include the theories relevant to Russian realities.

There are a lot of projects of the successful future of Russia. But they cannot come true unless there is a strong political will. In other words, it is the state relying on the works of Russian scientists that should be the main engine of the development of Russian stateness.

ALMANACH VIA EVRASIA, 2014, 3



***THE EURASIAN GEOPOLITICAL VECTOR
IN THE POST-COLD WAR GLOBALIZATION***

www.viaevrasia.com

ISSN (online) 1314-6645